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Founded in 1980 as *JRMMRA (The Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association)*, the journal is published once a year. In 1998 the Association voted to change the journal’s name to *Quidditas*, but retained the former title, *JRMMRA*, as a subtitle for that year of transition. The present volume for 2001 is thus the third volume published under the title *Quidditas*.

Scholars of the Middle Ages or Renaissance are cordially invited to submit essays (twenty to thirty double-spaced manuscript pages) that would appeal to readers of medieval and early modern disciplines. As always, submissions will be refereed.

Manuscripts dealing with medieval or Renaissance studies, regardless of field or nationality, should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style* and be submitted without the author’s name appearing therein. A cover letter containing the author’s name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and title of paper should accompany the submission. Please send four copies of the manuscript to:

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FROM THE EDITOR

The title of the journal has been changed from JRMMRA in order to reflect the national and international contributions included in each volume. Rather than remain a “regional” publication, with readers and articles drawn primarily from the Rocky Mountain states, the journal (as well as the Association itself) has expanded its focus and now seeks to publicize that change through this inaugural volume of Quidditas.

Quidditas. This is a Latin legal term that originally meant “the essential nature of a thing” and appeared in fourteenth-century French as “quiddité.” In the Renaissance, the English adaptation, “quiddity,” came to mean “logical subtleties” or “a captious nicety in argument” (OED) and is so used in Hamlet (“Why may not that be the skull of a lawyer? Where be his quiddities now, his quillets, his cases, his tenures, and his tricks?” 5.1.95–97). Thus, the original Latin meaning, together with the later implied notions of intense scrutiny, systematic reasoning, and witty wordplay, is well suited to the contents of the journal.

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ARTICLES
“True” History and Political Theory: The Problematic Orthodoxy of The Troublesome Raigne of King John

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The anonymous Troublesome Raigne of King John was performed by the Queen’s Men probably during the height of the Armada crisis; it appeared in print in 1591. The play’s few critics unanimously conclude that it is essentially a work of propaganda, a monument to Tudor orthodoxy and its principal buttress, obedience doctrine. Scott McMillin and Sally-Beth MacLean, recent historians of the Queen’s Men, add to the critical consensus their belief that Troublesome Raigne, like other Queen’s

1See, for example, Virginia Mason Carr in The Drama As Propaganda: A Study of The Troublesome Raigne of King John (Salzburg: Institut für Englische Sprache und Literatur Universität Salzburg, 1974) who writes that the play: (1) upholds “the doctrine of non-resistance throughout, that under no circumstances is it right to rebel against the king” (164); (2) is “intensely nationalistic,” even jingoistic (166); and, (3) is “not at all lacking when it comes to promoting the most important Tudor doctrines” (171), that is, obedience, conservatism, and nationalism. Carr situates Troublesome Raigne among other contemporary didactic histories, including Gorboduc (1562) and Bale’s King Johan (1538, rev. 1547, 1560). For Carr, the unifying principle of the drama is its “Protestant spirit” (118), and, although Carr admits that John “simply does not measure up to the Tudor ideals of kingship, and [that] his death is in many ways the best solution to England’s dilemma” (170), she reminds readers that “the Elizabethans had made John into a type of Henry VIII” whose vigorous resistance to the Pope transformed him into “a Protestant Martyr-hero” (105).

J. W. Sider, in the introduction to his edition of the play (Troublesome raigne of John, King of England [New York: Garland, 1979]), remarks on the rehabilitation of John’s medieval reputation in Troublesome Raigne and its indebtedness to John Foxe’s characterization of the king in Acts and Monuments (1563) and in Richard Grafton’s Chronicle at Large (1568, 1569). Sider also sees the play as explicitly didactic and propagandistic. “The play has two obvious historical functions: King John’s career exemplifies the course that Elizabethans should pursue in 1591; his death and unfinished work become a cause for the spectators” (lix). Sider considers the play “one of many propaganda pieces written in those especially anxious years just before and after the Armada. Like many of them it comments on current events by making clear and obvious historical analogues; but it also invites the Elizabethan audience to help resolve the conflict in which King John was martyred” (lxi), i.e. the unfinished work of reforming the church.

Douglas C. Wixson remarks that in the Troublesome Raigne “political propaganda appears on the stage, a moralization of history in which John is again a Christian hero fighting against the papal threat to England”. “Calm Words Folded Up in Smoke”: Propaganda and Spectator Response in Shakespeare’s King John,” Shakespeare Studies 14 (1981): 113. Wixson suggests that the broad comedy in the Bastard’s exchanges with the Friar (1.2) clumsily but effectively underscores the play’s anti-clerical, anti-Catholic bias.
Men’s plays, attempts to convey “true” history, i.e., history consistent with official Tudor political and religious policy.\textsuperscript{2} The formation of the company and the composition of its repertoire, they argue, represented an effort, orchestrated by the earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham, to bring the theater “back into the service of a Protestant ideology which could also be identified with the ‘truth’ of Tudor history” (33). The company’s principal target was Christopher Marlowe, whose anti- or un-Christian portraits, particularly of Faustus and Tamburlaine, threatened the company’s own efforts to effect the proper use of Protestant history and the moral benefits of orthodox Protestant theater.

The critical tendency to regard \textit{Troublesome Raigne} as mere propaganda takes “Tudor orthodoxy” for granted and presumes that the play’s ideological position and its historiography of King John’s reign are likewise stable or undiluted, but this is not so. The play’s propagandizing, while certainly genuine, exists alongside an interrogation of the nature of authority; consequently, the play participates in and extends discussions of the nature of political power and the relationship between governor and governed generated by Reformation politics and articulated in contemporary political theory. This essay challenges modern criticism of \textit{Troublesome Raigne} by directing attention to two neglected aspects of the play: the first deals with interrelated structural and historiographical tensions which, I argue, interfere with its usefulness as Tudor propaganda; the second explores the play’s hitherto overlooked organizational unity. \textit{Troublesome Raigne} is, in fact, built around four thematically linked episodes in which key characters dispute inheritance rights or challenge legitimate authority and risk riot, war, and civil unrest to pursue extralegal or illegitimate claims. Through these episodes, \textit{Troublesome Raigne} enacts ways both orthodox Tudor obedience doctrine and its nemesis, resistance theory, might be (and often were) manipulated to justify competing political, territorial, and sovereign claims. \textit{Troublesome Raigne}, as a consequence and perhaps unintentionally, registers the culture’s growing tolerance of challenges to traditional arbitral processes and willingness to locate arguments that justified alternative, non-traditional claims of authority.

Structurally, \textit{Troublesome Raigne} occupies a transitional space between early Tudor chronicle play, which relied for its shape on the morality tradition, and the history play, best exemplified in Shakespeare’s two tetralogies. David Bevington’s analysis of Christopher Marlowe’s contemporaneous \textit{Edward II} (1592) provides a useful point of departure for discussion of \textit{Troublesome Raigne} because the structural tensions he identifies embedded in the transitional morality/chronicle helps to disclose the

\textsuperscript{2}The Queen’s Men’s “true” plays also included \textit{The True Tragedy of Richard III} and \textit{The True Chronicle History of King Lear}. Scott McMillin and Sally-Beth MacLean, \textit{The Queen’s Men and Their Plays} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 32–33.
fissures in the play’s supposed orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{3} The traditional morality structure within which Marlowe (and \textit{Troublesome Raigne}’s author) labored demanded separation of “the godly and the profane,” “the reward [of] each according to his merit,” and the punishment of vice. In order to make King Edward an English Everyman, Marlowe needed to pit a “meek but worthy king” against “his depraved persecutor[s],” a structural demand difficult to reconcile with the “factual material,” covering twenty-three years of Edward’s life, found in Marlowe’s key source, Holinshed’s \textit{Chronicles}. Unsatisfied with the morality structure’s “plain interpretation of right and wrong,” Marlowe instead solves his structural problem by providing complex motivations that account for the changes his characters undergo. As a result, “his characters occupy two spheres, human complexity and moral abstraction. The complexity appears chiefly in the exposition…whereas moral causality leading to a restoration of order,” another demand of the morality tradition, “figures increasingly in the play’s continuation and denouement.” In the first half of the play, Edward’s complex relationship with Gaveston motivates the justifiable indignation of the Queen and Young Mortimer; in this way, Marlowe satisfies the structural need for the separation of “godly and profane” and for the punishment of vice. In the play’s second half, the profligate king is transformed into a repentant and besieged figure victimized by wicked and ambitious oppressors. The king falls, repents, learns from his error, and is finally avenged by his son; the play’s ending, therefore, makes the required moral statement.\textsuperscript{4}

The similarities between \textit{Troublesome Raigne} and \textit{Edward II} are striking. \textit{Troublesome Raigne} also falls into two parts: in the first half of the play, the nobles are justifiably motivated to rebellion by John’s murder of his own nephew, Arthur, the lawful heir to the English throne; in the second half, John becomes a besieged victim betrayed by ambitious nobles whose rebellion is “justified” by the treasonous arguments of corrupt churchmen. Like Marlowe, the playwright manipulates the morality structure to make appropriate moral lessons: King John repents, is murdered, and is likewise avenged by his son and heir. If Marlowe was the Queen’s Men’s particular target, the author of \textit{Troublesome Raigne} may have had explicit reasons for following Marlowe’s lead. However, by shaping King John with both “human complexity,” and “moral abstraction,” he succeeds in presenting the king as a more complex and hence more ambiguous figure than would presumably have been called for by the propagandistic demands of Tudor orthodoxy. To be useful to the Queen’s Men, the playwright ought to have dramatized a particular version of King John’s reign, something he chooses not to do.

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 235, 236, 244.
John Bale’s frank distortion of John’s history in his *King Johan* (1538?), it would seem, better serves the purposes of “truth” from an orthodox Tudor point of view than does *Troublesome Raigne.* As an unapologetic propagandist, Bale, as Robert Potter has noted, “dramatizes events not primarily in the interests of reconstructing the past but with the idea of illuminating the present,” and, of course, justifying the Henrician Reformation. Unlike *Troublesome Raigne*’s author, Bale very selectively dramatizes only John’s dispute with the Papacy and omits all references to his tyranny, the murder of his nephew, Arthur, and his nobles’ rebellion. Instead, Bale exploits the moral tradition, placing the helpless “Widow England” at the center of a cosmic contest between Good (King John) and Evil (the Church). In the play’s second half, Imperial Majesty, an obvious abstraction of Henry VIII, rebukes John’s antagonists and then pardons the repentant Nobility, Clergy, and Civil Order after they pledge unconditional fealty to their king. Bale’s reliance on morality structure and manipulation of both King John’s and Henry VIII’s history allows “Imperial Majesty [i.e. Henry VIII] [to succeed], where King John failed, in carrying out the necessary reformation” of the English Church. Bale never mentions Henry VIII’s divorce or its connection to his quarrel with Rome; instead, Bale’s monarch “ordains the Reformation with impersonal objectivity.”

By following Marlowe’s and not Bale’s structure, the playwright jettisons the morality’s simplified didacticism and thus creates an ambiguous and complex King John. By attempting to write “true” chronicle history, that is, to reconcile the factual material found in his sources—Holinshed and Polydore Vergil—he dramatizes both John-the-Tyrant and John-the-Victim. The author, as a result (and intentionally or not), juxtaposes contradictory, even paradoxical, views of John’s character and reign. Annabel Patterson writes of the “multivocality” of Holinshed’s *Chronicles* and concludes that the Chroniclers’ efforts at “indifferent” or unbiased historiography were intended to allow individual readers to draw their own conclusions from the material. This strategy is at least in part conventionally self-protective, but also symptomatic of what she sees as the period’s growing gesture towards individualism. I would suggest that *Troublesome Raigne*’s author, in attempting to record “true” history, borrows and deploys, perhaps unintentionally, a similar strategy. Despite the play’s association with the Queen’s Men and its overt propagandizing, the play’s

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7Ibid., 96.
8Ibid., 102, 103.
transitional form, the conflicting accounts of the life of King John it represents, and the ways key episodes in the play intersect with equally unstable contemporary political theory make it impossible to conclude that the play is as ideologically stable as its critics have suggested, that it is no more than a mouthpiece of Tudor orthodoxy.

A more productive approach in the analysis of Troublesome Raigne begins with considerations of ways it deploys issues central to contemporary political theory. The rival claims depicted in Troublesome Raigne, between King John and his nephew Arthur, his nobles and the church, betray ideological competition which invites an analysis of the underlying justifications, that is, the underlying, contradictory theories of the nature of the relationship between governor and governed that support those competing claims.

Essentially, obedience doctrine and resistance theory present arguments justifying or condemning competing jurisdictional claims. Both discourses justified “radical” political action, were highly volatile, and were adapted, much as King John’s story was, as needed, by Protestants and Catholics alike. The fluidity of their uses calls into question the stability of “Tudor orthodoxy” itself. Obedience doctrine, the pillar of Tudor orthodoxy, in fact begins as Papal “resistance” theory, that is, as justification for resistance against the Pope’s traditional jurisdictional authority. The separation of, or at least the questioning of, the relationship between, ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction is present at the inception of Reformation political thought. Certainly, the Pope’s refusal to grant Henry VIII’s divorce from Queen Katherine rankled precisely because the decision insinuates that Papal authority was prima facie superior to Henry’s in England. To free himself from Roman “domination,” and to justify seizure of church property, Henry employs resistance theory which argues for the divine and scriptural institution of kingship and asserts the Church’s “usurpation” of royal ecclesiastical power. Later, of course, the Supremacy requires Henry to enshrine obedience doctrine in order to prevent resistance against his actions by his own Catholic subjects. Tracts justifying resistance to royal secular authority arise in England in response to the accession of the Catholic Queen Mary Tudor and were written by some of the same English Protestants who, under her Protestant brother King Edward, had argued vigorously on behalf of obedience doctrine. The arguments, again, rest on questions of jurisdiction: as a Catholic loyal to

10 Political theory quickly shifted application in the sixteenth century. Peter Holmes, Resistance and Compromise: The Political Thought of the Elizabethan Catholics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) has remarked upon the “ease with which religious leaders transferred from one of these political theories to another,” 3.

11 See Henry’s arguments especially in William Tyndale’s Obedience of a Christian Man (1525), Edward Foxe’s De vera differentia (1534), and Bishop Stephen Gardiner’s De vera obedientia (1535).
the Pope, Mary can be branded both a heretic and a tyrant; she can be justifiably resisted, even assassinated.\textsuperscript{12}

Contemporary political theory is put into play in \textit{Troublesome Raigne} in a number of important scenes.\textsuperscript{13} For example, the monks who assassinate King John justify their actions with the language of resistance to tyrants, and Arthur and Hubert debate the moral limits of absolute obedience.\textsuperscript{14} However, I will focus here on four thematically linked episodes in the play in which legitimate or traditional authority is challenged and the brutal competition for property, territory, or jurisdiction uses as justification legal, dynastic, or religious arguments in much the same manner as contemporary political theory defended or condemned the actions of Protestant or Papist princes. These episodes are the Fauconbridge Northamptonshire riot, the siege of the town of Angiers, the Papal excommunication and interdict, and the baronial rebellion and French invasion.

The Fauconbridge episode begins with a description of a riot in Northamptonshire. Most critics focus on the failure of \textit{Troublesome Raigne}'s author to exploit similarities between King John's disputed inheritance of the English crown and the feud that erupts between Fauconbridge's sons.\textsuperscript{15} In Shakespeare's \textit{King John}, John and Arthur's situation closely parallels Philip and Robert Fauconbridge's: individuals in each

\textsuperscript{12}For anti-Marian resistance theories see especially John Ponet's \textit{Shorte Treatise of Polytike Power} (1556), Christopher Goodman's \textit{How Superior Powers Ought to Be Obeyed} (1558), and John Knox's \textit{Appellation} (1558).

\textsuperscript{13}All citations are to \textit{The Troublesome Raigne of King John}, in \textit{Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare}, ed. Geoffrey Bullough (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 4:72–151 (hereafter \textit{TR}).

\textsuperscript{14}Ponet allowed private men to commit tyrannicide in extreme cases (\textit{Shorts Treatise}, 111). The monk and abbot's conspiracy to poison John is couched in the language of "extremity." Believing themselves under mortal attack, any retaliation is, in their eyes, justifiable. The abbot even declares that the monk has been moved to tyrannicide by God himself: "O blessed Monke! I see God moves thy mind to free this land from tyrants slavery" (2.917–18). Arthur believes he is lawfully the king, his uncle a usurping tyrant. John is, therefore, effectively ordering Hubert to commit regicide. Hubert insists that as a mere subject, he must obey his king's command, but Arthur appeals to Hubert's conscience to resist John's unjust order. Hubert's refusal to murder Arthur, then, conforms to the tenets of passive disobedience, not strict Tudor obedience doctrine. See Scene 12, 2.1314–1452.


The differences between the episodes are often used to establish the textual priority of either \textit{Troublesome Raigne} or Shakespeare's \textit{King John}. If, for example, Shakespeare used \textit{Troublesome Raigne} as his source, it seems clear that Shakespeare effectively employed the scene to intensify the similarities between Philip's and John's claims. However, we must then ask why the author of \textit{Troublesome Raigne} included (that is to say invented) this scene? On the other hand, if Shakespeare's play is the source of \textit{Troublesome Raigne}, we must suppose
pair are rival claimants to an inheritance that hinges on primogeniture and legitimacy. It becomes clear that just as Robert Fauconbridge has a better claim than his bastard brother, so has Arthur over his usurping uncle.\textsuperscript{16} The Fauconbridge episode only seems unexploited in \textit{Troublesome Raigne} because comparison to \textit{King John} inevitably isolates and disengages it from other episodes in the play that also dramatize the characters' willingness to break the peace in the defense of "illegal" claims. In \textit{Troublesome Raigne}, the Northamptonshire riot provides a model for the next three episodes of civil disruption, each of which has more serious, international consequences; John's questionable disposition of the Fauconbridge claim foreshadows the disasters to come. His later actions will pit him against his citizens, the Church, and his nobles, causing siege, excommunication, and civil war; the stakes for John and for England are much higher than mere administration of the Fauconbridge Northamptonshire estate.

Robert Fauconbridge provokes a riot in Northamptonshire because he is unsatisfied with a lawful decision made by traditional, legitimate authority. He justifies his resistance on moral and ethical grounds, challenging the laws and traditions that would make his illegitimate elder brother his father's heir. Robert is also surely interested in the wealth and status that accompany the Fauconbridge estates, and so his contest with his brother is clearly also a competition for property. The "riot" suggests that the conflict spread well beyond familial/domestic contention; certainly the brothers solicited the assistance of supporters. The subsequent breakdown of order in Northamptonshire necessitates the intervention of "officialdom" in the person of "Thomas Nidigate, Shrieve of Northamptonshire" (TR, 1.81–82).

Robert claims to be Sir Robert's "lawful heire" (TR, 1.103); Philip counters that, according to "Englands auncient Lawe" (TR, 1.105), i.e. the law of primogeniture, he is undoubtedly the legal heir.\textsuperscript{17} For King John, then, the case is "plaine" (TR, 1.109); if Philip is Robert's elder

\textsuperscript{16}In \textit{Troublesome Raigne}, on the other hand, parallels are de-emphasized. For example, Philip's bastardy is far less obvious or certain: he is born only six weeks premature, his mother insists he is legitimate. Moreover both "the world reputes him lawfull heire," and his father "in his life did count him so" (TR, 1.122). By contrast, in \textit{King John} Philip is fourteen weeks premature, and his father has disowned him as a bastard: Beaurline, \textit{King John}, 1.1.113ff (hereafter \textit{KJ}). All citations are to this edition.

\textsuperscript{17}According to William Blackstone's \textit{Commentaries on the Laws of England} (1773), the rules of inheritance are clear: "I. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the person last actually seised, \textit{in infinitum}; but shall never lineally ascend. II. A second general rule or canon is, that the male issue shall be admitted before the female. III. A third rule, or canon of descent, is this; that, where there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit." Blackstone, Commentaries, 2:208, 212–14; quoted in
brother, he must be Sir Robert’s heir. Robert asserts, however, that Philip is illegitimate, despite both their mother’s denials and their deceased father’s belief in Philip’s legitimacy (TR, 1.121). But all of Robert’s evidence is circumstantial: King Richard “lay often” at his father’s house while Sir Robert was away; Philip was delivered six weeks premature; he resembles King Richard in “features, actions, and his lineaments” (TR, 1.169).

John’s response is not, as might be expected given the evidence, to award the inheritance to the legal heir, Philip. Instead, he orders Lady Fauconbridge and Philip to disclose Philip’s true paternity, and “as they say, so shall thy living passe” (TR, 1.213, emphasis added). Robert, incredulous, cries:

My Lord, herein I chalenge you of wrong,
To give away my right, and put the doome
Unto themselves. (TR, 1.214–16)

John’s response inhibits, rather than advances, justice, and Robert properly accuses John of “giving away” his right. One might argue that, Solomon-like, John foresees the eventual outcome (i.e. Philip’s intuited “admission” of bastardy), but, given the structure of later episodes and John’s lawless actions, here he is simply superseding the law by nullifying a decision made by the lower Northamptonshire court. In this episode, John rules by whim, the action of a tyrant. Philip is Sir Robert’s heir, and John should have instantly confirmed him so.

The legal tangle is further complicated because Philip is allegedly not his father’s illegitimate son, but rather the result of his mother’s adultery. In Shakespeare’s King John, the king follows English law and declares in favor of the Bastard Philip, regardless of the circumstances of his conception: “My mother’s son [i.e. Richard Lionheart] did get your father’s heir; / Your father’s heir must have your father’s land” (KJ, 1.1.128–29). But in Troublesome Raigne, John ignores English law and is not responsible for satisfying the rival claims of the rioting Northamptonshire brothers. Instead he allows “each of the parties to decide for himself. Philip confesses his illegitimacy rather than deny that the blood of a king (Richard I) flows in his veins.”18 Having appealed their case to the highest law of the land—the king’s own court—the brothers receive no legal judgement. The case is settled peacefully only because Philip voluntarily renounces his legal claim, an action rendered possible by the royal court’s unchallenged acceptance of his preposterous trance-induced “testimony.” The Fauconbridge estate consequently reverts to Robert, the next oldest son.


18Ibid., 214 n. 116.
The second episode, the scene before Angiers, parallels the Fauconbridge conflict on several points. First, as in Northamptonshire, rival claimants incite civil unrest and disturb the peace. There are even echoes in the language used by the Sheriff of Northamptonshire—who complains that the Fauconbridge brothers, “in seeking to right their own wrongs without cause of Law, or order of Justice … unlawfully assembled themselves in mutinous manner” (TR, 1.77–79)—and the citizens of Angiers—who protest that the Plantagenet dispute has “fill[ed] the world with brawls and mutinies” (TR, 1.742). Second, like the Fauconbridges, the quarreling Plantagenets place their feud before a “higher” authority, in this case before “the people” from whom they appear to require validation. The people then repeat John’s behavior: they demand “proof,” but refuse to make a choice, telling the kings to decide among themselves. Third, despite all the chivalric show and bluster, the dispute is settled extralegally. The Angiers episode not only echoes the Fauconbridge conflict but also enacts the situation of Protestant cities like Magdeburg in Germany whose elders refused to surrender its secular or ecclesiastical autonomy to either the Holy Roman Emperor, the Roman Catholic Church, or the Protestant leaders of the Schmalkaldic League. Magdeburg’s independence, like Angiers’, was defendable in part because of the competition among the rival claims for authority over it. Since none of the warring factions could exercise unchallenged sovereignty over the town, Magdeburg, like Angiers, was able to resist all claimants.

19The citizens “answere not as men lawles, but to the behoofe of him that prooves lawful” (TR, 1.631–32), and until the claimants “have prooved one right, [they] acknowledge none right” (TR, 1.644–45).

20German Protestant resistance theory culminated in the Confession of Magdeburg (1550), a tract written collaboratively by a number of that city’s elders. Cynthia Schoenberger, “The Confession of Magdeburg and the Lutheran Doctrine of Resistance” (Unpub. Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1972) records that Magdeburg had been among the first subscribers of the Schmalkaldic League, joining in 1546. After the defeat of Muhlberg in 1547, Magdeburg “was practically the only center of resistance left” and became a magnet for militant Protestant refugees (111). The Emperor promised the city and its property to the Duke of Saxony in return for its defeat. In 1550 the siege of Magdeburg began in earnest. The city’s “disobedience” was both religious and civil. It had refused the appointment of a new Roman Catholic archbishop in 1545; the City Council, from that point on, took control of religious and civic government. Consequently, “the city was being governed in a more or less republican fashion, by a popularly elected council, and was fiercely determined not to surrender and thereby lose its newly-found self-government” to the Emperor (109). The marriage of militant reform religion and institutions of self-government, as articulated in the Confession, is a recognizable feature of later English resistance theories.

Constance, widow of John’s elder brother Geoffrey, disputes the legality of King Richard’s bequest of the crown of England to his brother John; however, John’s *de facto* possession of the Crown, ratified by his barons, negates Arthur’s *de jure* rights. Arthur appeals, as did Robert Fauconbridge, to a higher authority, in this case King Philip of France. The French king brings his army before the gates of Angiers “To barre [John’s]…false supposed clayme” (*TR*, 1.600) to the English throne. John, however, insists that the citizens “offer [him] allcageance, / Fealtie and homage, as true liege men ought” (*TR*, 1.609–10).

Angiers’ citizens offer a rather unconventional response to the kings’ demands: they will admit the lawful king only after the contending parties legally resolve their competing claims. After a brief skirmish, each side claims victory. To end the stalemate, the Bastard proposes the international equivalent of the Northamptonshire riot: the English and French should unite their forces and destroy the town. Horrified by the Bastard’s “solution,” Angiers’ citizens offer an alternative: knit your forces together, not in war, but in marriage; the “lasting bond of love” (*TR*, 1.746) (swiftly broken in the next scene) best serves “the common good” (*TR*, 1.761). Angiers will open its gates to accept the happy couple, Prince Lewes Dauphin of France and the Lady Blanche, Queen Elinor’s niece. After the wedding, the citizens suggest, the kings “may so deale with Arthur Duke of Britaine, / Who is but yong, and yet unmeete to raigne” (*TR*, 1.758–59).

The siege of Angiers exposes a pragmatic attitude in the play inconsistent with the nationalistic, jingoist reading, and inconsistent with what Carr believes to be the play’s embrace of “John’s *de facto* right to the throne.” The town’s stubborn refusal to yield to either John’s *de facto* or Arthur’s *de jure* right until the claimants decide among themselves who is lawfully king recalls the response of the impatient inhabitants of

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21Her complaint raises two important issues: first, English law forbade a monarch from bequeathing the crown as if it were personal property; thus, King Richard’s will is suspect. Second, according to the laws of primogeniture, Arthur, as John’s elder brother’s son, is lawful king of England.

Carr, *Drama As Propaganda*, points out that Richard Lionheart’s will, which barred Arthur in favor of John, was ratified by the barons’ “election” of John as king of England; however, “the legality of this action was questionable” (80). Clarkson and Warren, *The Law of Property*, state “it was the law of England that the inheritance of real estate, in accordance with the established rule of descent, could not be defeated by devising the land, as such, by will to another” (210).

Much has been made of Richard’s bequest in *King John* criticism. Henry VIII ordered that his children should succeed him in order: first Edward, then Mary, then Elizabeth. However, the Duke of Northumberland manipulated Edward VI into naming Lady Jane Grey his successor, thus overthrowing “both his father’s will and the Statute of Succession.” May Mattsson, *Five Plays About King John* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1977), 28. Northumberland’s plan failed and Queen Jane went to the block. Ibid., 27–28.

22Carr, *Drama As Propaganda*, 165.
Northamptonshire to the battling Fauconbridge brothers. Like the citizens of Northamptonshire, the sensible inhabitants of Angiers act only when the internecine struggles directly threaten to disrupt their civic stability. The elders of Angiers express an antipathy for either claimant and offer an alternative resolution. The town in essence participates in the power struggle—is given a voice in the dispute—and its voice is practical, distant, and distinct from the warring aristocratic factions.

The third episode, King John’s quarrel with the pope’s legate, Cardinal Pandulph, also erupts in civil unrest. This conflict most closely enacts some of the jurisdictional disputes that lay at the heart of arguments supporting obedience and resistance theory, hence its exploitability by both Protestant propagandists like John Bale and Catholic polemists like Cardinal Allen whose An Admonition to the Nobility and People of England (1588) used King John’s defiance of the papal legate and resulting excommunication and interdict to explain and justify Queen Elizabeth’s excommunication, and to condemn the murder of her Catholic cousin, Queen Mary Stuart.23 John attempts to circumvent the pope’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction by refusing the appointment of Stephen Langton as archbishop of Canterbury. What ensues is a power struggle between church and state that mirrors the wars of religion that consumed Europe for much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The source of the struggle in Troublesome Raigne resides, once again, in John’s tendency to operate outside the law.

John’s conflict with the church in Troublesome Raigne is usually regarded as an affirmation of the orthodox Tudor position which offered John as the flawed but righteous predecessor of Henry VIII—“a Protestant martyr-hero”; indeed, the play makes that comparison explicit.24 Although the play makes an effort to exonerate John and to condemn the machinations of the papal legate, the characters’ interactions expose as well the interplay of power politics and the struggle for international dominance. John’s quarrel with the church in fact echoes the Fauconbridge and Plantagenet disputes. The conflicts in Fauconbridge v. Fauconbridge, Plantagenet v. Plantagenet, and England v. Rome center on determining who has lawful “title” to possess and administer property, whether the

24Carr’s study reviews the critical position on the anti-clericalism in the play. Irving Ribner, for example, argued that the “purpose” of Troublesome Raigne was “to argue the doctrine of royal supremacy against the claims of the Catholics. The play affirms strongly and directly that no Pope may deprive a king of his crown and that a king is responsible only to God”; quoted in Carr, Drama As Propaganda, 99. In the judgement of S. C. Sen Gupta, Shakespeare’s rehandling of the religious material supplied the “defect” in Troublesome Raigne, giving Shakespeare’s play “much greater cohesion” (quoted in ibid., 100). Both Ribner’s and Sen Gupta’s comments assume that an emphasis on religion is a dramaturgical defect and that Shakespeare’s de-emphasis constitutes dramatic improvement.
Fauconbridge estate, English holdings in France, or church property on English soil. We should recall that papal jurisdictional claims were at the heart of the English supremacy; Henry VIII’s use of *praemunire* makes that clear. John’s greed for the church’s lands and wealth, material possessions to which he feels entitled, discloses his desire for “title” or, in Tudor terms, supremacy. As it was for Henry VIII and other covetous Protestant princes, the religious jurisdictional contest was fused and perhaps even subordinated to rival property claims.

Cardinal Pandulph’s opening speech also echoes the language of the sheriff of Northamptonshire and the citizens of Angiers. He asks why John has “disturbe[d] the quiet of the Church, and disanull[ed] the election of Stephen Langton, whom his Holines hath elected Archbishop of Canterbury” (*TR*, 1.972–74). John’s responses are linked to both the Fauconbridge and Plantagenet episodes first because he threatens violence and appeals his case to a higher, in this case divine, authority. As many Protestant princes had done, John claims ecclesiastical jurisdiction directly from God:

as I am King, so wil I raigne next under God, supreme head both over spirituall and temrall: and hee that contradicts me in this, Ile make him hoppe headlesse. (*TR*, 1.980–83)

Second, John couches his rejection of papal jurisdictional claims in terms of disputed inheritance and legitimacy of title: “If the Pope will bee King in England, let him winne it with the sword, I know noother title he can alleage to mine inheritance” (1.989–91). Pandulph then repeats Arthur’s actions and appeals to France to enforce the Church’s authority. John is excommunicated and accursed, his subjects discharged of all dutie and fealtie that they doo owe to [John], and pardon and forgiveness of sinne to those of them whatsoever which shall carrie armes against [John], or murder [him]…. (*TR*, 1.996–99)

Pandulph dissolves English subjects’ duty to obey their lawful prince, exactly the action taken by Cardinal Allen against Queen Elizabeth, a move that Protestant princes complained allowed the Roman Church to intrude unlawfully into domestic secular affairs and thus undermine secular sovereignty. Pandulph, in addition, dissolves the oath of peace sworn between King Philip and King John before Angiers at the marriage of Blanche and Lewes, thus legitimizing a French invasion.

John swears to take possession of church lands (“no more but all they have” [*TR*, 1.1024–25]), which betrays his resentment both of the church’s land holdings in England as well as its ecclesiastical jurisdiction within his realm. John orders the Bastard to “Ransack the Abbeys, Cloysters, Priories, / Convert their coyne unto my souldiers use” (*TR*, 1.1007–
and declares that any Englishman who appeals to Rome for redress will "be judged a traitor to the State, / And suffer as an enemy to England" (TR, 1.1012–13).25 This declaration effectively stifles all opposition to John’s will; no Englishman may, after this point, resist the king in either Arthur’s or the church’s name without risking a charge of treason, since Arthur has appealed to France and the French have backed Pandulph. The question of religious piety hardly figures into the equation at all. John nationalizes church assets to finance a war that defends his “inheritance.” He also rewrites the law to enforce and legitimate his antipapal policy, precisely the actions undertaken by Henry VIII in the 1530s.

The fourth episode of disputed jurisdiction foregrounds Franco-Roman opportunism and John’s relationship with his barons. We might term this dispute England v. England, or perhaps Election v. Divine Right. Jurisdiction over England itself is contested in the barons’ revolt, and so it echoes Fauconbridge v. Fauconbridge since violence erupts over rival claims. The Fauconbridges’ quarrel over inheritance rights, that is, the rights lawfully to administer the Fauconbridge estates; John and his barons’ dispute is similarly jurisdictional since what is contested is the seat of sovereignty. John claims it rests in himself as anointed monarch, but the barons maintain their authority as “electors.” Most interesting is the play’s representation of “the people” in this contest. They do not obediently line up behind their king as one might expect them to do in a play touted as a mouthpiece of Tudor orthodoxy: instead, they resist both John and Arthur at Angiers; they rally behind Lewes’ invasion;26 and a common English monk acts as John’s assassin.

After John’s excommunication and the French military defeat that accompanies Arthur’s capture, the French seem prepared to withdraw, that is, until Pandulph reminds Lewes that the English crown can be his: “Arthur is safe,” (i.e. John’s prisoner), so, Pandulph urges,

25It is an argument similar to those used to suppress English Catholics. Elizabethan fears of a Catholic pretender (specifically Mary Stuart) escalate during the period. The 1559 Act of Supremacy condemned all appeals to foreign powers as treason, the particular “foreign power” being, of course, Rome (see Sider, Troublesome raigne, lx). In an Act of 1563, Elizabeth’s power was extended “over all estates and subjects within her dominions whereby any one upholding the authority or jurisdiction of the Pope would incur penalties of Praemunire,” a treasonable offence. Henry Birt, The Elizabethan Settlement (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907), 537–38. To frustrate Mary Stuart’s claim to the English crown, and following on the heels of Elizabeth’s excommunication (1570) the Succession Act of 1571 specified that “any person … who during the Queen’s life should lay claim to the crown… (shall be) incapable of succeeding to the crown after the Queen’s decease” (quoted in Mattsson, Five Plays, 43). The Act of 1585 registers pre-Armada fears of a Catholic coup to depose or assassinate Elizabeth and replace her with Mary: “‘every such person… being in any wise assenting or privy to the same (assassination) shall be… excluded and disabled for ever to have or to claim… the said crown of this realm’” (quoted in ibid., 43).

26Both the coastal towns and the “citie Rochester” (TR, 2.517) willingly yield before Lewes, and even London after brief resistance accepts him (TR, 2.522; 2.526-30).
let John alone with him,
Thy title next is fairest to Englands Crown:
Now stirre thy Father to begin with John.
The Pope sayes I, and so is Albion thine. (TR, 1.1172–75)

Pandulph is confident John will eliminate Arthur, thus making way for Lewes. Since John is excommunicate, France can invade England with the church’s blessing. The church’s goals—the deposition of a heretical king and reassertion of its customary authority (as ultimate arbiter) in European politics—would be met and France would, in doing the church’s work, be rewarded with the English crown. The French and papal decision resembles both the Fauconbridge and Plantagenet cases as well as the English jurisdictional dispute with Rome: all parties are willing to disturb the peace or wage war to defend extralegal claims.

But the Franco-Papal alliance is mooted once John recants. Pandulph demands that the French stop the war “For all is done the Pope would wish thee doo” (TR, 2.664); however, Lewes retorts: “al’s not done that Lewes came to do” (TR, 2.665). The French, indeed, seem positively astonished and affronted by papal manipulations that a moment before they were eager to exploit. Melun responds to Pandulph’s demands with antipapal language remarkably similar to John’s:

It can be nought but usurpation
In thee, the Pope, and all the Church of Rome,
Thus to insult on Kings of Christendome,
Now with a word to make them carie armes,
Then with a word to make them leve their armes.
This must not be: Prince Lewes keep thine owne,
Let Pope and Popelings curse their bellyes full. (TR, 2.676–81)

Melun here asserts that the papacy has usurped secular authority from Europe’s princes, one of the earliest justifications offered by Protestant princes for resistance against papal authority.

When the French and their allies, the English nobles, refuse to obey Pandulph’s command, they are promptly excommunicated (TR, 2.700–701). The French finally withdraw only after the English lords (learning of French plans to murder them) desert, that is, when they realize they cannot hold their position in England without English baronial collaboration. French opportunism is revealed in their refusal to obey the legate, their planned betrayal of the barons, and their politic utterance of the language of resistance. Indeed, this about-face and redeployment of resistance discourse accurately reflects the uses to which it was put by both Catholics and Protestants, English and Continental, since the beginning of the Reformation.

The barons justify their rebellion against King John with a long and legitimate list of grievances that they believe threatens their customary
rights and privileges. They argue that John owes his crown to “election” under feudal custom; consequently, they are within their rights to divest him of the crown and to bestow it on Lewes. Salsbury declares:

Our purpose, to conclude that with a word,
Is to invest [Lewes] as we may devise,
King of our Countrey in the tyrants stead (TR, 2.441–43, emphasis added)

The barons assume the power to bestow kingship of their country upon a candidate of their choosing. Their actions register the anxieties of their caste and respond to inroads made in the late sixteenth century by corporatizing absolutism; they demand, in effect, that England be run in their, and not in the king’s, interests.

The barons’ armies execute a successful domestic uprising; wherever Lewes lands “all places yeeld” (TR, 2.644) before him. And even after John’s reconciliation with the pope, the barons refuse to desert Lewes. It is only after they learn of Lewes’ treachery—his plan to murder all of them as traitors as soon as he is crowned king—that they recant (TR, 2.774) and seek John’s forgiveness; they march to Swinstead and immediately crown John’s son Henry king “In spight of Lewes and the power of Fraunce” (TR, 2.1120). Although Melun’s dying speech exhorts the English nobles in fairly orthodox ways to abandon their unnatural rebellion against “Mother” England, and both Pembrooke and Salsbury heed Melun’s advice, it seems clear it is only after the nobles understand they can gain no advantage in supporting the French that they end the rebellion, rebuff the invasion, and transfer their allegiance to the dying John and his heir.

It may have been the playwright’s and the Queen’s Men’s intention to salvage John’s medieval reputation and to turn him into a Protestant martyr, victimized by the church and murdered by traitorous monks. The play’s comic anti-Catholic scenes and Pandulph’s duplicitous behavior support such a conclusion and certainly would have done so in performance. However, the playwright’s decision to include the less savory aspects of John’s career, to represent his rants and dissemblings, forces readers also to regard the tyrannical practices (civil war, invasion, infanticide, interdict) undertaken to sustain his illegitimate claim to the throne. Even the play’s closing scene invites a paradoxical reading: if we grant that the playwright, in his pursuit of the “truth,” needed to stage John’s murder at Swinstead Abbey, we must still question his wisdom in doing so. John has ravaged the monasteries, openly defied the pope, incurred interdict against Catholics in his realm, yet seeks his last comfort from a priest.

27Sider notes the prevalence of “policy” as a “moral norm” in Troublesome Raigne: the nobles cry “tyranny” against John to advance their own ambitions and use “Arthur’s death as a pretext for deposing their King,” Troublesome raigne, lvi.
The abbot and monk pay with their lives for murdering John, and the Bastard is given patriotic closing words, but audiences are left with the uncompromising spectacle of King John dead inside an abbey forgiven by a Catholic cardinal and reconciled to Rome. *Troublesome Raigne* is a far more complex and unstable text than has been previously understood; it, and the remainder of the Queen’s Men’s “propagandistic” works, are worthy of critical reconsideration. The playwright’s efforts at “truth” antagonize the play’s supposed orthodoxy and the play’s frank enactment of contemporary political theory undermines its value as propaganda.
The Eastern Journey of William Feilding, earl of Denbigh (1631–33)

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Unlike other English courtiers whom Van Dyck painted—Lords John and Bernard Stuart in English court finery, James marquis of Hamilton in armor, Archbishop William Laud in clerical robes—his portrait of William Feilding, earl of Denbigh, depicts him in an exotic costume. The portrait, since 1938 in the National Gallery, commemorates Denbigh’s 1631–33 voyage to India and Persia in East India Company ships.1 He may have commissioned it for his daughter, the marchioness of Hamilton, or for his son-in-law the marquess, who owned it in 1641 (two years before Denbigh’s death), and in whose heirs’ Scottish mansion it remained until 1919.2 If Denbigh kept any written account of his travel to and in the East, it has disappeared, leaving only the portrait as his personal record; when, where, and how he went can, however, be discovered in occasional records of the East India Company and in a few of the State Papers Domestic for the reign of Charles I.

The East India Company minutes for 15 August 1630 give the gist of a letter from King Charles:

The Earl of Denbigh has requested permission to make a journey into Asia into the Great Mogul’s country and also into Persia. Knowing his journey would be too tedious and dangerous over-

1 The unmemorable William Feilding owed his title and other royal favors to having married Susan Villiers, sister of King James’s favorite Buckingham. When, early in the twentieth century, Cecelia countess of Denbigh searched Feilding records at Newnham Paddocks, Warwickshire, for her biography of Denbigh and his son Basil, she found nothing the earl had written about his voyage except a letter to Basil (then Charles I’s ambassador in Venice). Unlike Sir Thomas Roe, who knew he would have to justify his actions in India, Denbigh had no pressing reason to keep a journal; copies of letters addressed to him from his wife have survived, so it seems likely that either he did not write at all, or that any letter he did write miscarried.

2 Oliver Millar, Van Dyck in England (London: National Portrait Gallery, 1982), 58. Denbigh’s “Roundhead son” and successor Basil Feilding and his heirs may have forgotten or even not known of the portrait. An eighteenth century guide at Hamilton called Denbigh “the governor of Jamaica” though the English only captured the island in 1655, twelve years after Denbigh’s death; Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 55. The error suggests that little or nothing about a distaff Hamilton ancestor was remembered.
land his Majesty requires the East India Company to give orders
that he and his followers be received into such one of the Com-
pany’s ships as he shall make choice of, and be allowed for himself
and his train of six persons at most the great cabin. And because
he does not intend to be anyways chargeable or troublesome to
the Company, but rather to further their trade, his Majesty
expects the Company shall advise him with respect to his diet, and
assist him, when he desires to return, as a person whom his Maj-
esty tenderly affects, and whose furtherance and safety he ear-
nestly desires; and the Company will find his Majesty mindful and
himself [i.e. Denbigh] grateful.3

Denbigh was not quite the first Englishman to go to India for reasons
other than trade. In 1615 the East India Company grudgingly allowed
the Gentleman Pensioner Humphrey Boughton to sail with the fleet carrying
Sir Thomas Roe as King James’s (and the Company’s) ambassador to the
Great Mogul Jehangir; on 19 November, after only two months on the
road in India, Boughton sickened at Burhanpur, where Roe buried him
“by leave” on 26 November.4 In 1611 the adventurous eccentric Thomas
Coryate began a journey afoot through Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Armenia,
and Persia to Jehangir’s court at Ajmere, which he reached shortly before
Roe did. As he had done in Istanbul, Coryate took up residence in the
ambassador’s household, causing Roe repeated embarrassment.5 He fol-
lowed Jehangir’s progress from Ajmere to Mandu in Roe’s train, then,
already ill, he left on foot for Surat, where he died in 1618. Letters sent
home with a returning company chaplain show that Coryate’s journey
amounted even in his own mind to a heroic stunt that would top the
European travels afoot published in his Crudities. The East India Com-
pany’s view of its noble tourist Denbigh resembles Roe’s irritated view of

3 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies and Persia 1630–1634, ed. Noel
4 Like Denbigh, Boughton seems to have wanted only to see India, and had some idea
of continuing to China. When the English Company denied him passage, he threatened to
go with the rival Dutch Company; fearing he would appeal to the king, the Company then
allowed him space on the smallest ship, the Peppercorn. Though he joined Roe’s entourage
in India, Boughton had no financial reason to do so, for as a Gentleman Pensioner (the elite
royal guard) he had to have been of some means, and when he died was carrying £250. Roe
held the money until he came home in 1619 and “paid [it] unto the Companies account”;
Sir Thomas Roe, The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul, 1615–1619,
5 When Roe reached Ajmer in December 1614, Coryate was already there and came with
the East India Company factors to greet him. As an Englishman far from home, he became a
not altogether welcome member of the ambassador’s household. Roe disapproved of Cory-
ate’s familiarity toward Jehangir, who privileged him as a kind of court fool. Coryate had
made himself fluent in Persian, the Mogul court language, yet Roe never employed him
despite having trouble finding reliable interpreters; perhaps Coryate’s London reputation as a
fool made Roe think that to use him in a position of trust would lower his own court standing.
Coryate. From Roe’s diplomatic expertise the Company expected and got help with trading concessions, limited though they were, in the Mogul empire, but its managers evidently believed that Denbigh or his servants might jeopardize these concessions.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries foreign travel by aristocrats was undertaken “normally to study the cities and institutions of foreign States and to gain proficiency in their languages by converse with one’s social equals.” Sir Philip Sidney, Roger Ascham, James Cleland, Samuel Purchas, and James Howell all assumed that voluntary foreign travel was to educate youths in their teens and twenties. Some aristocrats’ travel filled the years between early marriage and cohabitation; when Sir Henry Savile was arranging his daughter’s marriage with Sir William Sedley’s only son, they agreed “to send him over to travel…till some few yeares may make them both more ripe for marriage.” Similarly, when “the Lord Fitzwater maried Sir Michael Stanhops elder daughter…because they are both young (she not above 12 yeares old,) he goes shortly to travayle.” George Villiers, later duke of Buckingham, for “giving ornament to his hopeful person…was by [his mother] sent into France, where he spent two or three years in attaining the language and in learning the exercises of riding and dancing.”

Though “not precisely confined to movements between court and court, [with] needless halts…seldom made except at provincial capitals,” most such travel had “an urban character.” James Cleland laid out a travel programme that took a long circuit from Paris to Orleans, Poitiers, Bordeaux, Nerac, Toulouse, Aix-en-Provence, Grenoble, and Lyon before crossing to Italy via Geneva. This routing enabled the traveler to see six “Courts of Parliament” instead of one “Court of Parliament at Dijon,” and to touch at important Protestant centres in southern France.

Travel also prepared the sons of aristocrats for future careers. The eldest son of Sir John Holles spent a year “finishing” in Paris, exhorted by his father to serve God, acquire languages and the social skills of his class, and send court and diplomatic news to his father’s political allies. Fynes Moryson, third son of a Lincolnshire gentleman, took M.A.s in civil law from Cambridge and Oxford, and afterwards traveled to learn languages

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8Ibid., 1:516.
10Mathew, *Sir Tobie Mathew*, 10.
and observe political and economic conditions in places significant to England. He therefore went outside the aristocrats’ usual circuit in France and Italy, visiting the Netherlands, north Germany, Poland, Bohemia, Austria (site of the Emperor’s court), and Bavaria, before proceeding to Italy and coming home through France.

Mature noblemen could undertake private journeys only with difficulty, “for they were burdened by their own great households, their friends and their attendant gentlemen.”¹³ In 1613, after accompanying Princess Elizabeth and her new husband the palgrave to Heidelberg, the earl and countess of Arundel went on to Italy with “a goodly number of gentlemen of their own choosing,” and a “great train of servants.”¹⁴ They entered Venice in state as official visitors, where they were escorted about the city by King James’s ambassador Dudley Carleton and two Venetian noblemen, but after reaching Bologna the earl went on to Florence and Siena with few companions while his countess followed more slowly with the entourage. They left “the most part of theyre great family” in Lucca and Siena in 1614 while they made an unauthorized, “secret and unsettled” expedition to Rome and Naples, but when they turned for home they entered Turin “followed by some thirty horse,” men of gentry rank, besides lesser servants.¹⁵ On a diplomatic mission to Spain in 1616, young Lord Roos was attended by “six footmen, eight pages…twelve gentlemen…[and] some twenty ordinary servants…in costly liverys…sumptuous beyond precedent.”¹⁶ These numbers provide a scale by which to estimate the number of Arundel’s attendants; besides the thirty documented horsemen, his train is likely to to have included no fewer than twenty footmen, twenty-four pages, and sixty “ordinary servants.”¹⁷ When Sir Thomas Roe sailed as King James’s ambassador to the Mogul court, his entourage was limited to fifteen: a chaplain, a surgeon, a secretary, and twelve servants. But when he landed at Surat harbor the Company augmented Roe’s train “for his Lordshipps better grace…by the generall, captains, and merchants of the fleet (on shoare)…; alsoe fower score menn in armes with shott and pyke redye ordred upon the sand in rancks against his landing for guard, and 48 peeces great ordnance discharged from our fleete; this daye our shipps were all hansomlye fitted with their waistclotes,

¹³Mathew, Sir Tobie Mathew, 14.
¹⁵Hervey, Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel, 89.
¹⁶Howarth, Lord Arundel and His Circle, 62.
¹⁷Arundel did not take anything like this train in 1612, when he went privately to consult the University of Padua’s medical faculty and use the neighboring baths. Similarly, when Dudley Carleton, King James’s ambassador to The Hague, went to Spa for his health, he and his wife took only a few servants.
ensignes, flagges, pendants, and streamers.” To the city of Surat proper, however, he was followed by only twenty-three men, who were greatly outnumbered and indeed felt threatened by a native escort of “about 50 horse and 200 foote.”

In contrast to the numbers who attended a nobleman traveling in Europe and even the smaller number who accompanied an ambassador to distant India, King Charles promised that Denbigh would travel with at most six retainers, though this may have been Denbigh’s idea, not the king’s. The Company showed itself skeptical that so modest an entourage would follow a traveling aristocrat, for it demanded a promise from the earl that his train would not exceed six and, for further assurance, asked him to provide their names. This he appears not to have done, for the list of his servants was still to come by the time his goods were loaded. Only two names appear in the company records, Denbigh’s kinsman Captain Feilding and his secretary Robert Barlowe, perhaps a company appointee. Nothing is said of a private chaplain, though one was de rigueur for any Christian envoy in unbelievers’ lands. James Cleland indeed thought a tutor, an elder manservant, and a boy enough English servants for a young noble on his educational tour of Europe, but for a courtier of Denbigh’s age and status his train of six was much too small to impress those abroad with his dignity and that of his king. Even though three merchant ships on a voyage lasting six months or more could not have accommodated the numbers that followed Roos to Spain, let alone the numbers that followed Arundel to Italy, they could have handled an entourage the size of Sir Thomas Roe’s. Denbigh’s minimal train probably explains “the base usage and disrespect of this Governor [when Denbigh debarked at Surat], who would not suffer him to have one horse to ride on, but enforced him and his followers to travel in coaches such as this country affords,” presumably the bullock carts used by merchant caravans.

18Roe, Embassy, 46.
19Roe, Embassy, 49.
20Barlowe was the son of a former Company employee who had gone bankrupt in 1630; at the end of that year the Committees “(understanding he has a son trained up as a merchant) [resolved] to employ him into the Indies, either in this fleet or the next”; CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 101. “The next” fleet was the one with which Denbigh sailed.
21When Roe’s chaplain John Hall suddenly died on 19 August 1616, Roe at once asked for a replacement, for “Heere I cannot live the life of an Atheist. I will not abyde in this place destitute of the Comfort of Godes woord and heavenly Sacraments.” The Surat chaplain was unwilling to go to Ajmere, but when the fleet from England arrived in late September Edward Terry was quickly despatched (Roe, Embassy, 246).
22If more attendants were thought necessary, Cleland advises engaging them in France, “where you shall have good store of faithful men and bois; who will serve you gladlie, & be profitable unto you, both in their natural language, and in buying of sundrie necessary things, wherein your Purse-bearer maie be coosened, either for lacke of the French tongue, or because he is not so wel acquainted with their price and fashion of counting” (Cleland, Institution, 246).
23CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 245.
Surat governor could hardly have thought a European so ill attended as Denbigh a person of importance, even if told that he was a “great Lord of the court,” any more than his predecessor had considered Roe (despite his sixteen followers) as one to whom he owed deference. Like contemporary Europeans, the Moguls assessed a stranger’s status by the size of his entourage.

The reasons for his journey, which Denbigh gave to his son Basil and to the East India Company, were in every respect unconventional for a man of his rank and age. His desire “only to see those countries” would have appalled Sir Philip Sidney, who wrote to his younger brother Robert in 1578 or 1579 that travel was justifiable only to learn “such thinges, as maie be serviceable to your Countriee, and fit for your calling.” The laws and customs of distant Turkey and China might have moral value, but “to knowe their riches, and power is of little purpose for us, since it cann nei-ther advantage us, or hinder us.” As for sightseeing, “howses are howses in everie place, they doe but differ Secundum magus & minus.”

James Howell advises a young man who has left the university to spend “forty months” seeing Europe, then, having studied “awhile in one of the Innes of Court…to understand something of the Common Lawes of England,…make one flying journey over againe, and in one Summer review all those Countreys…but being returned the second time, let him thinke no more of Forrain Journeys, unlesse it be by command, and upon publique service.” Denbigh’s defensive letter to his son Basil, Charles I’s ambassador to Venice, shows that he understood how eccentric would seem voluntary travel to such distant places by a man over fifty years old:

I have obtained leave from the King to make a voyage in the East India ship (as a volunteer) to the King of Persia and the Great Mogul; in which voyage I hope to better my understanding and

24Roe blamed the Mughal idea that an ambassador was a mere message-carrier on company representatives who usurped the title: “At this name of an Ambassador [men from Cambaya] laughed one upon another; it beeig become ridiculous, so many having assumed that title, and not performed the offices…. I mention these only to lett the Company understand how meanly an Embassador was esteemed at my landing; how [my predecessors] subjected themselves to all searches and barbarous Customes, and became sutors to the Governors and great men”; Roe, Embassy, 45–46.

25Sir Philip Sidney, The Prose Works, 4 vols., ed. Albert Feuillerat (1912; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 3:124–26. Sidney’s attitude resembles Roger Ascham’s, who had been uneasy at “the fancy that many young gentlemen of England have to travel abroad,” especially to Italy. Ascham feared they would learn exotic continental sins that “the simple head of an Englishman is not able to invent”; Roger Ascham, The Schole-master, ed. B. J. Schock (Don Mills, Ont.: Dent Canada, 1966), 59, 67. Sidney suggests that he and similar travelers learned nothing more sinister than “disguisementes, not onlie of our apparrell, but of our countenaunces, as though the credit of a travyler stood all upon his outside” (Sidney, Prose, 3:125).

not impeach my estate. These doings, I have thought better to undertake than to live at home, get nothing, and spend all.27

The East India Company suspected that Denbigh was really going in a secret official capacity, and at his first meeting with its Committees (directors) asked whether he was going “as Ambassador or as a private person.” Denbigh replied that he would “carry letters of recommendation from his Majesty to the Great Mogul and to the King of Persia, whose Courts he intends to visit, but not to go as an Ambassador.”28 A Dutchman in Surat could not imagine a mature nobleman taking such a journey for any other purpose: he wrote to the Dutch East India Company that “on the English Admiral came a great Lord, the brother-in-law of Buckingham, called the Earl of Denbigh,…it is conceived that he comes Ambassador to the Mogul.”29 Like the London directors of the English East India Company, Europeans in India thought that a man of Denbigh’s rank and age would undertake such a journey only as a legate from his prince.

Charles provided Denbigh with letters splendidly inscribed and decorated, addressed “to the several Eastern potentates whom the King commanded him to visit. These five [undelivered] skins of parchment are well written, and illuminated; much gilt, painted with the arms of England, and bear the King’s signature. They are all dated 1630.” Three are addressed: to “Shah Suffie Emperor of Persia,” to “the Nabob Aseph Khan favoured of the Mighty Emperor Shangh Jehan Great Mogul,” and to “the Nabob Khan Channa,” and two are blank, with space to add “the names of any other potentates the delegate might happen upon.”30 All the letters use similar language:

we have thought fit by these our royal and friendly letters to recommend unto you our trusty and well beloved cousin, servant, and subject, William Earl of Denbigh, who, being a prince of our kingdom whom we have formerly employed as admiral of our victorious armadas at sea, being now transported with the fame and glory of your empire hath desired to see that Prince and Court so renowned in the remotest part of the world. We shall therefore desire you to receive and entertain him according to his quality and our friendship.31

28CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 66.
29CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 229.
30Feilding, *Royalist Father*, 74–75.
31Feilding, *Royalist Father*, 75–76. Charles’s grandiose “Victorious armadas at sea” whitewashes Buckingham’s failed expeditions to Cadiz and La Rochelle and Denbigh’s role in them. He must have thought it unlikely that the eastern potentates he was addressing would know what really happened.
Denbigh would have presented such a letter to Shah Jahan in 1632, when he reached the Mughal court at Burhanpur.

The East India Company was hardly in a position to refuse what the king wanted. After its immense early success, by the later 1620s its profits were dropping thanks to a Europe-wide glut of pepper. In 1628 the President and Committees turned down a dissident faction’s proposal to make King Charles a Company member and give him a one-fifth share, even though the king supported the faction.32 Yet despite the risk of further offending Charles, the Committees delayed their reply to his 15 August letter. On 17 September they decided that “before giving an absolute answer to his Majesty’s letter on behalf of the Earl of Denbigh,…Committees [should] attend the Lord Treasurer and confer how the Company may receive satisfaction and assurance that his going shall not be prejudicial or chargeable to them, both by the way and in the Indies.”33

There were more points of disagreement. Denbigh wanted the great cabin of the Admiral (the principal ship), on this voyage the 800-ton Mary;34 the Company offered the great cabin on “the second ship,” the older 800-ton Royal Exchange. On 24 September the Committees kept Denbigh’s emissary Sir John Watts waiting all morning “for answer to his Majesty’s letter concerning the passage of the Earl of Denbigh in the Company’s ships to Surat and Persia which has been long expected,” before promising that a delegation would visit Denbigh that afternoon. They then “resolved to propound to the Earl…(1) That a list of the names of his servants be given to the Company, and that he lessen the number as much as with conveniency he may; (2)…that his Lordship would accept of the second ship, where he shall be every way as well accommodated; (3) that according to his Majesty’s letter he will give good caution not to prejudice or be chargeable to the Company.”35 The conditions suggest the Committees’ hope that the earl would give up the voyage if denied precedence and made to bring an even smaller train than the six he proposed. But Denbigh accepted most of their conditions; he “promised to give a list of his servants, and also on his honour to be careful that nothing be done to put the Company to charge or to prejudice their trade in the least kind, assuring them that none of those he intends to carry with him had ever been so far at sea as the Cape; but his Lordship seemed much to distaste their request that he would accept the second ship, in regard he hath formerly been Admiral, Vice-Admiral, and Rear Admiral of his Majesty’s

33 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 45.
34 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, 229–33.
35 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 47.
fleet, and is resolved in what ship soever he goes to bear the flag in the maintop.”

On 15 October, accompanied by Sir Thomas Roe (an honorary Committee since his return from India in 1619), Denbigh attended a Company meeting and “declared that he had nothing more to propound.” He reiterated that he would bring no more than six yet to be named persons, and assured the Company that none of his train had ever been in the East or engaged in “private trade,” a problem the Company had with its own servants, even with some of its chaplains. Denbigh, however, still insisted that “he could not with his honour give way to going in the second ship but did and doth expect that in what ship soever he goes she shall carry the flag in the maintop.” As a concession to business needs, however, he offered to “leave…the great cabin and dispose himself elsewhere” whenever Company people needed the space for private meetings. The Committees “thought fit to give way to this particular and let him know how ready they were to accommodate him.” Denbigh thus gained the premier accommodation he thought befitted his dignity. The Committees warned him that the Company meant to “dispeed the ships about the last of December and therefore desired that his provisions be timely put aboard so the ships be not forced to stay for them.” One motive for the Company to concede the Mary’s cabin may have been the next item on its agenda, an upcoming meeting with Secretary of State Dorchester about the still-unpaid compensation for the Dutch massacre of Company factors at Amboina in 1623.

On 17 December Denbigh and Sir John Watts again met with the Company Governor and Committees. Thanking them for willingness to further “his passage for Persia and the Indies, Denbigh assured them he would be ever ready to do them all friendly offices in his power,” and he and three Committees signed their agreement:

That said Earl with his kinsman Capt Fielding and five attendants shall take passage upon the Mary for Persia, paying for the ships’ allowance the sum of 70£ for six months, and if his Lordship take passage for Surat, he shall allow for himself and his followers per month of 30 days according to the rate of 1£ 13s. 4d; and whereas his Lordship has paid 70£ to the Treasurer, he shall pay to the Captain or Purser of the ship where he lands, according to said rate, and his Lordship undertakes to provide for himself such extraordinary provisions as he shall conceive needful.

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36 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 55.
37 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 66.
38 Ibid.
39 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 96.
On 3 January 1631, “Committees [were named]…to go down to dis-peed away the ships [the Mary, the Exchange, and the Speedwell] from Gravesend to the Downs,” and others “to give notice thereof to Lord Denbigh, and desire a list of his retainers that are to wait on him in this voyage,” still unsupplied despite his promise. The ships left the Thames before January ended, but in February the Mary was still caught in the Channel. In September a ship homebound from Persia was ordered to wait for the outbound fleet at the Comoro Islands and warn it not to call in the Persian Gulf, as there was plague at Gombroon. After an unusually long passage, whether owing to contrary winds or to lengthy halts at such usual stopping places as the Cape, the Comoros, and perhaps Soccora, the three ships reached Surat in late December. They found Surat flooded and suffering from a famine that had already lasted over a year, and the chief factor, William Rastell, lately dead.

The Company men in Surat show little sign of thinking Denbigh’s reception by Shah Jahan important. A postscript to their January 1632 letter says that “Lord Denbigh took his journey towards the Mogul’s Court 23rd Dec. last, being ill accommodated for such a journey, and the worse by the base usage and disrespect of this Governor, who would not suffer him to have one horse to ride on, but enforced him and his followers to travel in coaches such as this country affords.” A brief note the next April mentions “The Earl of Denbigh’s entertainment with the Mogul,” with no further details. This is the only evidence that Denbigh reached the court at Burhanpur, for two years Shah Jahan’s Deccan War headquarters. Sir Thomas Roe with a train of carts took a fortnight to get to Burhanpur from Surat, a distance he estimated at 223 English miles, so Denbigh most likely reached the Mogul court in mid to late January.

In December 1631 the funeral cortege of Queen Mumtaz Mahal, who had died in June, had left Burhanpur for Agra. Shah Jahan followed early in April 1632. Denbigh probably began his return journey to Surat

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40 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 111.
41 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 196.
42 At this time a Dutch East India Company man wrote that “no trade may be expected in these parts these three years; no man can go in the street without giving great alms or being in danger of being murdered” (CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 229).
43 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 245.
44 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 261.
45 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 243. The Surat factors minced no words about Shah Jahan’s war: “This base King continues his wars on Deccan, though the famine and their success has made him much the loser; and lately he has sent Aseph Khan upon them, against his will,… which will be to little purpose” (CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 243).
46 Roe, Embassy, 89–95. Late in 1631, when the famine had only recently begun, the Company clerk Peter Mundy took three weeks to reach Burhanpore, but he was attached to a native merchant’s caravan that made several halts on the way.
about the same time, for on 24 April he was there and ready “to go in the Mary whither she goes.” 48 On 28 April the Mary and the Exchange left Surat for the Coromandel Coast, reaching Amargon on 24 May and Masulipatam on 30 May. They meant “to stay but 15 days for receipt of goods for Persia, but were obliged to stay till the last of June,” when the ships had loaded “400 to 500 parcels of goods and about 130 passengers, which at 16 per cent freight and 20 Ryals for each passenger amounted to 8,000 Ryals of 8 paid there.” The ships left Masulipatam on 29 June; after a long transit hindered by contrary winds they reached Jask at the mouth of the Persian Gulf on 15 September, and on 3 October had been joined at Gombroon (Bandar Abbas) in the Gulf both by ships from London and by the Great or Royal James “from Bantam.” 49 On 27 November all these ships were anchored “between the Surat Bar and the outward road of Swally” after a thirty-five-day voyage “much hindered by calms and cross winds.” 50 Between the Mary’s arrival at Jask and the fleet’s departure from Gombroon on 24 October, Denbigh could hardly have traveled to and from the Persian court at Ispahan; King Charles’s letter to “Shah Suffie” remained undelivered. The Shah was in any case absent on campaign against the Turks, far to the northwest of his capital. On 4 January 1633 Surat wrote to London that “The Earl of Denbigh has been at Masulipatam and Persia in the Mary, and intends to return in the James” which had already sailed on 20 January. 51 Despite his expressed wish “to see those countries,” Denbigh spent little over six months ashore in widely separated parts of India, and no more than five weeks on or near the southernmost cost of Persia.

The James made good time to Mauritius, where she “arrived safely... 4th Feb, since when have carreened the ship, and found good store of fish and goats and some beeves, their sick being well recovered.” On 8 May 48 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 261. A long letter from four Company men at Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, dated 22 March 1632, shows that they were “not yet troubled with Lord Denbigh and his company, but if he arrive in these parts [they] will, by the Company’s order, afford him their best entertainment; but how to assist him and yet not engage the Company’s means” they do not know. They also expect he will want money from them (CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 259). This and other letters from Company agents in India and Persia show that a noble tourist did not count for much in the context of trade difficulties caused by the deaths of princes, famine, and war. Denbigh’s behavior once he reached India shows that he understood their position, for he no longer insisted on his own wishes, as he had in London in 1630, but accommodated himself to Company needs. 49 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 295–96, 301. 50 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 315. 51 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 341. Company captains still at Surat reported with concern that the James had sailed with “great want of bread, sail cloth, flesh, wine, cordage, and stuff” by reason of many disbursements to other ships, and the number of men they have taken, having hardly provisions for those they had” because of the famine. The captains had supplied Denbigh with “two butts of sack, for which he will make double satisfaction in England” (Ibid.).
the Mauritius agents wrote that the James would wait until 10 June “if meantime the Company’s ships arrive not from Persia nor they receive further advice from Surat.”52 Probably the provisions needed for the extra men, including Denbigh and those of his suite still with him, replaced much of the James’s cargo of spices. On 13 July 1633, Captain John Pennington met “the Jewel of London, one of our East India ships, much distressed for want of both men and victual” from which he heard “the Earl of Denbigh to be in good health and of purpose shortly to return home.” The interloper Captain Quaile’s crew carried the same message.53 Even if the James left Mauritius well before 10 June, she made a remarkably swift return, for on 28 August James Howell wrote to Secretary Windebank that “The Lo; Denbigh is returned from ye great Mogor full of jewells.”54 Denbigh’s view of his experience lives only in the portrait he commissioned from Van Dyck.

Oliver Millar describes this portrait as a “successful…[attempt] to plant a full length figure in a landscape…; the sitter strides—or lurches—forward towards the spectator and through the landscape which is no longer [a] decorative backcloth…[and] carries a flint-lock fowling piece, probably of French or Flemish origin.”55 This fowling piece would have been Denbigh’s own, perhaps even the one he took to India. Such guns were in request by Mughal rulers; a last-minute company memo (3 January 1631) directs Mr Colthurst “to look out…Some fowling pieces…to be bought for presents, and dogs.”56 His costume is partly Indian and partly European, a silk and gold kurta-pajama worn with English shoes and shirt. The assumption that “the costume [Denbigh] wears is of a type worn at that date by Europeans in India” is, however, questionable.57 Edward Terry, Sir Thomas Roe’s chaplain, recorded that in India, “We all kept to our English habits, made as light and coole as possibly we could have them.” For display as King James’s ambassador, “At Surat [Roe] pro-

52 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 262–63.
54 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 452. The company may have suspected Denbigh’s involvement in private trade, for on 20 September it recorded delivery to a “Mr Oswick, the Spanish merchant” of “60 bales of indigo and other goods secretly conveyed out of the ship…reported to belong to the Earl of Denbigh” (Ibid., 459). Some “interloping” in the East India Company’s territory was suspected, for on 5 October Pennington had heard a rumor that “Captain Mince [Mennes] is going a voyage to the East Indies with a ship of 500 tons and a pinnace of 200 tons, and that Lord Denbigh has a hand in it” (Ibid., 472). By 10 October, however, there was “not a word of Capt. Mennes’ going any where” (Ibid., 242) whether financed by Denbigh or on his own, and that is the last heard of it.
55 Millar, Van Dyck in England, 56.
56 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 111. Sir Thomas Roe despised Mughal greed for “presents” of guns, European pictures and jewelry, hunting dogs, and even an English horse demanded by Jehangir himself.
57 Millar, Van Dyck in England, 58; Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing, 53.
vided himself with twelve suits at a cost of from £3 to £42 each, and sub-
sequent entries [in an account kept in Roe’s journal] show that he spared
no expense to maintain the dignity of his post.”

Roe mentions wearing an item of native dress only once, in a journal
entry made during Jehangir’s 1616 progress from Agra to Mandu. Prince
Khurram (the future Shah Jahan) sent an eunuch to Roe with a message:

[T]he Prince would give me a great Present…[making] such a
busines as if I should have receiued his best Chayne of Pearle. By
and by came out a Cloth of gould Cloake of his owne, once or
twice wore, which he caused to be put on my back, and I made
reuerence, very unwillingly. When his Ancestor Tamerlane was
represented at the Theatre the Garment would haue well become
the Actor; but it is here reputed the highest of fauour to giue a
garment warne [sic] by the Prince, or, being New, once layd on
his shoulder.59

Denbigh, of much higher rank than Roe, is likely to have felt a similar con-
straint about an Englishman’s dignity, even if forced to travel to the
Mughal court in a merchant’s cart without a train great enough to assert
his nobility. Almost the only word Denbigh wrote about his travels men-
tions that he had brought back little but “pieces of Mesopotamia cloth,”
perhaps acquired at Gombroon, and a garment he calls “an old pagan
cloth,” conceivably a gift like the one Roe got from Prince Khurram.60 But
the costume in the portrait is not Mughal but Hindu, and would no more
have been worn for hunting in India than in England; the strain-folds
across the chest and the too-short sleeves also suggest that it had been
made for a somewhat smaller man.

In Europe Sir Robert Sherley did indeed wear the dress of Persia, but
this was not a souvenir of his years in Asia but a livery to assert his status
as the Shah’s ambassador.61 However he acquired it, Denbigh’s kurta-
pajama outfit, like Sherley’s Persian dress, is for European, not Eastern
eyes, but his European shoes, shirt, and gun with its accessories assert that
though Denbigh wears native garb, he has not “gone native” as did Cory-
ate on his epic walk from Aleppo to Ajmere.62 Furthermore, unlike Sir
Robert Sherley and unlike the boy beside him, Denbigh does not wear the

58Roe, Embassy, 106.
59Roe, Embassy, 334.
60Millar, Van Dyck in England, 56.
61Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing, 57.
62Merchants working in places of different culture “had to conduct themselves in a
manner acceptable to their hosts…. [I]n the Ottoman empire…the English adopted Turkish
dress, but only to avoid insult and injury”; this was why William Harborne, his guide Joseph
Clements, and his servant changed from European into Turkish dress in Poland before cross-
ing into Turkish territory (Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement, 37, 89). The inventory
of one dead East India Company factor’s possessions suggests that his owning native as well
Jean MacIntyre

Turban ("to the average Englishman... a sign of Islam")\(^{63}\), but, like most of Van Dyck’s other English noblemen, he is bareheaded. “In Van Dyck’s underpainting the earl was holding in his left hand a wide-brimmed black hat, the ‘castor’ made of beaver fur.... The elimination of the hat from Van Dyck’s painting emphasizes its allusions to Indian and Persian realms instead.”\(^{64}\) Perhaps, but the hat’s deletion would not have been at Van Dyck’s discretion but by Denbigh’s choice.

One early inventory of the Hamilton pictures describes the portrait as “my lords denbighs at length, with a fowlinge peece in his hand, and a Blackamore by him,” and another as “My Lorde Denbeigh & Jacke.”\(^{65}\)

“Jacke,” his coloring and features clearly Indian, wears a long tunic girded with a wide sash and a turban bound with a scarf, dress authentic for servants in Mughal India;\(^{66}\) his gesture points not only toward the South American parrot above his head but toward his own face. He stands to the earl’s left, a step deeper in the picture plane but in the same full lighting. Van Dyck painted one portrait of Charles I attended by his riding master, Antoine, and another of Charles in hunting dress attended by a groom, but unlike “Jacke” these attendants are in shadow, well behind the brightly lit king. In 1776 Benjamin West painted Colonel Guy Johnson wearing a Mohawk robe and moccasins with a British army scarlet coat; a Mohawk chief stands in the shadows to his left and behind him. The Mohawk “remains anonymous as a type, an *ancilla* to Johnson’s persona.... He exemplifies ethnographic stereotyping,.... [which depends] on the externals of appearance, especially costume.... [E]xoticism is manifested through careful attention to details of costume, personal appearance, and ‘race.’”\(^{67}\)

Given the authenticity of “Jacke’s” appearance, he must have been available to sit for Van Dyck, and Denbigh must have wanted “Jacke” emphatically placed in his portrait, but where might “Jacke,” clearly a servant important to his master, have come from?

The name of only one of Denbigh’s servants during his voyage is recorded. In January 1633, Surat wrote that “Mr [Robert] Barlowe, a Gentleman attendant on the Earl of Denbigh [was] left at Gombroon,” but he was back in England by September 1634, when the Company, noting that he had been “Secretary to the Earl of Denbigh...left behind

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\(^{64}\)Jones and Stallybrass, *Renaissance Clothing*, 53. In scenes of outdoor activity King Charles wears a hat, but male companions of all ranks and ages are bareheaded and seldom even carry hats. Archbishop Laud’s square clerical cap is a professional icon.


upon some difference between them,” granted “his passage and diet given him freely” because he had “not used private trade.” There is no record that any of Denbigh’s party died, or that he hired any new servant. Peter Mundy’s diary for 1630–31, however, does suggest one way that “Jacke” might have come into the picture.

Mundy left Surat for Agra on 11 November 1630, at “The begininge of the greate Famine” caused by “the want of rayne this last Season,” when “poore people [were] begininge to die for want of Sustenance.” On 16 November he reached a town where “the men and weomen were driven to that extremitie for want of food that they sold their Children for 12d., 6d., and [blank] pence a peece; yea, and to give them away to any that would take them, with manye thancks, that soe they might preserve them alive, although they were sure never to see them againe.” Mundy does not say that he or his fellow merchants bought children, but a nobleman like Denbigh would have thought that taking such a child was a gesture of aristocratic liberality, like taking the son of an unfortunate English dependant into his service. “Jacke” might also have been a gift from Shah Jahan or one of his nobles. However Denbigh acquired him, he would have had the boy christened, possibly acting as godfather; the quasi-kinship thus created would help explain the boy’s prominence in the portrait, even as his color and exotic clothing emphasize his alien difference.

Though Denbigh must have chosen the Indian suit and boy, the fowling piece, sword, and shot-bag (not purse) for his sitting to Van Dyck, the only likely target for his gun is the parrot toward which the boy gestures. As Richard Wendorf reads the scene, “Denbigh has stopped dead in his tracks, with his gun lowered, and with his left hand suggestively opening up to the scene that lies before him….in spatial terms, [placed] between the English trees on the left…and the native Indian tree and mountain scene on the right,” but his gaze is directed outside the picture, not toward the viewer as in other Van Dyck portraits but toward a mysterious something which the viewer cannot see.

Unlike Denbigh’s suit, accessories, and boy, this landscape setting came from Van Dyck’s imagination. The species of the tree on the left of the picture is indeterminate, unlike easily recognizable trees in the background of other Van Dyck paintings, so can hardly be claimed as “English” except as it resembles the generic trees that shade Charles I in some portraits located outdoors. The palm on the right side of the picture

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68 CSP Colonial, 1630–34, 360, 570.
could have been taken from an illustrated herbal, from a book of designs like those Inigo Jones used for masque scenery, or from Van Dyck’s observations in Italy some fifteen years before. The distant snowcapped mountain looks like a volcano. While in India Denbigh could hardly have seen a snow-capped mountain, volcanic or otherwise, but Van Dyck would have seen snow peaks en route to Italy, and in Sicily could also have viewed Mount Etna. The painting thus blends the authentic (the human subjects, clothes, and equipment) with the imaginary (the landscape background). In these respects the painting resembles Caroline masques, in which persons well known at court (including the king and queen) appeared in fanciful array before exotic settings.

Denbigh’s voyage and perhaps Van Dyck’s record of it, may even have contributed to the choice of subject for such a masque. Susan countess of Denbigh was Queen Henrietta Maria’s “most important attendant,” so her husband’s voyage to India and Persia may have suggested the Indian setting for the queen’s 1635 Shrove Tuesday masque, The Temple of Love. In this masque, noble Persian youths seek the Temple of Chaste Love, and in the Indian kingdom of Narsinga are resisted by “Brachmani” magicians whom they in turn resist. As the masque’s climax, Queen Henrietta Maria as Queen Indamora of Narsinga and ladies (among them Denbigh’s daughters the marchioness of Hamilton and Elizabeth Feilding) entered on a “maritime chariot…drawn by sea-monsters” from which they descended for their dances. Jones may have incorporated a detail from

71 The Catholic emblem book Parthenia Sacra places a palm and an olive inside the gate of the enclosed garden which traditionally symbolizes the Virgin Mary. “The Essay” on the palm declares it an emblem not only as “with Antiquitie…the Symbol of constancie and victorie” but also of married chastity, then adding that “The Indians haue need of manie things, and lo the Palm supplies the[m] al;…it affords them oyle, wine, and bread, as they ha[n]dle it; with the leaes they cover their houses, as we with tiles; they write theron, instead of paper; if they put themselues to sea, the Palmes doe furnish them with al things necesarie thereto…. The trunk and branches yeald them masts and boards; the leaes being wouen, make vp their sayles; with the bark, they frame their tacklings and cordage. So as not without some miracle, as it were, may you say, when you see a Man-of-warre of theirs, or a marchants ship, behold a Palm, how it rides vpon the seas.” Henry Hawkins, Parthenia Sacra (1633; repr. Menston, England: Scolar Press, 1977), 154–55.

72 Millar, Van Dyck in England, 14.

73 “Susan Villiers, Countess of Denbigh, sister of the favorite [Buckingham,…continued to have access to both the king and the queen independently even after [his] assassination…in 1628…. [She] kept alive the Villiers patronage network in both Privy Council and Household. Her work was made easier by the marriage of her son, Basil, Lord Feilding, to Anne Weston, daughter of the Lord Treasurer, and by the marriage of James, marquis of Hamilton, to her daughter. Although her husband…was Master of the Wardrobe for the king, her preferred intermediary was her son-in-law Hamilton, who was closer to Charles.” A patronage seeker “planned to approach ‘the king by my Lord Marquess and the Countess of Denbigh and by them jointly. My lady has promised me her furtherance.’” She kept her word. Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (London: Routledge, 1990), 73.

Van Dyck’s background to the earl’s portrait in the “Indian Shore” set for this masque; though most of the design comes from an Italian stage image of South America, Jones added a tree like the one on Denbigh’s right, which stands in the same relation (but in mirror image) to a palm as does the tree in the portrait. Except for the portrait and perhaps the masque, however, Denbigh’s eastern tour had no discernible effect on Caroline culture or his own career, unless whatever glimpses he had of Mughal recklessness in war inspired his mortal bravado during Prince Rupert’s 1643 assault on Birmingham. Nonetheless, he thought it important for Van Dyck to record not only his middle-aged appearance but, by costume, landscape, and servant, to document the truth of his eastern journey.

The parrot could have been drawn from either a living pet or a stuffed specimen, but that the boy points at the bird for Denbigh to shoot as game is unlikely. Parrots have long symbolized imitation; the boy’s gesture, simultaneously toward the bird and toward himself, suggests that he wishes to imitate his master, to become, as much as a “native” can, like an Englishman. But Denbigh’s Indian dress shows the imitation as reciprocal; just as the native imperfectly parrots him, so he, on a grander scale, imperfectly parrots the native. Denbigh’s awkward pose, his exotic costume, and his puzzled gaze beneath the palm of victory and the mocking parrot create an ironic comment (presumably Van Dyck’s own) on his voyage “to see those countries” in the East.
Latin Grammar in the Cathedral School: Fulbert of Chartres, Bonipert of Pécs, and the Way of a Lost Priscian Manuscript

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The starting point of the classical tradition in medieval Hungary is marked by a letter written by Bishop Fulbert of Chartres in Northern France to Bishop Bonipert of Pécs in Southern Hungary.1 In this letter, dated by its editor to 1023, Fulbert assured his colleague, Bonipert that he was going to send him one of his copies of Priscian: “Our son and your faithful servant Hilduin has told us of your gestures of charity toward us and dutifully stated that you would like one of our copies of Priscian. We are happy to send this by him, and whatever else you should ask of us we shall be most delighted to send you if we can; and if you should need and want us to, and if we are able, we ourselves shall most obediently attend you in person.”2 The otherwise unspecified

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2Of the many editions of Fulbert’s letter, the best one is that of Frederick Behrends, The Letters and Poems of Fulbert of Chartres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 148–49: Significat autem nobis filius noster tuusque fidelis Hilduinus tuae caritatis erga nos insigniam, fideliter asserens unum de nostris Priscianis te uelle, quem et per eundem libenter mittimus, quicquid etiam de nostro pecieris hilarissime tibi (si possibile fuerit) transmissuri, ipsum quoque presenciam nostram, si tibi opus esset ac voluntas, nosisque potestas, obsequentissime pretatur.

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Priscian manuscript mentioned in Fulbert’s letter is now lost. Departing from this evidence, however, it is possible to explore the implications of teaching and learning Latin in a recently Christianized country.

First of all, it is necessary to give an overview about the persons involved in this correspondence. A former disciple of Gerbert of Aurillac in the cathedral school of Reims, Fulbert was one of the greatest intellectuals of his time. He was bishop of Chartres between 1007 and 1029. Recalling his memories, one of the alumni of the cathedral school of Chartres, Adelman of Liège, called Fulbert Socrates in a letter to Berengar of Tours: “in the academy of Chartres under our venerable Socrates.” Fulbert of Chartres had close connection with Abbot Odilo of Cluny who was in correspondence with King Stephen of Hungary in the late 1030s about relics to be sent to the altars of Hungarian churches. An indicator of Ful-

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bert’s Cluniac relations is an entry in the twelfth-century library catalogue of the monastery of Cluny: “The letters of Bishop Fulbert and another work by him on verses, rhythms, and hymns in prose and song.”7 As a bishop, Fulbert might also have had a private library independent of the cathedral library. At least, this can be inferred from one of his letters: “Among the prerogatives of the Roman Church there are some that we must honour which as a result of our negligence are not easily found in our book-chests.”8 In the eleventh century, the Chartres library possessed more copies of Priscian, but again, the surviving book list does not specify which works.9 Manuscripts of Latin classics like Horace, Ovid, Statius, Terence, and Vergil also figured in the cathedral library. The seven liberal arts were part of the curriculum in the cathedral school in order to instruct the higher rank of the diocesan clergy.10 The library of the monastery of Saint Peter in Chartres had a copy of Priscian in those days as well.11

Due to the lack of proper documentation, the prosopographic study on Bishop Bonipert of Pécs is a lot more difficult than that on Bishop Fulbert of Chartres.12 One of the most important questions about Bonipert is whether he was of French or Lombard origin. The occurrence of his name, Bonipert, in a charter issued by Emperor Otto III in Rome in 996 supports the hypothesis on his Lombard origin.13 In either case, Bonipert

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was probably a Benedictine monk with strong Cluniac connections like many other missionaries around King Stephen of Hungary. He was first bishop of Pécs in Southern Hungary from 1009 to 1036. King Stephen’s foundation charter of the bishopric in 1009 recorded that Bonipert was appointed first bishop of Pécs: *Boniperto ibi episcopo facto.* Bishop Bonipert also figures in the foundation charter of the Benedictine abbey of Zalavár, issued by King Stephen in 1019. The charter records that one of the two witnesses to the consecration of the new church of the monastery was Bishop Bonipert. Nevertheless, his role is less obvious in the reception of Gerard, a Benedictine monk from Venice, later bishop of Csanád, in Hungary. According to the twelfth-century legend of Saint Gerard, it was Maur, second bishop of Pécs who welcomed him in Hungary. On the other hand, Gerard arrived to Hungary in 1015 and became bishop of Csanád in 1030. None of these sixteen years is suitable for having Maur as bishop of Pécs because he was appointed to this rank only in 1036. If so, the author of the twelfth-century Gerard legend did not remember correctly and it was Bishop Bonipert who received Gerard in Hungary and introduced him to King Stephen. Even more problematic is the issue of Bonipert’s alleged chancellorship. Some of the editors of Fulbert’s letter argue that its address reads *archiepiscopo,* meaning that Bonipert was chancellor of King Stephen in his archiepiscopal role. This hypothesis can be supported by two arguments. The first is Fulbert’s greeting to King Stephen in the closing words of his letter: “In closing we send our wishes for your continual well-being, and we ask you to convey our greetings to that new and glorious adopted son of the Most High King, namely King Stephen, and to assure his excellency on behalf of us and all the communi-

14The cathedral of Pécs was dedicated to Saint Peter. See György Györffy, *Diplomata Hungaricae antiquissima,* 1:54–58: *eractionem episcopatus, qui vocabitur Quinqueecclesiensis, statui-


ties in our diocese, both canons and monks, of our faithful prayers." According to the second argument, Bonipert’s archiepiscopal rank explains why he asked for a copy of Priscian: as archbishop and chancellor, he was in charge of supervising the composition of royal charters, a task requiring a proper command of Latin. Following these arguments, some historians suggested that Bonipert was not only archbishop but also *capellanus* or *sacellanus*, that is, court priest of King Stephen. They also proposed that the first royal law code of King Stephen was prepared by Bonipert and Hilduin, the messenger mentioned in Fulbert’s letter. Their arguments, however, fail at two points. First, the contemporary German model, namely, the system of the court of Emperor Henry II in the early eleventh century, does not fit into their hypothesis. Second, they simply fail to recognize that the archbishop of Esztergom was Astrik-Anastas at that time. The so-called Annals of Pozsony, written by Benedictine monks from 997 to 1203, also contain valuable information on Bishop Bonipert. At the year 1036, it reads: *Maurus episcopus est factus.* The entry of 1042 says: *Bompertus episcopus obiit.* The conjecture of these two entries suggests that Bishop Bonipert resigned six years before his death. He may have been sick or gone to cloister. If the hypothesis on his French origin can be accepted, it is possible that due to political reasons he was put aside by the German supporters and the Bavarian escort of Queen Gisela (sister of Emperor Henry II and widow of King Stephen) and by King Peter Orseolo, subsequent king of Hungary; and that he had to return to France. Anyhow, his successor in the bishopric of Pécs from 1036 to 1070 was Maur, formerly a Benedictine monk in the abbey of Pannonhalma. Finally, the fact that the Annals of Pozsony were composed...


by Benedictine monks also supports the hypothesis with respect to Bonipert’s Benedictine past.20

On top of all these issues that have existed already in centuries of scholarship, one has to formulate another set of new questions in order to get closer to the solution of the problem raised by Fulbert’s letter. Did Bonipert know Fulbert personally? The personal tone of Fulbert’s letter proves nothing, given the stylistic patterns of medieval epistolography. Did Bonipert know the cathedral library of Chartres or the private library of Fulbert? Since he turned to his colleague with a precise request, he probably did. On the other hand, however, one can easily reject this conclusion by saying that it does not require a personal experience for an eleventh-century bishop to infer that a well-equipped cathedral library has at least one copy of Priscian’s grammar. Another series of questions is related to the person of Hilduin, the messenger between Chartres and Pécs. Was he a priest of Fulbert and a canon in the Chartres cathedral or was he a priest of Bonipert and a canon in the Pécs cathedral? An intimate expression in another letter of Fulbert suggests that Hilduin once belonged to the Chartres cathedral community or Fulbert’s circle: Hilduinum, animae dimidium meae.21 This evidence, on the other hand, does not exclude the possibility of Hilduin being a canon first in Chartres and later in Pécs. In this case, consequently, the triangle of Fulbert, Hilduin, and Bonipert would support the hypothesis on the French origin of the bishop of Pécs.

Another problematic part of the research is to define the Priscian work Bonipert asked for. The question is all the more complicated because the manuscript might also have contained more than one of Priscian works. Although the manuscript the bishop of Pécs asked for is now lost, it probably included Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae or at least part of it, the so-called Priscianus maior (De octo partibus), containing the first sixteen books of the work, or the Priscianus minor (De constructione), containing the seventeenth and eighteenth books of the work, since this grammar had usually been copied and circulated in separate parts. Originally, the Institutiones grammaticae of Priscian, the early sixth-century grammarian in Constantinople, was meant to be a Latin grammar based on Greek author-


ities in order to help Byzantine Greeks learn Latin as a foreign language.22 According to other theories, the requested work may have also been the Praeexercitamina, a short review of rhetorical practices, in fact, a translated and reworked version of the Greek Progymnasmata of Hermogenes, schoolmaster in Tarsus in the second century.23 The proximity of the Pécs Diocese to Byzantine territory supports the theory of Bishop Bonipert as a prelate ready to pursue missionary activity in the Greek cultural zone. This hypothesis is, nevertheless, improbable since no one could expect a satisfactory level of Greek knowledge in a recently established cathedral community for that kind of purpose. Furthermore, the conversion of pagan Hungarians in his diocese presented a sufficient challenge to Bonipert.24 Other Priscian works can also be taken into consideration: the Partitiones duodecim versuum Aeneidos principalium, with a particularly rich Carolingian manuscript tradition,25 the Institutio de nomine et pronomine et verbo,26 the De figuris numerorum,27 and the De metris fabularum Terentii.28 Nevertheless, compared to the popularity of the Institutiones grammaticae, it is unlikely that Bishop Bonipert thought of one of these smaller treatises when he turned to Fulbert of Chartres with his book request. One can even ask, however, if Bonipert received the manuscript at all because there is no other evidence on the Priscian volume apart from Fulbert’s letter.

The editor of Priscian’s grammar wrote in 1855: “I would certainly state for sure that there are around one thousand codices of the *Institutiones Grammaticae* preserved in all the libraries of Europe.” 29 This sentence has misled generations of literary historians. 30 Philologists, however, have already demonstrated that this estimation was a gross exaggeration about the manuscript tradition of the grammar. Taking into account all the known manuscripts copied until the end of the fourteenth century, the most reliable results vary between three hundred and eight hundred Priscian manuscripts. 31 In theory, one of the approximately one hundred surviving manuscripts that were copied before or at the beginning of the eleventh century could be Fulbert’s Priscian. The Chartres provenance of two Priscian codices, an early ninth-century manuscript (today in Bern) and the early eleventh-century Priscian codex of Hartwic of Saint Emmeram (today in Munich), also supports this hypothesis. 32 The Munich manuscript is a miscellaneous codex that contains a glossed text of Priscian’s *De constructione*. The following inscription can be read on its first folio: *Dominus Fulbertus episcopus*. The donator of the codex was probably Hartwic, a Benedictine monk from the monastery of Saint Emmeram in Regensburg, Bavaria, who spent some time studying in the cathedral school of Chartres under the direction of Bishop Fulbert. Upon his return to Regensburg, he presumably carried one of the codices of his former tutor to his home cloister as study material. Since the Bavarian roots represented a constant cultural influence in Hungary in the eleventh century, the Munich manuscript, as well as the codex in Bern, is subject of further study from the perspective of Bishop Bonipert’s book request. 33

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32 Bern, Bürgerbibliothek, AA. 90. fasc. 22, and Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 14272.

Grammar, an essential part of the *trivium* in the seven liberal arts, played a major role in the medieval curriculum. The teaching of Latin grammar was essentially based on two authors in the Middle Ages: Donatus and Priscian. Their early medieval importance is plausibly attested by the Carolingian scholar, Alcuin, who recorded in his poem their presence in the rich cathedral library at York. Both Donatus and Priscian set up their grammars according to the standards of the Latin classics; thus they became important indirect mediators of the classical tradition in the Middle Ages. Similar to that of Donatus, the popularity of Priscian’s grammar can be illustrated with the excerpts, glosses, and commentaries written in the Carolingian period. Earlier, Cassiodor’s *De orthographia*, a compilation of the treatises of ancient grammarians, relied heavily on Priscian’s grammar as well: “These have been collected from the first book of the grammarian Priscian who was a teacher in our time in Constantinople.” The collection of excerpts from Priscian’s *Institutiones grammaticae* provided by Alcuin did not become a standard textbook in the Middle Ages; only a couple of its manuscripts have survived. The so-called *Excerptio de arte grammatica Prisciani*, however, became much more popular. Its manuscripts and the old library catalogues of the monastery of Fulda attributed this work to Hraban Maur but it was probably a false attribution. Apart from the excerpts, the commentaries constituted

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another significant branch of the Priscian tradition in the Carolingian period. These sophisticated treatises aimed at a narrower circle of learned scholars instead of a general audience.

Among them, Irish monks also played an extraordinary role in writing commentaries on Priscian’s works. One of them was the *In Priscianum* of Sedulius Scottus in the middle of the ninth century.59 The *Expositio super Priscianum* of Remigius of Auxerre and later the early scholastic *Glosule on Priscian*, surviving in manuscripts copied in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, were also part of this tradition.40

The purpose of Bishop Bonipert of Pécs was simply to recruit and to instruct priests and canons in his new cathedral while the cathedral school of Chartres already put a great stress on the trivial arts, especially on grammar in the time of Bishop Fulbert.41 After the foundation of the bishopric of Pécs in 1009, the cathedral school must have been established relatively soon by Bishop Bonipert. Presumably, the *scriptorium* of the cathedral was busy with the copying of liturgical books in the earliest period.42 The beginning of the cathedral’s activity of issuing public charters as a place of authentication can be dated only to 1214. Before that, the first and most important duty of the cathedral as an institution was the recruitment and instruction of priests and canons, including the trivial arts. This enterprise required a library and the lack of proper textbooks compelled Bonipert to import study material from abroad.43 On the basis of foreign *exemplaria*, either borrowings or donations, the codex copying activity must have


41It is significant that later, in the middle of the twelfth century, the archivolts of the right portal of the Western façade of the Chartres cathedral featured allegoric sculptures of the liberal arts—grammar was represented by the figure of either Donatus or Priscian. See Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), 151–53.


started in Pécs. Local traffic of books between Hungarian monasteries and cathedrals at that early stage cannot be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, there has been an attempt to prove that Bonipert asked for a Priscian manuscript in order to compare Fulbert’s copy to other volumes already available in the Pécs cathedral library. According to this hypothesis, Bonipert simply wanted to check his manuscripts against others. The relevant Hungarian scholarship, however, has still not reached a consensus about the Priscian manuscript being a borrowing, a kind of a medieval inter-library loan, or a present. According to some speculation, Bonipert supported Fulbert with a considerable amount of money while he was restoring the cathedral in Chartres, which had been damaged by fire in 1020. From this prospective, a copy of Priscian’s grammar in return was not a major issue, no matter how expensive a codex could have been at that time. In addition, since the scriptorium at the cathedral of Pécs must have been busy with copying liturgical codices at that early period and the scribes may not have had enough time for such luxury as to copy a Priscian manuscript, it is more probable that this Latin grammar was a gift from Fulbert to Bonipert.

It is extremely difficult to estimate the cultural level of a cathedral with the help of a single letter that mentions one book. Of course, the Priscian volume, if it arrived at all, was not the only book in Pécs in Bishop Bonipert’s time. Since nothing else can be documented, however, one should consider some contemporary parallels in order to put the cathedral of Pécs into a wider context. The description of Arnold, another Benedictine


46See Mezey, “A pécsi egyetemalapítás előzményei,” 54.
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monk from the monastery of Saint Emmeram in Regensburg, sheds some light on the eleventh-century cathedral school of Esztergom in Hungary. Around 1030, Arnold sailed down the river Danube to Hungary and spent some time in Esztergom as a guest of Archbishop Astrik-Anastas. During his stay, he composed a Saint Emmeram officium and the archbishop made his clerics learn that. The earliest detailed narrative source on the formation of a cathedral school in medieval Hungary is the fourteenth-century Gerard legend describing the establishment of the cathedral school at Csanád. This source, however, does not reflect the early eleventh-century circumstances. On the other hand, surviving library catalogues of nearly contemporary Western European cathedrals prove that Priscian's grammar was essential in teaching Latin in the cathedral schools. Foreign parallels suggest that having a Priscian was more or less a common feature of Central and Western European cathedral libraries, but by no means self-evident. For instance, the library catalogue of the Krakow cathedral, compiled in 1110, enlists Latin classics like Ovid, Persius, Sallust, Statius, Terence, and even a certain Regule gramaticae, but no Priscian. The late tenth-century inventory of the cathedral chapter of Freising contains the following entries of interest: Priscianus...Priscianus minor. Donatus maior et minor... The book register of the Bamberg cathedral chapter, compiled around 1100, has Prisciani duo... Going farther West, there is no trace indicating that the Salisbury cathedral library had any Priscian in the eleventh century. The Worcester cathedral library, however, had one copy of the Priscianus maior at the end of the


eleventh century. Finally, according to a Spanish document, the cathedral of Barcelona purchased a hundred-year-old codex containing the *Grammatica Prisciani* for a house and a field from a Jew in 1044. The later presence of Priscian in medieval Hungary is also problematic. Bishop Hartwic, writing the legend of King Saint Stephen between 1112 and 1116, speaks of Priscian in his preface: “Priscian, author of the art of grammar, whom once I had known so well…” Nonetheless, it does not matter how well Bishop Hartwic knew Priscian because he had probably acquired his thorough knowledge in Latin grammar as a Benedictine monk in Germany at the end of the eleventh century. He was not young when he came to Hungary and became bishop of Győr in 1088. Consequently, his reference to Priscian does not originate from Hungarian schooling.

Priscian has always been praised for his relatively precise citations. The number of his classical Latin quotations is around ten thousand, thus his indirect contribution to the classical tradition is considerable. He refers to virtually all the authors of ancient Roman literature. Contributing to the indirect survival of Latin classics with its quotations, Priscian’s Latin gram-

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54 Gustav Hänel, “Zweiter Bericht des Dr. G. Heine in Berlin über seine litterarische Reise in Spanien,” *Serapeum* 8, no. 6 (1847): 86.


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mar was a major mediator of classical antiquity in the Middle Ages. This helps to explain the status of Latin literacy in early eleventh-century Hungary and the extent to which it was based on the Latin classics. In addition, the first chapter of the second law code of King Stephen decreed: “The king shall provide vestments and altar cloths, and the bishop the priests and the books.” First of all, this royal decree referred to liturgical books but it was also the bishop’s responsibility to provide the cathedral community with proper textbooks. Similar to monastic education, the basic part of the curriculum in the cathedral schools was the trivium. The study of the grammars of Donatus and Priscian, however, already required an advanced command of Latin. Schoolmasters had to write their own elementary Latin grammars for beginners or else their students must have already been litterati. Since Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae was not designed for beginners (it has been characterized by one of the scholars as


“a university-level grammar if ever there was one”), Bishop Bonipert might have had students already with an advanced command of Latin who needed further training and instruction in the seven liberal arts. These aspects of teaching and learning advanced Latin grammar in a recently established cathedral school show how Latin language enabled cultural innovation in a recently converted country and that literary encounters did not cease to cross political borders. This is the way the letter of Bishop Fulbert of Chartres to Bishop Bonipert of Pécs marks the starting point of the classical tradition in medieval Hungary.61


Reading Beyond the Words: Material Letters and the Process of Interpretation

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Until recently, early modern letters, and women’s letters in particular, have been neglected as a source of information about early modern life and literary culture, although they have much to say, especially about the manuscript culture of which we now have become aware. In the 1990s, scholars began to cross the traditional disciplinary lines between literature and history and examine letters for indications of social and linguistic interrelationships and of personal artistry. Scholars of historical pragmatics now are treating issues such as how forms of address shifted across time; Lynne Magnusson is completing a book that explores early modern Englishwomen’s letters with regard to how the prose signals complex social and power relationships; Linda Mitchell and Carol Poster’s forthcoming essay collection examines letter-writing manuals and their influence; and James Daybell’s recently edited collection, *Early Modern Women’s Letter Writing, 1450–1700*, contains essays on specific Englishwomen’s letters from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, considered within their varied social and cultural contexts.¹ In these works, not surprisingly, the focus is on the words used in the letters, the rhetorical models, the rhetorical conventions, and letters’ contribution to our wider understanding of the writers’ lives and of early modern culture. Other than a few works which I will consider later, little yet has been published about the material aspects of early modern manuscript letters. As an archival scholar and a critic, I would argue that those of us who interpret letters need to learn to read beyond the words, and I would like to start that discussion by exploring some of the material aspects of manuscript letters, and particularly women’s manuscript letters,

Fig. 1. Lady Arbella Stuart to Sir Robert Cecil, 22 June [1603], MS Ashmole 1729, fol. 150r, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Portrait of Lady Arbella Stuart, ca. 1605, artist unknown, often attributed to Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger, from the Government Art Collection (GAC 399), on display at Lancaster House, London, Crown Copyright: U.K. Government Art Collection.
that may be meaningful. This essay might be considered a primer on materiality.

Probably the most obvious physical aspect of a manuscript letter is the handwriting, and the first question is whether the letter has been physically set down by the author. What is the style of handwriting used, and can the handwriting be compared to other letters known to be in the author’s own hand? Most women who were literate would have written in the italic, rather than the secretary style. (Note figures 1 and 2 for samples of italic hands and figures 3 and 4 for secretary hands.) Italic was the style most often taught to women—what Malvolio called “the sweet Roman hand”—in part because it was believed to be easier to learn and thus more appropriate for women.2 The italic hand had been used first at court and extended over time down the class scale,3 so that in Twelfth Night Maria, a gentlewoman, is capable of writing a hand that can seem indistinguishable from that of her mistress, the countess Olivia, which is of course the point of the joke. Female and male signatures also commonly appeared in the more readable italic hand by the end of the sixteenth century, even when the letter itself might have been written in secretary hand or by a secretary (figures 3 and 4). Among aristocratic and highly literate women like Lady Arbella Stuart, whose letters I have edited (and from whose correspondence I will often draw examples), there might be more than one style of italic hand. Stuart, like many women of her class, used a presentation italic hand for formal letters to her social superiors or politically influential friends (see figure 1) and an informal italic hand for letters to family, friends, and social inferiors (see figure 2). In such cases, we may know something about the occasion and situation even before we read the words, just from the style of the handwriting. When Arbella Stuart writes to Robert Cecil, her inferior by birth but her superior in influence, asking him to “move his Majesty” on her behalf,4 she uses her presentation hand (figure 1). Anything less than her own most formal handwriting would undercut the earnestness of her plea and the respect with which she regards her potential benefactor.

In addition to indicating relative status, a letter in one’s own handwriting could reflect alliance with the recipient. Among the upper classes, a letter from a social superior written without a secretary as intermediary

Fig. 2. Lady Arbella Stuart to Gilbert Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, 17 June 1609, Arundel Castle MSS, Autograph Letters 1585–1617, no. 167. By kind permission of His Grace The Duke of Norfolk.
indicated closeness, a condescension and consideration that made the physical letter itself a personal token of affection. Repeatedly one finds in letters written to the court, where gift-giving was high political art, thanks being rendered for the kindness of someone’s having written “with your own hand.” Under house arrest after having tried to contract an unapproved marriage, Arbella Stuart—like others before her—hoped for a letter in Queen Elizabeth’s “owne hand.” Even two lines, she thought, would have indicated the queen’s forgiveness and acknowledgment of Stuart’s rank and familial relationship. Stuart deeply resented receiving the queen’s reply “in m. Secretaryes hand” (letter 16).

Because handwriting was meaningful, there was, not surprisingly, much concern about the quality of one’s handwriting. Even Prince Henry at age fourteen asked that his reader “not bethink me anything the worse scrivener etc. that I write so ill” (letter B9). Women, who often lacked the training and practice that men had, frequently apologized to their friends and social superiors for the quality of their hands; surely those apologies were not always merely rhetorical devices.5 It is not correct to assume, however, that having a letter in a secretary’s hand indicates illiteracy on the part of the author. A literate woman might choose to use an amanuensis for any number of reasons. If she were from the upper class and the letter a routine one, she well might want to use her secretary, who was after all being paid for such work. If she were writing to someone abroad, she might feel comfortable with an amanuensis more skilled in Latin or French or Spanish. She might be ill and physically unable to write. In his recent study of more than 2300 early modern women’s extant letters, James Daybell estimates that approximately one quarter were written in the hands of secretaries; Daybell raises engaging questions about the degree to which such a collaborative process might have affected the content and style of women’s writing.6

If the manuscript letter is a holograph, and there are other letters in the author’s handwriting, a comparison of the manuscripts may yield significant information. The writer’s handwriting may be careful and precise at one point, a hurried scrawl at another. The difference may not always be meaningful—I would hate for someone to attempt to determine my emotional state from my varied signatures on credit card charge receipts—but it may reflect anger or frustration or a need for haste. The same holds true with additions and deletions or unusual inclusion or omission of punctua-

Fig. 3. Sir John Elphinstone to Lady Arbella Stuart, 9 March 1607/8, Arundel Castle MSS, Autograph Letters 1585–1617, no. 158. By kind permission of His Grace The Duke of Norfolk.
tion. It may be significant that a writer who regularly sends careful final copies at one point instead sends what would appear to have been a draft filled with additions, deletions, and ink blots. This could suggest a simple error—the wrong copy was folded and sent—but could also indicate something more unusual and worth investigating. That decision, however, requires that there be enough letters that we can see patterns and exercise reasonable judgment about what is the norm and what the exception.

Another meaningful aspect of manuscript letters is spacing, and here scholars can turn to useful work done in the 1990s by A. R. Braunmuller and Jonathan Gibson, drawing from English books on letter-writing by William Fulwood or Angel Day and from Braunmuller’s and Gibson’s own experiences in the archives. Both Braunmuller and Gibson point out that space, too, was a convention that indicated social hierarchies. The amount of unfilled space on a page, for example, well might imply respect in an era in which most paper was imported and expensive. Similarly, the distance between the subscription (the “Your most humble and obedient servant”) and the signature, or between the body of the text and the subscription and signature as a unit, which sometimes was placed so close to the bottom edge of the paper as to be missed by the casual modern reader, could suggest the relative social distance between the writer and the addressee. According to Angel Day in The English Secretary (1599), the greater the personage to whom the letter is written “by so much the lower, shall the subscription thereunto belonging, in any wise be placed,” even to the point that “the verie lowest margent of paper shall do no more but beare it, so be it the space bee seemelie for the name, and the roome faire enough to comprehend it.” In figure 4, a letter of appeal from Sir John Harington to Lady Arbella Stuart gives some sense of this use of space. By contrast, in a letter to a family member or friend, a writer well might fill the space with closely written text, finishing a letter by writing in the margins (as shown in figure 2) or inserting notes between lines rather than use an additional sheet of paper.

William Fulwood in his 1568 book on letter-writing, The Enimie of Idlenesse, also suggests a horizontal significance in the placing of the subscription: to the right for superiors, toward the middle for equals, and to


\footnote{Angel Day, The English Secretary; or, Methods of Writing Epistles and Letters, with a Declaration of such Tropes, Figures, and Schemes, as Either Usually or for Ornament Sake are Therein Required (1599), facsimile reproduction, with introduction by Robert O. Evans (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967), 15.
Fig. 4. Sir John Harington of Exton to Lady Arbella Stuart, 19 November [1604–9], Arundel Castle MSS, Autograph Letters 1585–1617, no. 169. By kind permission of His Grace The Duke of Norfolk.
the left for inferiors. What Fulwood would make of those who combine these placements I am unsure. Elizabeth Talbot, countess of Shrewsbury, writing to her friend and sovereign Queen Elizabeth in 1603, places the first part of the subscription at the middle (“your Majesties”), then finishes it at the right (“most humble saruant and subiect”), which would correspond neatly with Fulwood’s guidelines. In my experience, however, early modern letter-writers rarely follow Fulwood’s or Day’s or any of the letter-writing manuals’ rules precisely, and it would be surprising if they did, so we must interpret space loosely and, again, within the context of the writer’s usual practice if we can. On occasion, the meaning is quite clear: in the “Tide Letter” from the young Princess Elizabeth, accused of treason, to Mary Tudor, her half-sister and queen, we see the respectful lowly placement of the subscription and signature, accompanied by a note requesting “only one worde of answer from your selfe,” but with careful lines drawn through all that unfilled space so that no one could add to her text anything that would accuse her (figure 5).

Other significant aspects of manuscript letters are associated with the receipt, delivery, and retention of correspondence, and I initially found this process sufficiently confusing in its material manifestation four hundred years later that I hope you will excuse me if I explain at some length. Extant manuscripts may reflect letters in a number of states. For example, a writer might have drafted a letter, making additions and corrections on the draft, and then sent a clean copy in her own hand or someone else’s to the addressee. The original draft well might have been destroyed when the clean copy was sent, making the final letter the only version extant, or for any number of reasons the draft might have been kept for the writer’s own correspondence file. Two copies, perhaps slightly different texts. If the received letter is no longer extant, and we have only this writer’s draft, we cannot be assured that this letter was sent, was sent in this form, or ever was received, given a developing but highly inexact postal system – although it may have been. A similar letter that we are certain was received may be a revision of this draft. Or it might be another letter written for a similar purpose at another time. A draft or second clean copy may have been retained as a writer’s file copy because the letter held special personal or business significance; or the writer may have hoped to maintain a complete file of a specific correspondence, whether with a lover or a distant sister or with those involved in a struggle over an inheritance. After Arbella Stuart’s clandestine marriage and subsequent imprisonment, Lady Jane Drummond, Queen Anna’s attendant, wrote with some puzzlement that she had received Stuart’s letter, and a copy of it with “just the sam words” but without instructions on what to do with the copy (letter B15). Stuart,

10Elizabeth Talbot, countess of Shrewsbury, to Queen Elizabeth, 9 January 1602/3, Hatfield House Cecil Papers 135, fol. 112r.
Fig. 5. Princess Elizabeth to Queen Mary Tudor, 17 March 1554, Public Record Office SP 11/4, no. 2 (2).
who was keeping a file of such important letters for her reference, probably accidentally enclosed a file copy. Sometimes letters appear to have been kept just for the paper, long after the importance of the original letter faded; writers regularly drafted new letters, or composed scraps of poetry, or made financial notations on drafts of old letters they had at the house.

When a letter was composed, the writer might decide to send the letter by post or to entrust it to a private carrier, often a friend or relation or servant. The most common form of closing and sealing a letter was what we now call the tuck-and-seal format: the letter was “first folded twice horizontally and then twice vertically, the left portion tucked inside the right one and the seam sealed in the center with wax.”11 The superscription and address, the form of which also might vary according to the degree of the recipient,12 were then written on the front of the folded sheet. If a manuscript letter with which you are working was sent and/or delivered, then the paper probably will reflect this with appropriate creases and an address. For example, see the fold pattern and address on the letter in figure 6. I once was told that a specific letter in a collection had been enclosed with another, only to discover when I examined the manuscript that that sheet of paper never had been folded and thus had not been the enclosed copy. In some cases, letters were written on folio sheets of paper already once folded in half, so that words might appear only on the first recto, with the second recto blank or nearly so. When the letter was then folded for posting, no ink from the first recto would have bled through the second sheet to mar the superscription and address on the second verso. This choice effectively added an extra measure of security, as some people in the twenty-first century employ envelopes with linings printed for privacy or wrap their checks or paper currency within another piece of paper.13 It is difficult to know whether security was the sole purpose in early modern England, however, since other economic and social factors well may have come into play.

When a letter was received, it too might have been placed in a correspondence file, this time the addressee’s. Either the recipient or a secretary or a spouse might place a docket, or brief explanation of the contents, on the outside to allow for easy recognition in the file and later rereading. See figure 6, where the docket appears center right. Dockets often were placed at right angles to the address and at the edge of the paper, as in this figure, indicating something about how the papers were folded and filed, but dockets can appear in many places. They may be quite detailed, including

13For this idea, I am grateful to Lynne Magnusson.
Fig. 6. Lady Arbella Stuart to Gilbert Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, 17 June 1609, Arundel Castle MSS, Autograph Letters 1585–1617, no. 167. By kind permission of His Grace The Duke of Norfolk.
subject, author, recipient, and date, or something as simple as “Mrs. Sher-land.” Drafts retained by the writer for her personal file might have similar dockets, but the phraseology would differ from dockets in the recipient’s file, for example “My letter to Mr. Turnbull” or “My Lady’s letter to his lordship” rather than “From Jane.” Many collections of manuscript letters show just this diverse mixture, some letters sent to various people, some letters received from various people, and some letters that were forwarded, or copied and forwarded, by friends and family, that is, letters of which the “owner” was neither writer nor recipient, merely someone expected to be an interested reader. The format of the docket and the handwriting of the docket well could be significant pieces of information. To take a simple case: if the letter was docketed in the hand of a secretary or spouse who died in 1593, then the letter probably does not allude to that controversy of 1596.

Dating letters often is difficult, especially when we are working with drafts or copies. Writers rarely took time to date drafts, as most of us probably rarely did before we had a computer that did it electronically for us. Sometimes the letter’s content may make a date clear, but content can be misleading, particularly in regard to an on-going issue such as a property dispute or problem child. It is too easy for us to date letters from the storyline we imagine in our heads as we read. Letters in collections in repositories well may have dates on them, sometimes more than one, some of which were placed there by later readers who were themselves speculating about the dates. It is important to learn about handwriting and conventions for indicating dates. Otherwise we could give credence to a wild guess that was placed on that paper eighty years after the letter was written, perhaps even by the librarian when it was added to the library’s collection a hundred years later. A further complication can occur when letters, many of which may be undated drafts, have been bound in library volumes. Even sheets once folded together may have been separated and misbound long ago, leading to misreadings of the narrative as a result of confusion about chronology.14

The physical evidence of multiple copies of various letters may say much about a particular letter or situation, about who was informed or invited into the epistolary circle. The prevalence of multiple copies also says much about a manuscript culture. It asks that we reconsider our textual assumptions that letters are private documents through which writer and recipient intimately converse, an idea we are beginning to recognize was not necessarily the only model accepted in the Renaissance, where letters circulated widely and even letters intended to be carried by trusted

14For discussion of misbound manuscript volumes, I am grateful to Charles Whitney and Elizabeth McCutcheon.
servants were written with the knowledge that the contents might receive far wider circulation than the original addressee.\textsuperscript{15} Letters regularly were forwarded: people passed on letters of petition to those who might be more able to help than they were; they sent on their own drafts or clean copies to ask if others thought they had handled a situation well; they forwarded letters they thought might interest friends, family, or political allies\textsuperscript{16}—the early modern equivalent of “cc.” Diplomats’ letters and dispatches routinely were copied and distributed. Investigations at court or in law meant letters were gathered in evidence and copied.

Certainly there were shared understandings among individuals of what should not be said in delicate situations, for fear of antagonistic readers or even nosy neighbors like the Shuckboroughs, who in the Restoration were said to “open all letters that comes to their hands.”\textsuperscript{17} Often writers overtly reveal their consciousness of their potential audience, saying only that the bearer will explain the details—see the marginal note to figure 2 in which Stuart mentions “somme good ends whearof this bearer will tell your Lordship one”—or that the details must wait until the writer and recipient are again together or even that the letter should be destroyed after being read. Anne Bacon, for example, aware of and hoping to control her potential readership, asks that her son not share a letter with his male servants or companions: “Observe I pray burn my letter. Your


\textsuperscript{16}Later epistolary fiction also reflects the way in which copies were forwarded and shared in a manuscript culture. In Samuel Richardson’s \textit{Clarissa}, for example, Clarissa Har- lowe regularly forwards to her friend Anna Howe copies of letters she has written to and received from others—even in one case when she has been ordered by her mother to burn the letter; she occasionally comments on whether letters had been sent to her unsealed or unsuperscribed, points that obviously were meaningful (\textit{Clarissa}, abridged and ed. Philip Stevick [San Francisco: Binchart Press, 1971], 3, 49-50, 53, 55). Similarly, in Aphra Behn’s \textit{Love-Letters Between a Noble-Man and his Sister}, Behn’s lovers discuss sealing, enclosing, and concealing letters, trusting servants, counterfeiting handwriting, and tearing or burning letters when read (\textit{Love-Letters Between a Noble-Man and his Sister} [London: for J. Hindmarsh and J. Tonson, 1693], passim). Although the needs of epistolary fiction differed from those of general correspondence, Richardson, Behn, and others would not have had their characters regularly share letters unless, as the archives indicate, letter-writers often did so. On this point about epistolary fiction, I am indebted to Nancy Gutierrez.

men and your brothers’ pry into every matter and listen. I pray send back or burn this.” Her uneasiness likely was well founded.

Not only young roisterers shared letters, of course. George Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, wrote his wife Elizabeth, countess of Shrewsbury, that he had liked her recent letters so much that he had sent them to his son Gilbert, as he similarly sent to her his letters from Gilbert; on occasion he intercepted and read letters.19 Networks of correspondents were the primary means of circulating news in an era that lacked newspapers, and the news might be international and national or local and familial. Those who read letters that had been forwarded from others certainly understood the system and were aware when they wrote that their letters, too, could be shared, forwarded, and copied.

Much of what I have discussed here about the material aspects of early modern manuscript letters will not appear in our print and on-line editions. It is highly unlikely that, outside of facsimile reproduction, any publisher will be willing to reproduce the space left between the body of the text and the subscription and signature, or will want to indicate where ink blots mar the text. The material aspects of manuscript letters should be part of our discussions, however, both because they are meaningful and because they make us more aware of the degree to which our interpretations of early modern letters may be based on our own textual assumptions, not on early modern conventions. While I would not pretend that this awareness of materiality will allow us to recreate the early modern letter-writing milieu, it well may yield a more enjoyable reading experience and one that more accurately reflects the subtlety and complexity of early modern manuscript culture.

19 Folger Shakespeare Library MSS X.d.428 (89), (97), and (103).
The Prevention of Infirm or Monstrous Births

Michael T. Walton, Ph.D. and Robert M. Fineman, M.D. Ph.D.

FROM ANCIENT TIMES, HUMANS HAVE TRIED to improve reproductive outcome, that is, to give birth to healthy, beautiful babies. Both folk traditions and medical theories offered hope that infirm or monstrous births could be avoided. While most efforts were ineffectual by modern standards, some may have been beneficial. It was not until well into the twentieth century that clearly demonstrable therapies were developed to improve birth outcomes. However, those therapies were almost as limited as the ancient techniques, in light of the possibilities of genetic therapy in the twenty-first century. In the following essay, we will look at the history of medical and ethical ideas of influencing birth outcome, and of what use they may be in guiding our consideration in an era of the mapping of the human genome and genetic engineering.

I

Attempts to affect the outcome of fetal development are inevitably connected to medical theories. Ancient medical theories, whether Greek or non-Greek, tended to present conception and gestation as dependent on an interplay of male and female seed, and external environmental factors. Aristotle taught that the lighter, more spiritual male seed formed and shaped the more material female seed after conception. Sex was determined by the location in the uterus where the fetus developed. In De usu partium, Galen wrote that although animals had multi-chambered uteri suited to multiple births, the human uterus had only two chambers.¹ The warmer, right side caused the development of male children while the colder, left side developed females. During the medieval period, a misunderstanding arose that led to a teaching that the human uterus was seven chambered. Three produced males, three females, and the center chamber produced hermaphrodites.²

¹Margaret Tallmadge May, Galen on the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 2:625.
This system, in which the male seed worked upon the female seed as a carpenter works upon wood, explained a great many phenomena associated with generation and birth. According to Aristotelian causality, the intended product or end of generation is a perfect male child. Anything less, such as a female child, results from some kind of perversion or failure in generation. For example, a simple insufficiency of heat would thwart nature and create the colder, unfinished female. Multiple births were also viewed as monsters produced by generative errors. Twins, triplets, etc., were variously explained as the result of a large quantity of matter being divided among several chambers of the uterus, or a normal amount of matter being similarly divided. Male seed from different sexual contacts could also play a role in multiple births. Siamese twins and babies born with deformed or missing parts resulted from an imbalance of male and female seed.

Monsters that appeared to be part human and part beast were explained by postulating a mixture of human and animal seed. Some writers considered such births as proof of bestiality, but others did not. Aristotle argued that human and animal seed could produce no fruit because humans and animals had different gestation periods. When one of his herd gave birth to a human-like monster, Albertus Magnus saved the life of a herdsman charged with bestiality by arguing that the apparent mixture of species was actually the result of astrological influences. Ambrose Paré, in the sixteenth century, reported monsters generated “by a woman and a dog” and by a herdsman who “fell in love with a goat.” Paré also accepted the idea that such births could also result from both bestial thoughts and actions. The apparent mixed species problem remained unresolved into the eighteenth century.

External factors were not limited to astrological influences. They included the season, sexual desire, diet, and images the mother saw at conception and during gestation. Soranus, the great compiler of ancient gynecological teachings, set forth the essential doctrines of conception and fetal formation that could help lead to healthy births. Conception required sexual appetite in both the male and female. “Just as without appetite it is impossible for the seed to be discharged by the male, in the same manner, without appetite it cannot be conceived by the female.”

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3Demaitre, Fasciculus Medicinae, 54.
5Thijsen, “Twins as Monsters.”
Although sexual appetite in both sexes was essential to expel seed, the formation of seed into a healthy fetus was governed by many factors. Among the most important physical factors was the mother’s diet. Soranus wrote,

Moreover, one must realize that the food sufficient for one organism has to be divided for the nourishment and growth of two organisms, so that it no longer remains sufficient for the gravida; for what is devoted to the fetus is of necessity taken away from the gravida.

Nicholas Culpeper, in the seventeenth century, recommended a diet including fruit and sage ale.

The mother’s consumption of alcohol also affected the fetus. Because of its ability to disturb both the body and the mind, drunkenness was considered a danger for both conception and the formation of the fetus. This sort of premodern realization of fetal alcohol syndrome was based on the humoral medical theory. Again, Soranus allows us to understand that theory:

Because the body in a natural state performs its proper functions but it is not in a natural state at the time of drunkenness and indigestion. And just as no other natural function can be effected in such a state, neither can conception. Second, because the seed when attached must be nourished, and takes food from the substance containing blood and pneuma which is brought to it. But in drunkenness and indigestion all vapor is spoilt and thus the pneuma too is rendered turbid. Therefore danger arises lest by reason of the bad material contributed the seed too change for the worse. Furthermore, [the] satiety due to heavy drinking hinders [the] attachment of the seed to the uterus. Just as in drunken people the wine, by vigorously rising up makes wounds difficult to unite, it stands to reason that the attachment of the seed is disturbed by the same cause.

Drunkenness worked, also, on the maternal imagination. This physiological factor ultimately helped to shape the fetus. To ensure the birth of a healthy child, a woman had to control her imagination during conception

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9The birth of a child did not excuse rape, because the law recognized a distinction between sexual appetite and mental resolve. See, Soranus, Gynecology, 1:36.
10Soranus, Gynecology, 1:42. Nicholas Culpeper, A Directory for Midwives (London, 1651), 84–85, develops the notion of desire in the female in a Christian context. Love stimulates production of seed; therefore, barrenness often is caused from want of love.
11Culpeper, Directory, 147–53.
12Soranus, Gynecology, 1:38.
and gestation, not only by avoiding drunkenness, but also through concentrating on positive images. Soranus wrote,

What is one to say concerning the fact that various states of the soul also produce certain changes in the mould of the fetus? For instance, some women, seeing monkeys during intercourse, have borne children resembling monkeys. The tyrant of the Cyprians who was misshapen, compelled his wife to look at beautiful statues during intercourse and became the father of well-shapen children; and horse-breeders, during covering, place noble horses in front of the mares. Thus, in order that the offspring may not be rendered misshapen, women must be sober during coitus because in drunkenness the soul becomes the victim of strange phantasies; this furthermore, because the offspring bears some resemblance to the mother as well, not only in body but in soul.\textsuperscript{13}

The Talmud also illustrates the widespread belief in the power of external forces and imagination to shape the fetus. For example, it tells the story of a famous heretic:

When the mother of the apostate Elisha ben Abuya was pregnant, she passed an idolatrous temple and smelled the aroma of an idolatrous sacrifice. The aroma spread in her body like snake poison and infected the delicate fetus with the desire for the prohibited.\textsuperscript{14}

Moreover, the rabbis suggested that women keep good images in their mind during conception. To that end, Rabbi Yochanan, noted for his beauty, “used to sit at the gates of the ritual bath so that women leaving would see him...and beget children as handsome as he.”\textsuperscript{15} The passage demonstrates a desire and a methodology for improving birth outcome.

In the sixteenth century, Paracelsus’s chemical understanding of nature yielded a view of conception and fetal development consistent with ancient medicine. He wrote, “Four things play a part in conception and birth: body, imagination, form and influence [astral and other influences].”\textsuperscript{16} The maternal imagination could influence her seed profoundly.

The imagination of a pregnant woman is so strong that it can influence the seed and change the fruit in her womb in many directions. Her inner stars act powerfully and vigorously upon the fruit, so that its nature is thereby deeply and solidly shaped and

\textsuperscript{13}Soranus, \textit{Gynecology}, 1:39.
\textsuperscript{14}Talmud Jerusalmi, Chagigah 2:776.
\textsuperscript{15}Talmud Babli, Berachoth 20a. A woman immerses herself in a ritual bath before resuming marital relations with her husband after a monthly period of prohibition.
forged. For the child in the mother’s womb is exposed to the mother’s influence, and is as though entrusted to the hand and will of its mother, as the clay is entrusted to the hand of the potter, who creates and forms out of it what he wants and what he pleases.

In his doctrine of imagination, the usually unorthodox Paracelsus differs not from more orthodox practitioners. For example, Ambrose Paré also stressed the importance of imagination in forming the foetus, proving the fact with the story of the Ethiopian queen who produced a white child after she thought of a white object during intercourse.

Even monstrous births could result from negative imagination. As late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, people blamed the entertainer Johannes Grigg’s legless and deformed state on his mother’s viewing the mutilated corpses on a battlefield during her pregnancy. The importance of imagination required that a woman conceive and gestate in a healthy, pleasant environment.

II

Ideas similar to doctrines from classical, medieval, and renaissance medical writers about improving reproductive outcome continued into the modern era in more or less recognizable form because of their empirical rather than their theoretical basis. Diet and external factors in the mother’s life, as well as the context of conception, passed through the eighteenth into the nineteenth century. Diet, alcohol, weather, and astral events all affected the fetus. Maternal psychological factors, imagination, at conception and during gestation were potentially crucial to the proper outcome of a pregnancy. As Paré stressed, too much or too little seed, improper diet, or improper influences on the maternal imagination could produce monstrous births.

In the nineteenth century, however, the notion of heredity re-shaped the understanding of seed. This was the result of the development of the science of embryology and evolutionary theory. The shift in attention to the “seed” as a hereditary vehicle stressed good breeding and taught that although external factors affect the seed, “bad” seed is itself intolerable; moreover, it attracts additional negative influences. For example, in such a view, drunks are born, not made. Heredity and eugenics superseded the more venerable doctrine of maternal imagination. Still, proper sexual prac-
tice and maternal health were very important in the nineteenth century. Sexual purity and good health were seen, in a Lamarckian way, as shaping heredity. This was, in part, because nineteenth century biological thinkers were very much in the tradition of the Christian synthesis of ancient and medieval moral-theological theorists. Emma Drake’s *What a Young Wife Ought to Know* is an example of information on biology and moral philosophy offered to educate young mothers and mothers-to-be. Mrs. Drake combined current science with an evangelist’s zeal for a healthy moral society producing healthy moral children. These children would also form a healthy moral society. Not surprisingly, Mrs. Drake referred to the work of Francis Galton, who had written:

> I conclude that each generation has enormous powers over the natural gifts of those that follow, and maintain that it is a duty that we owe to humanity to investigate the range of that power, and to exercise it in a way that, without being unwise toward ourselves, shall be most advantageous to the future inhabitants of the earth.\(^{21}\)

This was consistent with Darwin’s idea of pangenesis:

> The average proportion of gemmules modified by individual variation under various conditions preceding birth clearly admits of being determined by observation, for the children will, in the average, inherit the gemmules in the same proportion that they existed in their parents. It follows that the human race has a large control over its future forms of activity; far more than an individual has over his own; since the freedom of individuals is narrowly restricted by the cost in energy of exercising their wills.\(^{22}\)

The control over gemmules envisioned by “right thinking people” was selective breeding based on morality, class, and economics. Darwin’s philosophy blended with religion:

> That we reap what we sow is an inevitable law in the mental and moral as in the physical sphere. While there is this great and awful law, I am so thankful that we can emphasize the far greater and wider reaching gospel of heredity. Into this we can put all the sweet promises whose fulfillment is sure—if we are ever reaching up the higher and nobler aspirations of our nature, and not degenerating to the lower tastes and inclinations.\(^{23}\)


\(^{22}\)Ibid., 136–37.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., 139.
In Mrs. Drake’s opinion, temperate, moral, middle-class marriages were the hope for a healthy regular society, whereas socially disadvantaged marriages resulted in defective children. She tells the tragic story of heredity gone wrong:

There is a story of one neglected little girl, poor Margaret, who never had a home, and who grew up a wretched outcast, living a life of sin and shame. After seventy-five years it was reckoned that her descendants numbered twelve hundred; two hundred and eighty of whom were paupers, and one hundred and forty habitual criminals, while most of the whole degraded family cursed the country with vice, crime, pauperism, and insanity.24

Medical, social, and legal attempts were made to control heredity for the good of society. Eugenic laws were instituted in Europe and the United States to keep the unfit from reproducing. In England, the Fabian Society opposed the poor laws and anything that furthered the reproduction of the undeserving poor:

We are very fully conscious of the great importance of the eugenic standpoint in connection with the problems of destitution, especially as regards the feeble-minded. Moreover, there can be no question that the present Poor Law, like many forms of charity, has a definitely anti-eugenic influence, because on the whole it tends to subsidize the reproduction only of the lowest social types, i.e., those who cannot be deterred by the “taint” attaching to Poor Law relief and who regard the Workhouse as a free maternity hospital where their infants can be born and if necessary brought up.25

It is against such a background that nineteenth and twentieth century eugenics yielded to a more detailed understanding of fetal development, and especially genetic research.26

24Ibid., 141.
Germany was a powerful force in turning the science of genetics away from improving the gene pool toward curing genetic diseases.27 This more traditional goal comports with traditional medical theories and attempts from ancient times to positively influence birth outcome.

At one level, eugenics yielded to euphenics, the idea of improving not the seed (genotype), but the physical nature and viability of the organism (phenotype). Hence, studies of diet and neural tube defects yielded the information that if a mother took 0.4 mg of folic acid per day in her diet, neural tube defects could be reduced by 50% or more. Fetal alcohol syndrome has been defined and can be prevented.

Perhaps the most interesting example of euphenics is somatic cell gene therapy. This involves inserting a functioning gene into a patient’s cells to correct an inborn error of metabolism or some other genetic malady. PKU is a disorder that could be so treated. Many other disorders, from cancer to autoimmune diseases, are theoretically susceptible to somatic cell/gene therapy; yet, such an action would not change the patient’s germ line genotype.

Of course, the hope exists that as knowledge of the human genome grows, it will be possible to alter a conceptus’s genotype, by correcting an error in the DNA code, and preventing genetic disorders. All such therapy, phenotypic or genetic, is harmonious with humankind’s traditional attempts to influence positively reproductive outcome.28

Our theories, however, are on a philosophical, ethical level, not such a radical change from traditional ones that emphasized externals, maternal status, and the adequacy of seed. Our understanding is simply more detailed and our technology more effective. We can demonstrate that we can affect fetal development. We may not, however, have more metaphysical certitude than Aristotle, Galen, Paré, Soranus, or Galton.

27This point is well made by Weingart, “German Eugenics,” 260, 280–82.
28There are two ways to view genetic engineering:
1) somatic cell engineering—therapy designed to improve the health and well-being of a particular individual;
2) germ cell engineering—therapy designed to affect and improve the health and well-being of all subsequent generations.

Historically, therapy was seen as able to affect only the current pregnancy, or at most the current generation. In the future, we could attempt to affect subsequent generations. Only if scientists attempt to change the genome will they step beyond traditional concerns and moral categories. That issue will undoubtedly become more important, but it falls outside the scope of this essay. We seek only to show that humans have traditionally sought to affect in a positive way fetal phenotypic development and that, indeed, in light of their medical ideas, believed that they could.
Metacognitive Expressions in *La Respuesta a Sor Filotea*, a Seventeenth-Century Text by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz

Alfredo Urzúa B.

In the *Respuesta de la poetisa a la muy ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz*, her famous letter/treatise, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1648/51–1695) eloquently defends her right to study, learn, write poetry, and pursue academic matters. In this document, Sor Juana repeatedly refers to her intellectual activities as arising from an innate desire in her. This “desire to know,” that she “knows not whether to take as a Heaven-sent favor or as a punishment,” was indeed a recurrent theme in her mental explorations.

Sor Juana’s *Respuesta a Sor Filotea* constitutes an extraordinary example of an early essay-like letter, a biographical narration, and a legal treatise representing “a unique document in the history of Hispanic literature.” Its uniqueness results not so much from its rhetorical style and format as from the themes developed, their treatment, and the subjective, reflective nature of Sor Juana’s prose, particularly as part of Hispanic literature, a literature

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1There is controversy about Sor Juana’s date of birth. Electa Arenal and Amanda Powell, *The Answer / La Respuesta* (New York: The Feminist Press at The City University of New York, 1994). The *Respuesta* was written in 1691, as dated by Sor Juana. However, it was originally published nine years after it was composed (thus after Sor Juana’s death), in volume 3 of *Poesía y Obras póstumas del Fénix de México, Décima Musa, Poetisa Americana, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Religiosa Profesa en el Convento de San Jerónimo de la imperial Ciudad de México* (Madrid: Imprenta de Manuel Ruiz de Murga, 1700). See Sarah Poot Herrera, “Las Cartas de Sor Juana: Públicas y Privadas,” in *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz y sus Contemporáneos*, ed. Margo Glantz (Cd. de México: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1998), 291–317. Even though some researchers believe that the *Respuesta* circulated in Mexico City among people in Sor Juana’s social network, the only published copy is the one in volume 3. The *Respuesta* was composed in response to the *Carta de Sor Filotea*, which prefaced Sor Juana’s *Carta Atenagórica* (Letter Worthy of Athena) published in Puebla in 1690, where she critically discusses a sermon published forty years earlier by Antonio de Vieyra (1608–97). Such publication, which she claims in the *Respuesta* was without her knowing and consent, was sponsored by the bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz, who used the pseudonym of Sor Filotea to admonish Sor Juana and compel her to dedicate her talent to more spiritual matters.

2Translation to English by Arenal and Powell, *The Answer / La Respuesta*. In Sor Juana’s words: “deseo de saber... que no se determinar si por prenda o castigo me dio el Cielo.”

3Octavio Paz, *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz o las trampas de la fe* (Cd. de Mexico:Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1982).
where “reflections about the solitary adventures of the soul have been a neglected topic in the work of the great Hispanic writers.” Thus, it has been said that “few documents of the seventeenth century embrace matters of learning, intellectual freedom, and power with such erudition and eloquence as does the Respuesta a Sor Filotea de la Cruz.”

In the Respuesta, Sor Juana embarks on an exploration of concepts, arguments, and ideas that result, as in a mirror-image, in a profound reflection of her life as a scholar and an examination of her “Self” as a woman-nun facing a major crisis in her life. This text is said to represent the height of the baroque epistolary style in New Spain and is an early example of the later Hispanic polemical essay. It is also an example of a type of discourse and reasoning that, on the one hand, seems to contain signs of the innovative notions being developed in contemporary Europe regarding explanations of physical-mechanical phenomena, as well as explanations of concepts, such as matter, feelings, and mind. On the other hand, it also contains concepts and ideas concerning apprehension

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4Ibid., my translation.
6José J. Blanco comments that many researchers believe that the bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernández, “used” Sor Juana to antagonize the archbishop of Mexico City, Francisco Aguilar y Seijas, his political enemy and an individual known for his fanatic religiousness and his misogynous ideas and attitudes. José J. Blanco, Espléndores y Miserias de los Criollos: La Literatura en la Nueva España (Cd. de México: Cal y Arena, 1989). Another possibility is that Fernández and Sor Juana were working together against Aguiar y Seijas, who was a friend of Antonio Vieyra, whose sermon Sor Juana critized in the Carta Atenagórica. The intention would have been, then, to humiliate the archbishop through Sor Juana’s critique of Vieyra, whether she participated in these events willingly or not, and whether she expected the consequences of these actions or not. For instance, that Sor Juana is eventually forced to “donate” her library and to stop writing.
7Arenal and Powell, The Answer / La Respuesta, note that it is inaccurate to refer to the Respuesta in terms of the essay, since this genre was not part of the Hispanic literature around the time of Sor Juana’s life. However, they also remark that some of the rhetorical characteristics found in the Respuesta reflect a number of elements later developed in Hispanic essays.
8T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene, in their review of philosophers From Descartes to Locke (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940), note that the ideas about the physical world, such as those proposed by Newton (1642–1727), “effectively united contributions from reason and observation” (1). This fusion resulted in part from a division of the world into two parts: extended matter and cogitating mind, a concept expanded by Descartes (1596–1650). Such separation, Smith and Grene say, had numerous implications. One of them was the distinction between feelings (which are of the body) and ideas (which are of the mind). John Locke (1632–1704), on the other hand, differed in his conception of knowledge and ideas from those proposed by Descartes. What he does, according to Smith and Grene, “is to examine ideas with a view to discovering what part of our knowledge of the Cartesian world can really stand as knowledge thus defined (i.e., as a system of connected ideas having absolute validity in reference to as real world). After dispelling… the notion of ‘innate ideas,’ he enumerates…the kinds of simple ideas we get by sensation and reflection, and the complex ideas we form from them” (342). From the discussion of human understanding proposed by Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), as well as from others like Hume and Berkeley, we arrive at our modern conceptions of mind and subjectivity. David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Metacognitive Expressions in La Respuesta

of knowledge that are no longer prevalent in many parts of seventeenth-century Europe.9

The study reported here examines Sor Juana’s Respuesta in relation to subjective mental activities (e.g., reflecting, knowing, understanding) and their relationship to the “Self” (i.e., the writer’s subjectivity, as expressed in written form). The analysis is conducted from a pragma-linguistic point of view; that is, it is concerned with Sor Juana’s use of language, particularly those linguistic expressions used to refer to her “Self” and her own thinking and reasoning: her metacognitive language. Metacognitive expressions, in this study, refer to those expressions that comprise “the many ways we describe our own and others’ mental states and mental processes.”10 In general, these many ways include terms to characterize thinking processes, acquisition or production of knowledge, formation of opinions, as well as the relationship of evidence to opinion, and various special modes or types of thinking, such as reflection, contemplation, planning and so forth.

My aim is to describe the ways by which Sor Juana linguistically expresses her thinking “Self” in written mode. This approach is taken in order to understand better the linguistic construction of the highly subjective nature of the Respuesta; in other words, the construction of what Lyons calls “the locutionary subjectivity” of a text.11 As defined by Lyons, locutionary subjectivity is comprised of both the subjectivity of cognition, feeling, and perception and the subjectivity of action or agency. This type of subjectivity thus refers to an individual’s locutionary expressions (i.e., what the speaker or writer intends to convey when producing a text) or, simply put, “self-expression in the use of language.”12 It is precisely the concept of self-expression that ties together the questions explored here: How does Sor Juana express her metacognitive, subjective “Self” in her writing? What expressions are called upon when referring to her own thinking and reflecting?

The study focuses on Sor Juana’s use of verbal predicates as these are tied to the writer (herself) through self-referential markers. Therefore, this paper is not concerned with a literary analysis of Sor Juana’s work or with an examination of the path she followed to reach her scholarly, literary

9Paz believes that Sor Juana was ignorant of the “intellectual revolution” taking place in Europe during the seventeenth century, particularly in topics related to physics and astronomy. In Sor Juana, he explains, “opposite beliefs co-existed: Christianity and feminism, religious faith and attraction to philosophy” (547).
12Ibid.
goals. Nor is it concerned with exploring Sor Juana’s interactions—as an individual and as a poet-writer—within her social, political, and cultural environment. Numerous books, articles, research papers, and biographies are available which shed light onto these matters. Rather, I concentrate on two types of linguistic resources used by Sor Juana to construct and express her thinking “Self”: verbal predicates and first-person pronouns, and how these linguistic elements are called upon in “talking” about her cognitive processes, her knowledge, her ideas, arguments, beliefs, opinions, and so forth.

The Respuesta a Sor Filotea de la Cruz is of particular importance since Sor Juana develops, in prose, a manuscript where a knowing, reasoning “Self” is both the subject and the object of the discussion. In addition, the fact that Sor Juana composed this text in the last decade of the seventeenth century enables us to study it in light of crucial changes regarding literary practices said to have taken place in Europe around this time. These changes have to do with the way writers related to their texts (i.e., how their subjective “Self” is represented), as well as to how mental activities were described and reported in written form. Preliminary questions of the extent to which a well-known writer in the New World adopted the new conventions, and whether the Respuesta written by the famous Mexican nun was one of such “innovative texts,” provided the initial motivation for this study.

BACKGROUND

In the seventeenth century, a revolution of sorts took place in the Western world in terms of how language and written texts affected each other and how literacy practices were implemented. Olson points out that a “new” type of text emerged during the Renaissance, in part influenced by scientific progress, and in part due to new philosophical conceptions of thought and mind. This manifestation led to a “new awareness of language,” which resulted in a type of text in which writers were able to explicitly mark relationships between themselves and their ideas expressed in writing. Writers started to express, linguistically, attitudes towards their ideas, using both speech act verbs, such as “affirm,” “argue,” “deny,” “state,” and mental verbs, such as “doubt,” “understand,” “consider,” and so forth. Furthermore, the recognition of mental states as such was instrumental in the definition of the concepts of “subjectivity” and “consciousness of

13Arenal and Powell’s The Answer / La Respuesta, a bilingual publication of the Respuesta, includes a useful bibliography of scholarly works about Sor Juana, as well as editions of her works (recent and early editions) and translations of these.
14Olson, The World on Paper.
15Ibid., 162.
mind.” It is important to remember, Olson explains, that the conceptualization of the interplay of action, intention, belief, and desire is culturally dependent, linked, in particular, to literacy practices.

In seventeenth-century Mexico City, literacy practices were strictly regulated by the Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church. As a nun who managed rhetorically to develop close connections with the Viceregal Court, Sor Juana deploys the rhetorical conventions prevalent among the privileged elite in her society, which, in turn, are a reflection of those favored in the Iberian peninsula. In addition, her writing is also part of common literacy practices associated with life in New Spain’s convents. Thus, Sor Juana is typical in that she was an educated nun with the means and time necessary to write while cloistered in a well-established, reputable convent. Nevertheless, she is unique in that no other writer in New Spain, male or female, pursued so intensely and passionately a life of intellectual excellence. Moreover, she did so not through the traditional route of mystic and spiritual achievement, but through Neoplatonic, scholastic (in the tradition known as Hermeneutics), and rationalistic perspectives. Her work thus focuses on secular matters as much as it does on religious topics. During her lifetime, the publication of her poems and prose gave her fame and recognition. However, such fame, her theological discussions, political connections and, last but not least, her condition

16In the New Spain, as in many other parts of the Colonial world, convents became a place where female writing flourished. In them, women found a viable alternative to marriage and were thus free of the usual obligations of married women. They could dedicate their free time to cultivating their own interests and, although cloistered, they were by no means disconnected from the outside world. In convents like the one Sor Juana chose, Saint Paula of the Jeronymite Order in Mexico City, the nuns’ cells were spacious two-story rooms where they were allowed to have slaves, servants, and protegés (Paz, Sor Juana).

17In convents, mysticism, theology, and knowledge merged into one in the fertile minds of the nuns, resulting in a particular type of feminine thought. Electa Arenal and Stacey Schlau, “El convento colonial mexicano como recinto intelectual,” in Conquista y Contraconquista: La Escritura del Nuevo Mundo, ed. Julio Ortega and José Amor y Vázquez (Cd. de México: El Colegio de México, 1994), 279–88. Mystic visions were encouraged (see Alessandra Riccio, “La Autobiografía de la Madre Josefa de Castillo,” in Conquista y Contraconquista, ed. Ortega and Vázquez, 325-34), although strongly controlled by the nun’s confessors, who often confiscated and destroyed many of their manuscripts (typically their Vidas, or Lives). “The act itself of narrating mystic experiences” argue Arenal and Schlau, “represented a mental exercise.” (“El convento colonial mexicano como recinto intelectual,” 283, my translation). More importantly, they state, the fact that nuns were part of the dominant Catholic religion protected them from institutional forms of repressions; that is, any other woman who dared to act publicly and/or speak independently from male control could easily find herself questioned by the Inquisition.

18Paz, Sor Juana.

19The total number of the original editions of Sor Juana’s published volumes (1689–1725) are: 8 editions of volume 1, 6 editions of volume 2, and 5 editions of volume 3. All were published in Spain, except the second edition of volume 3, which was published in Portugal. Georgina Sabat-Rivers, “Editando a Sor Juana,” in Conquista y Contraconquista, ed. Ortega and Vázquez, 303–13.
as woman-writer and nun, all contributed to the attacks and harsh criticisms that she suffered towards the end of her life. Ironically, it was one of these attacks that resulted in her well-known and highly praised piece of prose, the Respuesta de la poetisa a la ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz.

THE STUDY

In order to analyze Sor Juana’s metacognitive verbal expressions, I use a set of categories adapted from both Tishman and Perkins and Scholnick and Hall.20 The language of thinking is divided by Tishman and Perkins into three major categories: terms that mark an epistemic stance, terms that describe an intellectual process, and terms that describe an intellectual product. Epistemic terms indicate a stance or attitude toward a claim to knowledge (e.g. “conclude,” “believe,” “confirm,” “doubt,” “know”), and their function is to characterize the relationship of thought to fact. Intellectual-process terms, on the other hand, characterize the process of thinking and express its flow, structure, and feel: utilizing verbs such as “analyze,” “discern,” “investigate,” “examine,” “contemplate,” etc. Finally, intellectual-product terms are basically nouns that name and mark differences among kinds of ideas (e.g., “conclusion,” “hypothesis,” “option,” “solution,” “reason,” “claim,” “theory”). In addition, Tishman and Perkins comment that the language of thinking involves feelings and emotions, often described by terms such as “cognitive emotions.”21

Scholnick and Hall, on the other hand, describe the language of thinking in terms of “internal-state” words, which are classified, based on Hall and Nagy, into four categories: cognition, affect, perception, and intentions and desires.22 These categories are to be identified contextually, as they express a change in the speaker’s internal state. In addition, such a classification is said to convey four pragmatic functions: (1) they may encode indirect speech acts, (2) they may conventionalize conversational devices and mannerisms (e.g., “you know”), (3) they may convey uncertainty, and (4) they can be used as “intentional devices” (e.g., “Look what I did!”). Furthermore, six levels of thinking may be represented by the terms in the aforementioned categories: perception, recognition, recall, understanding, metacognition, and evaluation.

These classifications served as a departing point in developing an analytical instrument for the study. However, the categories used here emerged as a by-product of the interactive, recursive process of going back and forth between text readings, preliminary observations, and the refinement of potential linguistic patterns. Such patterns resulted from the quantitative and qualitative assessment of the data as they were coded, classified, tallied up, organized, and finally, interpreted.

In addition to analyzing the metacognitive verbal expressions found in the Respuesta, I decided to examine the co-occurrence of these verbs with first-person reference. According to Olson, subjectivity, in its reflexive state, refers to the “recognition of one’s own and other’s mental states as mental states.”\(^{23}\) It involves the construction of a first-person perspective in relation to those mental states. Thus, Olson argues, subjectivity “opens the door to introspection” and is tied to consciousness of mind.\(^{24}\) Given the fact that the notion of subjectivity is closely related to the concept of consciousness, it is thus expected that key linguistic elements related to a subjective stance include first-person markers. The writer’s language—in this case Sor Juana’s language—used to describe or “talk about” her thinking is assumed to be a reflection not only of her reasoning process and mental acts and products but also of her distance from, involvement in, or attitudes towards those processes, acts, and products. Therefore, the “I” subject and the “I” self (explicit or implied) and the mental states being described are inextricably linked. For this reason, first-person reference, particularly the explicit use of yo, the first-person singular subject pronoun in Spanish, is included as a relevant variable in the analysis of mental verbs.

As can be seen in Table 1, the metacognitive verbs used by Sor Juana in the Respuesta were classified into the following categories: intellectual processes, cognitive states, speech acts, epistemic attitudes, cognitive emotions, planning, and literacy activities. The use of the first-person singular subject pronoun yo was assessed in terms of its explicit presence or its absence according to traditional rules of use of this pronoun. In Spanish, adding an explicit yo to a statement only occurs in restricted situations: to disambiguate verbal forms employed with more than one pronoun (although this is often worked out through context), to give emphasis to a statement, to contrast the self with other persons, and, more impor-


\(^{24}\) Ibid. It is important to remember, Olson explains, that while the ability to think of the mental states of others appears to be innate and universal, the conceptualization of the interplay of action, intention, belief, and desire seem to be culturally dependent, linked in particular to literacy practices. The notion of understanding, for instance, is related to the development of the notions of subjectivity and consciousness as well as the ways of referring to knowledge, speech, and feelings. The development of writing made it possible to transform aspects of language into objects of consciousness and, by extension, the ideas that words represent also became similar objects.
tantly, to affirm the personality of the speaker. The first-person pronoun is also analyzed in terms of its co-occurrence with the metacognitive verbs just mentioned. I hypothesize that the co-occurrence of these two elements is a way to enhance linguistically the subjective stance of the text writer, since the unmarked case of a proposition in Spanish does not contain an explicit yo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Verbal Expression</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual-Process Verbs</td>
<td>Distinct “ways” of thinking or reasoning, acquisition of knowledge, development of understanding, etc.</td>
<td>Contemplar (contemplate) Descubrir (discover) Darse cuenta (realize)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive-State Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs describing static state of knowledge (or lack of it), i.e., what one knows at a given moment</td>
<td>Saber (know) Conocer (know) Entender (understand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech-Act Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs that describe modes of direct and indirect speech or language production in general</td>
<td>Decir (say) Afirmar (assert) Proponer (propose)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic-Attitude Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs by which the speaker/writer expresses attitudes towards what is said/written</td>
<td>Creer (believe) Dudar (doubt) Estar seguro (be certain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive-Emotion Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs that express both mental processing and emotional involvement</td>
<td>Admirar (admire) Atreverse (dare) Ceder (give in)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs that describe intention and determination, as well as desire, wish, and choice</td>
<td>Intentar (try) Decidir (decide) Esperar (hope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Verbs</td>
<td>Verbs that describe literacy activities in general</td>
<td>Excribir (write) Leer (read)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Categories of Metacognitive Verbal Expression

**Analysis and Results**

Before presenting the quantitative and qualitative analyses and the results obtained in the study, it is important to review briefly some of the more general textual characteristics of the Respuesta, since the interpretation of the data should be considered in light of the discourse context in which

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25According to Manuel Seco, *Diccionario de Dudas y Dificultades de la Lengua* (Española. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986), the use of an overt/explicit pronoun versus null/no pronoun is typically explained in terms of emphasis and avoidance of ambiguity. However, Robert Bayley and Lucinda Pease-Alvarez, “Null Pronoun Variation in Mexican-Descent Children’s Narrative Discourse,” *Language Variation and Change* 9 (1997): 349–71, explain that, in recent years, sociolinguistic studies of modern Spanish and Portuguese have shown that this variation is “conditioned by multiple linguistic, social, and stylistic factors, among them co-reference with the subject of the preceding verb, surface ambiguity of the verb form, education, age, and speech style” as well as degree of “discourse connectedness.” Given that this study deals with seventeenth-century Spanish, I decided to take into account only the traditional rules as defined by Seco.
they occur. As previously mentioned, this text belongs to what is known as the religious epistolary genre and includes many of the features typical of this genre within the Baroque literary style: multiple voices and meanings, ambiguity, complexity, and so forth. Sor Juana also uses rhetorical conventions and patterns typical of other genres, such as Renaissance legal discourse, exegetical discussions and sermons, traditional autobiographical narratives composed by nuns (Vidas or Lives), and Greek and Roman classical rhetorical models. In the Respuesta, Sor Juana defends herself, her work, her right to be a scholar and to use profane themes in her poems. She also advocates the right of women to be educated and to participate in critical discussions of religious themes. In addition, she contends that a rationalistic, logical approach to acquiring knowledge is valid, and even necessary, for a proper understanding of philosophical and religious matters. In composing the Respuesta, Sor Juana makes use of many of the rhetorical conventions expected of nuns, such as self-deprecatory remarks and personal anecdotes, as well as reference to biblical figures and concepts. However, unlike typical female, religious writing, she also includes citations from a wide range of scholars (often in Latin), exegetical analysis, legal argumentation, and rationalistic discussions. These characteristics led Arenal and Powell to consider the Respuesta as an example of humanist moralism, within the Mexican theological literary space, which “anticipates a later genre, the polemical essay.”

Now, how does Sor Juana construct her text in relation to her metacognitive, subjective “Self”? What are the verbal expressions used to describe her mental acts and products, and how do these relate to her textual presence as expressed through the use of an explicit yo?

In Table 2, a quantitative description of the metacognitive verbal expressions found in the Respuesta is provided. In order to assess the range and variety of verbs used within each category, the number of verb types as opposed to verb tokens were tallied up. Verb types refer to semantic categories, for example, the verb descubrir (to discover), whereas verb tokens refer to the various forms that a verb type could take, such as descubro, descubrí, he descubierto (I discover, I discovered, I have discovered).

As shown in Table 2, Sor Juana uses a higher number of verb tokens in the categories of “Speech-Act” verbs (26% of total) and “Intellectual-process” verbs (21%). “Speech-Act” verbs are those that describe the production of language as well as specific modes in which statements might be expressed. “Intellectual-Process” verbs, on the other hand, refer to distinct ways of thinking or reasoning, and they also denote the active acquisition of knowledge, the development of understanding, and the production of new and innovative ideas (see Table 1). Thus, the first find-

{26}Arenal and Powell, The Answer / La Respuesta, 22.
ing shows that a substantial proportion (47% of the total) of Sor Juana’s verbs of thinking in the Respuesta is comprised by verbal expressions in these two categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I-P Verbs</th>
<th>C-S Verbs</th>
<th>S-A Verbs</th>
<th>E-A Verbs</th>
<th>C-E Verbs</th>
<th>Planning Verbs</th>
<th>Literacy Verbs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tkn</td>
<td>typ</td>
<td>tkn</td>
<td>typ</td>
<td>tkn</td>
<td>typ</td>
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<td>typ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counts</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>1:1.9</td>
<td>1:4.8</td>
<td>1:4.8</td>
<td>1:3.4</td>
<td>1:1.2</td>
<td>1:1.8</td>
<td>1:8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most frequent verbs:

- **ver** - 16
- **acordarse** - 4
- **considerar** - 3
- **saber** - 17
- **conocer** - 6
- **entender** - 2
- **caudal** - 2
- **decir** - 27
- **confesar** - 7
- **hablar** - 6
- **creer** - 11
- **parecer** - 8
- **pensar** - 2
- **juzgar** - 2
- **tener por** - 1
- **atreverse** - 3
- **all others** - 1
- **querer** - 6
- **proponerse** - 3
- **desear** - 2
- **elegir** - 2
- **intentar** - 2
- **escribir** - 14
- **estudiar** - 9
- **leer** - 2
- **156 (69.6%)**

The category that yielded the fewest verb tokens was “Cognitive-Emotion” verbs (6% of the total number of occurrences). The remaining verbal categories yielded the following percentages: “Cognitive-State” verbs, 13%; “Epistemic-Attitude” verbs, 12%; “Planning” verbs, 11%; and “Literacy” Verbs, 11%. In comparing verb types with verb tokens, it was noted that, even though speech-act verbs are more numerous than “Intellectual-Process” verbs, there are relatively few verb types accounting for those speech-act verbs: Sor Juana uses only 12 different verbs in producing 58 tokens, yielding a ratio close to 1:5. There is, therefore, little variety in the types of verbs used by her in the “Speech-Act” category. In contrast, in the category of “Intellectual-Process” verbs, she used more verb types, with a ratio of almost 1:2. It can be said, on the basis of this finding, that Sor Juana either chose a fewer number of “Speech-Act” verb types to express a mental activity, or found that this category didn’t offer her a wide variety of linguistic options to express her intended meaning. In other words, using speech-act verbal expressions to refer to her own thinking and reasoning was a productive strategy in Sor Juana’s prose, given the number of occurrences. However, the verbal expressions (verb types) available for such a purpose do not seem to have been as extensive. This is not the case in relation to Sor Juana’s use of “Intellectual-Process” verbal expressions, a similarly favored strategy, but one where Sor Juana seems to have found more linguistic resources, given the number of verb types used. The category with the greatest verb type-token ratio is that of “Literacy” verbs, where only 3 verb types account for 25 tokens, with a ratio close to 1:8.

The more frequent verb types in all categories found in the Respuesta, as well as corresponding verb tokens, are also listed in Table 2. The most common speech-act verbs are: **decir** (say), **confesar** (confess), and **hablar** (speak, talk). In the intellectual-process category, they are: **ver** (see), **acor-
darse (remember, recall), and considerar (consider). It is worth noting that these frequently used verbs account for almost 70% of the total number of occurrences across categories (156 out of 224). It can be said, then, that these constitute—in essence—the core lexical system of Sor Juana’s metacognitive expressions regarding verbal predicates, as used in the Respuesta. It was also noticed that almost all of the frequent metacognitive verbs in the Respuesta are verbs of common use in contemporary Spanish, with the exception of the verbal expressions tener caudal and tener por.27

In general terms, a pragmatic analysis refers to an examination of the relationships between discourse (e.g., text organization, linguistic choices), context (e.g., time, place, cultural conventions), and interlocutors (e.g., purpose of communication, power relationships) that are encoded into the structure of the language. In this study, the focus is restricted to what is known as linguistic pragmatics, which adopts the general principles of pragmatics in systematically accounting for acts involving linguistic expressions.28 Thus, the interpretation of the data focuses on the linguistic choices made by Sor Juana in conveying meaning so that the reader/interpreter of her text can re-assess his/her model of how things are…including a model of the speaker’s or writer’s beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.29 The qualitative analysis that follows examines the relationship between linguistic choice and intended meaning.

Among the frequent verb types used by Sor Juana, the most frequent is the verb decir (to say, in modern Spanish), which appears 27 times in the Respuesta. Sor Juana repeatedly uses this verb to introduce her own ideas and arguments, as in excerpt 1:

Y volviendo a nuestro Arce, digo que trae en confirmación de su sentir aquellas palabras de mi Padre San Jerónimo (ad Laetam, de institutione filiae), donce dice: Adhuc tenera lingua….30

27In Maria Moliner, Diccionario de Uso del Español (Madrid: Gredos, 1986), the term caudal refers, in the sixth entry, to a “treasure” or the “richness” that comes from the possession of something (e.g., Tiene un caudal con esos ojos). In the seventh entry, caudal refers to the abundance of something (e.g., Tiene un caudal de simpatía). However, these expressions seem somewhat awkward to contemporary speakers of Mexican Spanish. In the Respuesta, Sor Juana uses this expression twice: “…que no tengo caudal para ello [para enseñar],” which conforms to the former meaning; and “que tenga el caudal de letras e inge-nio,” which conforms to the latter. As for the expression tener por, Moliner explains that this form occurs very often in the imperative mode, meaning “to consider.” It is added that the expression “tener por cierta [una cosa]” means “to be sure [of something].” Sor Juana also uses this expression twice: “porque yo tengo por muy necio al que….” and “y tengo por mayor el riesgo de los aplausos…,” which express the meaning of “to consider,” although there is also an element of certainty involved.

28Georgia M. Green, Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996).

29Ibid.

30Arenal and Powell, The Answer/ La Respuesta, 82, line 884. All line numbers are from this edition.
(And returning to our own Arce, I observe that in support of his views he presents these words of my father St. Jerome (in the letter to Leta, on the education of her daughter), where he says: “Her childish tongue...”31

It is interesting to note that, in Arenal and Powell’s translation of this excerpt, the verb “observe” (a verb of perception) is used to convey the functional meaning of *digo* (I say). In fact, Sor Juana’s use of the verb *decir* seems to be an indication of the predominant function of this verb to express a mental act or product, in addition to its function as a descriptor of the act of speaking. In other words, in using *decir* to refer to a mental act, with a meaning close to “I believe” or “I think,” Sor Juana expresses her cognitive subjectivity. She is obviously not uttering words, nor is she actually perceiving something (in the strict sense of the term); rather, the functional meaning of this verb—a typical speech-act verb—is appropriated to convey an extended meaning: to notice, believe, or think.

The verb “confess,” also relatively frequent among “Speech-Act” verbs in the *Respuesta*, is somewhat expected, given the religious condition of Sor Juana. However, a separate analysis of the single other letter by Sor Juana that has been recovered, known as “The Letter of Monterrey” (a letter of a more private nature), revealed that such a verb type was not used at all in this other document.32 This might be an indication that the *Respuesta* represents, indeed, a different genre from that of the private letter, and is thus more closely related to the evolution of the Hispanic essay, as suggested by Concejo.33 Therefore, the verb “confess” might be related more to formal texts of a public nature than to private letters.

The high frequency of the verb *ver* (to see) also proved to be quite revealing. Sor Juana uses this verb in its present-day function of describing the subjective act of understanding or realizing something in excerpt 2:

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31 Arenal and Powell, *The Answer / La Respuesta*, 83, line 968. All translations are from this edition.
32 This document was discovered in 1980 by Aureliano Tapia Mendez at the Monterrey Archdiocesan Seminary in Northern Mexico. It appears in his publication entitled *Carta de Sor Juana de la Cruz a su confesor: Autodefensa Espiritual* (Monterrey: Impresora, 1986). A third “letter,” known as the *Carta de Serafina de Cristo*, is also attributed to Sor Juana: Elias Trabulse ed., *La Carta de Serafina de Cristo* (Toluca: Instituto Mexiquense de Cultura, 1996); cited in Poot Herrera, “Las Cartas de Sor Juana.” The latter document is dated 1 February 1691, that is, one month previous to the date in the *Respuesta*, dated 1 March of the same year. If Sor Juana is indeed Serafina, it is she who now uses a pseudonym. However, this letter is not in *prose*; rather it is composed as a “poetic labyrinth.” Emil Volek, “La Señora y la Ilustre Fregona: Las Trampas de la Comunicación, Teología y Poder entre Sor Filotea y Sor Juana” in *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz y sus Contemporáneos*, ed. M. Glantz (Cd. de México: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1998), 333–57.
he buscado muy de propósito cuál sea el daño que puedan tener [mis versos], y no le he hallado; antes sí los *veo* aplaudidos en las bocas de las Sibillas; santificados en la plumas de…. (line 1089)

(I have sought quite deliberately to discover what harm there might be in them [my verses], and I cannot. Rather, *I see* them praised in the mouths of the Sybils and sanctified by the pens of…. [line 1191])

However, Sor Juana uses this verb more frequently in a different way, that is, conveying a different functional meaning and one no longer common in contemporary standard Spanish as demonstrated in excerpt 3:

*veo* que también dice San Gregorio: *Victoria non minor est*…. (line 1178)

(*I see* too that Saint Gregory says: *Victoria non minor est*…. [line 1289])

and excerpt 4:

*veo* una santísima madremía, Paula, docta en las lenguas hebrea, griega y latina y aptísima para interpretar las Escrituras. (line 789)

(*And seeking no more examples far from home,* *I see my own* most holy mother Paula, learned in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin tongues and most expert in the interpretation of the Scriptures. [line 862])

In excerpt 3, Sor Juana uses the verb *veo* in order to include, as part of her argument, a citation in Latin by Saint Gregory. The function of “see” is thus to introduce new information from a reputable source as evidence and support for her argument. In this way, the verb indicates, rather, an equivalent to “I cite / quote.” In other words, to the usual meanings of “seeing” (as a physical act and as a mental act), a third meaning is added: a discoursive function to introduce evidential information (e.g., extra-textual information), almost in the form of “I present evidence” (as in excerpt 4). The verb *veo* means, therefore, both “I understand” and “I cite / quote” or “the evidence is.” This is even more evident in excerpt 5, which comes from a section in which Sor Juana presents a list of famous learned women found in literature, theology, and history to similarly support her thesis:

*Veo* una Pola Argentaria, que ayudó a Lucano, su marido, a escribir la gran Batalla Farsálica. *Veó* a la hija del divino Tiresias, más docta que su padre. *Veó* a una Cenobia, reina de los Palmirenos,
(I see one Polla Argentaria, who helped Lucan, her husband, to write the Battle of Pharsalia. I see the daughter of the divine Tiresias, more learned still than her father. I see, too, such a woman as Zenobia, queen of the Palmyrians, as wise as she is courageous. Again, I see an Arete, daughter of Aristippus, most learned. [line 844])

Therefore, the function of the verb “see” is not only to convey an act of understanding and to cite relevant sources, but it also serves to introduce new information or concepts into the text, thereby making it an organizational / rhetorical device.

In relation to the verb type acordarse (to remember, recall), it is important to note that this form, used four times by Sor Juana in the Respuesta, occurs more frequently in modern Spanish in speech or informal texts, as opposed to the form recordar, which has the same meaning but is of slightly higher (more formal) register.34 This potential diachronic variation might also be related to the connection between the epistolary genre and the essay and, in this case, the use of acordarse could be a feature that reflects more the epistolary style of the Respuesta rather than its essay-like features. Another possibility is that the two variants evolved differentially in their use (register variation) across time.

In terms of the relationship between metacognitive verbs and first-person reference markers, this connection proved to be strong at both the qualitative and quantitative levels. Out of a total of 75 instances of explicit yo found in the Respuesta, 44 (58%) co-occur with a metacognitive verb. In other words, in more than half of the cases in which an explicit yo was used by Sor Juana, it was accompanied by a verb related to the language of thinking. As a result, these mental activities are emphasized, personalized, or increased in their subjective expressiveness. This finding suggests that the locutionary subjectivity in the Respuesta is grammaticalized, in one way, through the relatively frequent collocation of those two elements (i.e., yo + metacognitive verb).

A further relevant feature related to the use of explicit first-person singular pronouns was the relatively frequent inversion of subject pronoun and metacognitive verb, as exemplified in excerpt 6:

Esto me proponía yo de mí misma y me parecía razón; si no es que eras (y eso es lo más cierto) lisonjear y aplaudir a mi propia inclinación…. (line 273)

(I argued in this way to myself, and I thought my own argument quite reasonable. However, the fact may have been (and this seems most likely) that I was merely flattering and encouraging my own inclination… [line 298])

and excerpt 7:

reprendédme, que eso apreciaré yo más que todo cuanto vano aplauso me pueden otros dar…. (line 880)

(chastise me, for I shall value that more than all the vain applause others could give me…. [line 964])

This type of inversion marks even more the explicit presence of the self in a statement, in contrast to the unmarked subject-verb sequence. In the Respuesta, there are 13 instances of such an inversion out of 44 (29.5%) “yo + metacognitive verb” constructions. Similarly, in the “Letter of Monterrey,” this strategy accounts for 36% of the cases (5 of 14). Furthermore, in this latter document, subject-verb inversions represent almost half of all instances (46.8%, 15 of 32) of subject-verb (any verb) constructions. In the Respuesta, overt subject + verb inversions (any verb) account for 33% of the cases (25 of 75). So, this seems to be a strategy favored by Sor Juana in constructing a subjective, cognitive “Self” in her reflective prose. In addition, in excerpt 6, it can be noticed that Sor Juana not only uses an explicit yo and inverts it with the verb, but also over-emphasizes her message by using the indirect object form de mí plus the reflexive marker misma (myself), which seems superfluous and non-standard to a contemporary reader. Similarly, she also emphasizes her “inclination” to learn by using the qualifier mi propia (my own). An even more striking example of the redundancy of first-person marking in some of Sor Juana’s statements is illustrated in excerpt 8:

Pené yo que huía de mi misma, pero !miserable de mí! Trámeme a mí conmigo y traje mi mayor enemigo en esta inclinación, que no se determinar si por prenda o castigo me dio el Cielo…. (line 251)

(I thought I was fleeing myself; but—woe of me!— I brought myself with me, and brought my greatest enemy in this inclination to study, which I know not whether to take as a Heaven-sent favor or as a punishment…. [line 274])

In this excerpt, Sor Juana’s use of first-person markers is highly redundant: an explicit yo, subject + verb inversion, the object pronouns mi and me, the possessive pronoun mi, and the reflexive marker misma, in addition to verb endings already marking first-person reference. All of these elements contribute to highlight the locutionary subjectivity of Sor Juana’s prose as reflected in the Respuesta.
Finally, excerpt 8 also serves to exemplify another important feature of Sor Juana’s subjectivity: her divided “Self.” As has been pointed out by Martínez-San Miguel, in the writings of Sor Juana, a divided subject emerges representing two facets that function in a complementary manner: an obedient “Self” and a dominated “Self,” one “menacing” and “disturbing” the other.35 Martínez-San Miguel states that, in the Respuesta, Sor Juana represents herself as a divided “Self” whose intellectual inclination is the “agent,” and whose condition as woman and nun embodies the “passive” subject dominated by such an inclination (excerpt 9).

!Rara especie de martirio dondo yo era el mártir y me era el verdugo!

(A strange type of martyrdom, where I was the martyr and “me” was the executioner! )36

This last excerpt also reveals Sor Juana’s innovative use of the linguistic resources at her hand. She conveys here, in a precise, efficient, and rather elegant manner, her divided “Self” by using, in the last clause, the object pronoun me in the position of the subject pronoun, while keeping the subject pronoun yo in the preceding clause. This is an ungrammatical usage, yet a highly accurate way to convey intended meaning through linguistic markers.

**Conclusion**

The present analysis reveals that the locutionary metacognitive subjectivity expressed by Sor Juana in the Respuesta is constructed, in part, by means of a relatively frequent use of intellectual-process verbs and speech-act verbs. The quantitative analysis conducted for this study showed that speech-act verbs are more frequent in terms of verb tokens, but intellectual-process verbs, although less frequent, are represented by a larger number of verb types. However, the single most frequent intellectual-process verb used by Sor Juana was ver, which was often used in ways that are not standard in modern Spanish. Based on these findings, it is possible to speculate that, in seventeenth-century Spanish in the New Spain, intellectual-process terms were limited in terms of the variants available in the language, although they were quite necessary to convey the relationship


36I modified slightly the translation offered by Arenal and Powell, *The Answer / La Respuesta*, 63, line 513, in order to highlight the use of the object pronoun “me,” given that its usage is key to the discussion about this excerpt.
between a writer and her text, and between subjective “Self” and intended meaning. A hypothesis can then be formulated that, in Sor Juana’s time, intellectual-process terms might not yet have evolved into the wide number of variants available to the modern writer. This is certainly an area that deserves further research and one which can be expanded to investigations regarding the diachronic relationship between intellectual and speech-act verbs in Spanish and, for that matter, in other languages.

The results also suggest that the effect of conjoining mental activity with utterance production (use of the verb decir, for instance), as well as with perceptual knowledge (as with the functional use of the verb ver) may have been a strategy to increase the writer’s subjective stance and involvement in relation to the content of the text and its message. The metacognitive verbal expressions used by Sor Juana provide us, therefore, with valuable indicators of how the language of thinking was constructed in the seventeenth century epistolary, essay-like genre.

In addition, the study showed that, in Sor Juana’s Respuesta, metacognitive verbal predicates interact markedly with first-person reference markers. The two elements collocate to a great extent given the fact that, in 58% of the cases in which an explicit yo is used, the first-person pronoun is accompanied by a metacognitive verb. Moreover, it seems that Sor Juana purposely emphasizes this co-occurrence by including other first-person markers in her prose, to the point that the presence of the writer becomes highly redundant. Investigations on factors affecting overt/null pronoun variation in Spanish are, for the most part, focused on dialectal variation and are commonly synchronic in scope. More research is necessary to investigate the evolution of this linguistic feature in the Spanish language across genres and from a diachronic perspective.

To conclude, much remains to be done regarding the language of thinking in relation to the subjective “Self,” an endeavor particularly challenging when one focuses on non-contemporary texts. All I can say is that I “see” Sor Juana when she quotes an unnamed poet: “Even when strength is lacking, still the intention must be praised. I surmised the gods would be content with that.”
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Nothing’s Paradox in Donne’s “Negative Love” and “A Nocturnal Upon S. Lucy’s Day”

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John Donne’s complicated use of paradox is nowhere more inviting than in the grammatical and conceptual use of the word “nothing,” especially when Donne chooses to give this noun the quality of substance and presence, rather than using it to denote the absence of anything. Two poems in particular, from the Songs and Sonets, give affirmative existence to a nothing in order to make distinct arguments regarding the status of an existing thing. Both “Negative Love” and “A Nocturnal Upon S. Lucy’s Day, being the shortest day” rely on this paradox to give a precise definition of the word nothing. The definition arises from two overlapping and intersecting discourses called paradox and negative theology.

The modern meaning of paradox, it seems, was being solidified in the period of the English Renaissance. Rosalie Colie’s Paradoxia Epidemica is the most extensive treatment of the subject to date. Colie displays the various conceptions and uses of paradox in Donne’s age. Its originary use names a statement that goes against received opinion. Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum, which circulated widely in the Renaissance, gives proofs for statements such as “The life of virtue is the completely happy life” (Paradox 2) and “Only the wise man is rich” (Paradox 6). His paradoxes show both the effectiveness of the use of this figure and its close relationship to irony. These Stoic paradoxes accomplish two things: by defending the creeds of the Stoics, they claim to go against prevailing opinion; yet by presenting the statements in ways that would likely accord with “common belief,” they expose, and go against, common practice. Undoubtedly the revival of these paradoxes had the same effect in the Renaissance as they had upon their original readers.

Erasmus’s The Praise of Folly (1511) makes use of this primary sense of paradox, while also delighting in rhetorical paradox, both praising an

1 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Hudson Strod Program in Renaissance Studies at the University of Alabama, whose Grant money aided my opportunity to research and revise this essay for publication.


“indefensible” topic as well as supporting “publicly disapproved propositions.” Folly’s analysis of the theologians (more than the last third of the text) gives many instances of these moves: “O marvelous prerogative of theologians, if to speak incorrectly is reserved to them alone!”, “To work miracles is primitive and old-fashioned, hardly suited to our times”; “Who has not learned that in proportion as a good is more widespread it is greater?”; “The Christian religion on the whole seems to have a kinship with some sort of folly, while it has no alliance whatever with wisdom”; “Peter received the keys, received them from One who did not commit them to an unworthy person, and yet I doubt that he ever understood—for Peter never did attain to subtlety—that a person who did not have knowledge could have the key to knowledge.”

These last two examples are selected because, in addition to functioning as rhetorical paradoxes, they are both a form of semantic and logical paradox, and thus are more recognizably paradoxical today. Furthermore, each borrows from and participates in the second discourse with which this paper is concerned. The “folly” of religion argued in an encomium to folly and the proposition that ignorance can hold the “key” to “knowledge” are distillations from a negative theology. John Donne (who wrote his own prose paradoxes) would, in the Songs and Sonnets, make extensive use of “paradox” in all these forms—rhetorical, semantic, logical, and religio-mystico-metaphysical.

Felicitously, the origins in Western thought of both “paradox” (in all senses of the word) and of “negative theology” (as it would come to be called) can be situated in Plato’s dialogue, Parmenides. In this dialogue of the one and the many, Parmenides inaugurates a method founded upon the category being/non-being: “you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not.” The argument regarding the “one,” which is investigated from both sides of the hypothesis, holds up on both sides, thus forcing Parmenides to ascribe a kind of being to not-being. The unworkable either/or effects a collapse of the binary being/not-being, and a paradoxical conclusion that helps pave the way for a negative theology:

4Colie, Paradoxia, 3, 4.
6These statements are especially reminiscent of the “Learned Ignorance” espoused by Nicholas of Cusa (see below on ignorance and on “knowledge” and “understanding”).
So if one is not, none of the others is conceived to be one or many, since, without oneness, it is impossible to conceive of many…. Therefore, if one is not, the others neither are nor are conceived to be one or many…. Then if we were to say, to sum up, “if one is not, nothing is,” wouldn’t we speak correctly?…Let us then say this—and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other (my emphasis).9

The indefinitely definite conclusions of Parmenides display paradox par excellence while showing also a way to respond to paradox, that is, by not resolving it.

The “Negative Theology,” or via negativa, takes various forms in writings of religious philosophers from the early Christian period, through the Middle Ages, and into the Renaissance, yet it pervades many non-religious discourses (philosophical, literary, etc.). Frederick Copleston describes the doctrine thus: It “rejects any real positive knowledge of God: we know in truth only what God is not, for example, that He is not a genus, not a species, that He is beyond anything of which we have had experience or which we can conceive. We are justified in predicking perfections of God, but at the same time we must remember that all names we apply to God are inadequate—and so, in another sense, inapplicable.”10

I will focus on two of the major historical figures in this discourse in an effort to lay out certain logical propositions incorporated into their works that will give insight into John Donne’s paradoxical use of “nothing.” From the texts and letters of the Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500), I extract from only The Mystical Theology, in which the author offers a way of praising “the Transcendent One in a transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings.” Denial becomes affirmation. Dionysius gives an analogy: “We would be like sculptors who set out to carve a statue. They remove every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden.”11 The statue, in this case, impossible to be conceived of as an object, properly existing, may perhaps be thought of as a kind of “transcendent” knowledge or access to a non-being, and thus as that non-being itself.

The final chapter of The Mystical Theology offers a presentation of denials that serves to define God. The author concludes: The “supreme Cause [God] falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.

9Plato, Complete Works, 397.
Existing beings do not know it as it actually is and it does not know them as they are. There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Darkness and light, error and truth—it is none of these. It is beyond every assertion and denial….”

These statements of the Pseudo-Dionysius prefigure the *De docta ignorantia* of fifteenth-century thinker, Nicholas of Cusa, who cites Dionysius frequently. His doctrine “Of Learned Ignorance” (the title of one work) governs the writer’s entire corpus. His writing is performative exercise, a striving to attain an ignorance that is greater than learning, thus to gain access to an incomprehensible deity. His metaphysical speculations into the nature of God rely on a logic of paradox, *coincidentia oppositorum*, the co-incidence of opposites. The fundamental category, maximum/minimum, extends (or includes) the category of being: “Existence and non-existence can be equally predicated of all that which is conceived to exist; and non-existence cannot to any greater degree than existence be affirmed of all that is conceived not to exist. But the absolute maximum, in consequence, is all things and, whilst being all, it is none of them; in other words, it is at once the maximum and minimum of being.” The greatest maximum approaches “all” to the same degree that the greatest minimum approaches “none.” Stretching these categories until they “coincide” (today we might say deconstruct) necessitates canceling-out the opposition being/not-being. The greatest maximum equals the greatest minimum, and therefore each negates the other, negating with them the metaphysical oppositions maximum/minimum, being/non-being, all/none.

The central and oft-repeated paradox in Cusa’s work (which is also methodological) predicates these linguistic and ontological paradoxes. Citing Dionysius, he says of God that He is “known but that no mind or intelligence comprehends Him.” The rift between “knowledge,” on the one hand, and “understanding” or “comprehension,” on the other, is a paradox, in every sense of the word. It also yields a prescriptive formula that delimits (or expands) one’s reaction to, and relationship with, paradox. In other words, there are (at least) three ways to respond to a paradox: 1) run away; 2) seek to resolve it; 3) *embrace it*. Like Plato’s *Parmenides*, Cusa chooses the third response. It is also the course we are taking in this investigation.

The ubiquitous Saint Augustine investigates the nominative status of the word “nothing” in the dialogue, “Concerning the Teacher.” In the opening pages of the dialogue, Augustine rejects his son Adeotatus’s claim that *nihil* (nothing) signifies “that which is not”: “Perhaps you are right.

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14Cusanus, *Of Learned Ignorance*, 35.
But I cannot agree with you because of your recent admission, namely, that a sign is not a sign unless it signifies something. And that which is not cannot in any way be something.”15 Augustine concisely exposes the fundamental grammatical paradox of nothing, on the level of the word, thus acknowledging his awareness of and complicity in a kind of negative theology. In his classic treatise on language and reading, *De Doctrina Christiana*, Augustine acknowledges and then overcomes the inherent limitations of language: “Yet although nothing can be spoken in a way worthy of God, he has sanctioned the homage of the human voice, and chosen that we should derive pleasure from our words in praise of him.”16

It is worth noting that Donne’s position on this issue, in his sermons, always immensely sensitive to the complications and limitations of language, is virtually identical to Augustine’s statement. He fully realizes the inherent problems with language, but, guided by the Gospel of John, he takes refuge in The Word, entering into knowledge of God thereby.17 It may be surmised that Donne’s brilliant logical gymnastics in the *Songs and Sonets*, especially with regard to the paradox of nothing, his clever and rigorous use of a negative theology, are not necessarily consistent with the studious and serious theological metaphysics found in the sermons. While Donne the profane poet may cheerfully embrace the nothingness of language and existence, Donne the sermonizer must strive to overcome it.18

Thus we return to the word nothing, the *locus in quo* and *sub verba* of negative theology, for which Jacques Derrida, refusing to call it a “dis-course” and refraining from defining the phrase, offers a “provisional hypothesis” that is appropriate here. He suggests that negative theology:

> consists of considering that every predicative language is inadequate to the essence, in truth to the hyperessentially (the being beyond Being) of God; consequently, only a negative (“apophatic”) attribution can claim to approach God, and to prepare us for a silent intuition of God. By a more or less tenable analogy, one would thus recognize some traits, the family resemblance of

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18Frank Kermode, in discussing Donne’s “Nocturnal,” says, “As he extracted the notion of absolute privation in alchemical terms, Donne must have been thinking of the Cabalistic description of God as the nothing, the quintessence of nothing; here a keen and prejudiced ear might discover one of his blasphemies. But it is more interesting, I think, that Donne the poet is claiming what Donne the theologian calls impossible....” Frank Kermode, “John Donne,” in *British Writers and Their Works No. 4*, ed. Bonamy Dobrée (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 23.
negative theology, in every discourse that seems to return in a regular and insistent manner to this rhetoric of negative determination....

John Donne makes this “return in a regular and insistent manner.” In many places in the Songs and Sonnets Donne’s rhetoric centers upon the grammatical paradox of the word nothing. Lines 25–26 of “The Broken Heart” provide one basic formulation of the word’s inherent paradox: “Yet nothing can to nothing fall / Nor any place be empty quite.” These two clauses form an implicit neither-nor relationship that can be read as “Neither can anything fall to nothing, nor can any place be quite empty.” This literal reading preserves the sense of the poem, because the “place” referred to is that in which the speaker’s heart should reside, and the poem concludes that the missing heart is not ultimately absent, but merely transformed: “Therefore I think my breast hath all / Those pieces still, though they be not unite” (27–28). Nevertheless, the inherent semantic play on the word yields an affirmative statement arising from a double negative: Whether nothing can or cannot fall to nothing, nothing is, nevertheless, granted a specific affirmative existence. Though “The Broken Heart” reveals the paradox of nothing through a buried play on words, the two poems dealt with in this essay rely upon precisely this affirmative use of the noun for their meaning. “Nothing” is a noun that is a thing that is no thing.

The intersecting discourses of paradox and negative theology provide an accurate framework for Donne’s poem, “Negative Love.” This poem gives a description of the speaker’s love by, first, distinguishing the speaker’s love from other love (stanza 1), and then attempting to define that love (stanza 2). The definition of stanza 2 concerns us here. It relies on both grammatical affirmation of the word nothing and on a philosophical proposition which asserts that perfection can at best be articulated in negatives. The negative love in this poem represents Donne’s compact expression of the via negativa. The “hidden statue” of the Pseudo-Dionysius finds its parallel in the love described in the poem, which pushes negative definition to its extremes to argue that denying all positive attributes


20 In the fifty-five poems that comprise the Songs and Sonnets, fourteen contain at least one use of the word “nothing,” twelve contain the word “none,” and thirty-four use the word “all” one or more times. All quotations from Donne’s poetry will be cited in the text, by line number in accordance with the Penguin text. John Donne, John Donne: The Complete English Poems, ed. A.J. Smith (London: Penguin Books, 1971).
ultimately leads to nothingness. In doing so, it explicitly accepts Cusa’s model paradox response by explicitly embracing (not resolving) the paradox of nothing. The second stanza of “Negative Love” makes its argument elliptically. It uses non-specific pronouns, making affirmative statements of negative things. The stanza follows:

If that be simply perfectest
Which can by no way be expressed
But negatives, my love is so.
To all, which all love, I say no.
If any who decipher best,
What we know not, ourselves, can know,
Let him teach me that nothing; this
As yet my ease, and comfort is,
Though I speed not, I cannot miss. (10–18)

The stanza is comprised of two if-then statements, between which lies a specific rejection that joins them together. They are followed by a mysterious final consequent. The first statement (10–12) contains both a conditional syllogism concerning the perfect love, and a declarative statement defining the speaker’s love. The speaker’s love is that which “can by no way be expressed / But negatives.” The “if” declares that the perfection of the speaker’s love be contingent upon an abstract and hypothetical designation of perfect love.

The fourth line complicates, not the conditionally perfect love, but the stated love: “To all, which all love, I say no.” Though the precise referent for “all” in both uses is ambiguous, the line is definitely a negation of something called “all,” suggesting that the speaker embraces its opposite, which is, in fact, what happens.

In the second if-then statement (14–16), the speaker asks to be taught a “nothing.” The request offers a hypothetical challenge to anyone who can decipher the unknown nothing and then teach it. This knowledge, if possible, would be knowledge of a nothing: “Let him teach me that nothing.” In Donne’s via negativa, “that nothing” is “that” “perfectest love” hypothesized in the initial conditional. The “perfectest love” (here, love between two people) stands in the position held by God in a negative theology. (The title of this poem in several manuscripts is “The Nothing.”) The relationships in this poem among “deciphering,” “knowing,” and “teaching” are reminiscent of, though not identical with, Cusa’s paradoxical distinction between “knowing” and “understanding.”

The final lines of the poem (17–18) present an affirmation of negative love, and a requisite acceptance of the impossibility of “teaching” “that nothing”: “this / As yet my ease, and comfort is, / Though I speed not, I cannot miss.” “This” refers to the speaker’s assertion, “Though I speed
not, I cannot miss.” “This” is “my ease, and comfort” because the acceptance of “negative love” includes a buried premise: if one fundamentally cannot miss something, neither can one fundamentally make (“express,” “know,” “be taught,” “understand”) that thing (that love, “that nothing”), and vice versa. This premise yields four logical possibilities: 1) If one can (may) make something, one cannot (may not) miss it; 2) If one cannot (may not) make something, one can (may) miss it; 3) If one can (may) make something, one can (may) miss it; 4) If one cannot make something, one cannot miss it. The fourth proposition (the double negative) is affirmed by the argument in “Negative Love.” Thus the speaker resolves the conditional and hypothetical propositions by not resolving the paradox: “Nothing,” here = perfect love, which would come into existence, as “nothing,” only if it could be deciphered and taught.21

“The Nothing” in “Negative Love” names the poem, in so far as its argument gives a definition of the speaker’s love as nothing. Donne’s “Nocturnal Upon S. Lucy’s Day” is a more complicated treatment of nothing, because the word “nothing” refers to and defines the speaker. The speaker deserves our attention, for the poem’s argument is presented as a gradual, persistent self-identification and self-definition. Frank Kermode says of this poem, “the argument goes in search of a definition of absolute nothingness; yet the cause of the poem is grief at the death of a mistress.”22 If one “goes in search” of its definition by approaching the speaker’s self-referential claims through a consideration of the conditions outlined so far, an identity emerges (for speaker and poem), a “nothing,” with more clarity than is generally supposed.

In recent decades of Donne scholarship, it has become increasingly apparent that Donne’s speakers should not always be confused with Donne the man or the poet. Biographical readings have given way to comparisons, for instance, between the speakers of the Songs and Sonets and the traditional Petrarchan lover, variously represented in the sonnet sequences of Sidney and Spenser. Helen Gardner’s note that “Break of Day” seems spoken from a woman’s perspective has resulted in some interpretations that complicate the identity of other speakers. However, the biographical assumptions about the speaker of the “Nocturnal” have not been contested. It is unanimously considered to be, if not Donne himself, at least the persona of a grieving lover who has been ruined by love and then somehow “re-begot” out of that ruin. Tilottama Rajan, for instance, in a “deconstructive” analysis of Donne’s general employment of the word

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21See Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 17, regarding Cusa’s exhaustive propositions concerning “the maximum truth on the absolute maximum itself: it is or it is not; it is and it is not; it neither is nor is it not.”

22Kermode, “John Donne,” 21. Considering Donne’s larger work, while speaking of the “Nocturnal,” Kermode also suggests that “the violent paradoxes on All and Nothing...belong to Donne’s mental habit,” 23.
“nothing,” concludes that Donne uses the word to project an assessment of himself as well as of his poetry. Rajan claims (for reasons unclear to me) that “[f]or the Metaphysicals the words in a poem are not things, except when the wit of a poem is (as it is for Herbert) the wit of God.”23 Roy Booth’s essay on “nothing” in Donne’s poetry focuses on Donne’s own “obsessive” “self-identification with nothing,” and he cites John Carey in naming Donne “the extraordinary nothing of the ‘Nocturnal.’”24

Neither the object of the poem (“her”) nor the speaker (“I”) are clearly determined through these pronouns. Only the addressees, “you, who shall lovers be,” are explicitly named. I see no cause for giving the speaker an autobiographical, or even an animate, identity. Fixing the speaker as a person creates some serious problems, while depersonalizing the speaker opens the way for an impressive demonstration of the logic of a negative theology. If one defers ascribing animate existence to the speaker, another option becomes available: The speaker of the poem is the poem itself. Further, the “I” of the “Nocturnal” is the paradox of the being of nothing, not to be riddled, but to be embraced. The poem is the paradox, speaking in the first person, defining itself. To explore how this is possible and what it may mean requires some basic preliminary claims. However the poem may be defined (nocturnal, vigil, lesson in alchemy), the “Nocturnal” is organized according to a gradual definition of the identity of the speaker, developed systematically, and without contradiction, in the poem’s five stanzas. That is, the speaker’s claims should not be interpreted as random associations, but may be held to a strict developmental progression. Three sets of oppositions contribute to the formation of this identity: contrasts between the speaker and other things, present tense statements set against the past and the future, and affirmative and negative declarations about the present.

Each stanza gives a dominant statement of the speaker, in the first person singular, using the copulate “to be”: I am an “epitaph,” “I am every dead thing,” “I...am the grave / Of all, that’s nothing,” “I am... / Of the first nothing,” and “I am none.” These are contrasted, in each stanza, with a dominant other: “all these,” “you who shall lovers be,” “all others,” “all,” and “You lovers.” The set of contrasts opposes some “nothing” (the speaker) to some “all” outside of the speaker. The careful use of tenses allows for delineation of a prior existence or form of existence that is in direct contrast to present identity. It is referred to in stanza two and described in stanza three. The descriptions of stanza three, of weeping, of souls, of bodies, suggest the speaker to have been a living human lover, ruined by love. Yet previous human existence can do no more in determining present identity then to affirm what the speaker is not. This structural

Sean Ford

approach is an exercise in *via negativa*, where the speaker gains present identity to the extent with which it is contrasted both to the “other” in each stanza and to the attributes it once had.

Future tense also reveals the contrast between the speaker and “you who shall lovers be,” fixing the moment of the poem—“the year’s midnight, and…the day’s”; “this hour”—as a perpetual now. This perpetual now, in addition to drawing attention to the metalinguistic exercise of reading poetry, gives the poem a temporal definition that mirrors theological systems of the negative way. In Nicholas of Cusa’s general metaphysics (non-separable from the divine), “all time is comprised in the present or ‘now.’”25 Augustine, in the *Confessions*, asks,

What, then, is time? If no one ask me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not, and the future is not as yet?26

The present “I am” statements of the “Nocturnal” provide another kind of “negative identity,” either by explicitly stating what the speaker is not (negation), or by stating that what the speaker is is a kind of nothing (negative affirmation). These give a forceful definition of the speaker’s current status, and should be placed together, not as various stages or types of existence, but as a comprehensive statement of existence in the perpetual now. The poem’s affirmative and negative statements follow:

**Affirmative:**

I am the “epitaph” for the spent sun and the dry, lifeless, buried world (3–9)

I am a thing that can be studied (10)

“I am every dead thing, / In whom love wrought new alchemy” (12–13)

“I…am the grave / Of all, that’s nothing” (21–22)

“I am… / Of the first nothing, the elixir grown” (28–29)

“…I am none” (37)

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26See Augustine, *Writings*, 76.
Negative:
I am not a man (30)
I am not a beast, a plant, a stone (32–33)
I am not “an ordinary nothing” (35)

It is difficult to apply any of these self-definitions to animate, human, existence. The first two affirmative statements are explicitly textual: I am an epitaph, and I am a thing to be studied. These point to the poem itself, and thus contribute to two buried claims: I am a nocturnal, I am a poem: “I am a text.” The four subsequent affirmative statements do not make specific claims to a textual identity. Instead, each defines the speaker according to increasing stages towards, and culminating in, nothingness. The first two of these assert a nothingness that is directly connected to, but specifically lacking, animate existence. The third is a genitive that states the speaker’s existence to be of (is born from, comes from) “the first nothing.” The final affirmation unequivocally states, “I am none.” These stages toward nothingness follow a negative logic in keeping with the Pseudo-Dionysius’s (as well as Cusa’s) metaphysics of denying. The denials, Dionysius says, “climb” up towards transcendent knowledge, that is, non-being: “But my argument now rises from what is below up to the transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when it has passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally be at one with him who is indescribable.”

The meaning of the poem’s final affirmation, which may seem ambiguous, receives its definitiveness from the three negations offered in stanza four. The first two negations deny animate existence, and the third, “I am not an ordinary nothing,” proves to be a buried affirmation, both by the logic of the poem and by the paradoxical logic of the word nothing. The presence of the adjective “ordinary” forces, by grammatical necessity, that the statement mean “I am a non-ordinary or extra-ordinary nothing.” The speaker’s grammatical existence emerges as a proposition with a three-stage consequent: “I am not an ordinary nothing,” therefore, “I am a non-ordinary nothing,” therefore I am a “nothing that is something.” The final affirmation, “I am none,” can be taken to mean “I am none of these things” (man, beast, ordinary nothing); but it also states, simply and more plausibly within the logic of the poem, “I am nothing.”

The speaker’s identity, then, depends upon an acceptance of the grammatical necessity that nothing, a noun, signifies something. It remains to be understood how “nothing” can signify a literary text. However, this double assertion, this knowledge, avoids a host of confusing interpreta-

27See Pseudo-Dionysius, Complete Works, 139.
tions made regarding the speaker of Donne’s poem. For an example I turn to an article called “Donne’s Riddles,” which seeks to “balance the identifica-
tion of the grieving lover or husband against another central concern of the poem—the spiritual deprivation of the speaker, a condition defined by his apparent physical illness and recovery.”28 The author, Alison Rieke, later offers this reading: “In stanza four, he cannot determine whether he is man or beast because he cannot see his own ‘properties.’ He thinks his ‘body must be here,’ but his own shadows, light, and body are not sensible to him. Finally, he repeats ‘I am None; nor will my Sunne renew,’ feeling again the despair of his exclusion from seasonal renewal and the sun’s light.”29

According to the logic proposed in this essay, these lines can be interpreted quite literally, without contradiction, and without an appeal to biography. I paraphrase lines 30–37 as follows: If I were a man, I would know that I was one; If I were a beast, a plant, or a stone, I would have some ends or some means, or would be invested with some “properties”; If I were an ordinary nothing, as a shadow is (an example and not a reference to the self of the speaker), “a light, and body must be here”; But I am nothing, and my sun will not renew (literally, because “I am a Nocturnal”).

If the speaker is a “nothing,” and at the same time a poem, what meaning results? Go back to the first line of stanza two: “Study me then, you who shall lovers be / At the next world, that is, at the next Spring” (10–11). Stanza two provides both the cause and the method of the speaker’s coming into existence as an object of study; it is described as a rebirth. Love is named as the cause of “ruin.” Rebirth is an increasingly articulate description of nothingness that gains pragmatic value as the object to be studied by “you who shall lovers be.” Addressed to future lovers, the poem is an image of the nothing they are destined to become after love has ruined and “rebegot” them.30 Kathleen Dolan, in an interesting analysis of what she calls a “paradoxical meditation on ‘nothingness,’” uses the alchemical figures of the poem to suggest that the poet, as the “first nothing,” “prepares for the soul’s ascent.”31 Though Dolan is not alone in foreseeing the speaker’s future resurrection, it seems clear to me that the rebirth has already occurred—“I am rebegot” (17)—and that the future, for the speaker as well as the poem, is non-existent: “nor will my sun renew” (37).

30As a visible warning to lovers who “read” this object, the “Nocturnal” has a parallel with several other Songs and Sonnets. Both “Valediction: Of the Book” and “The Relic” present themselves as documents to be studied.
Nothing’s Paradox in Donne

Stanza three, the poem’s middle stanza, highlights the speaker’s nothingness in two ways: it contrasts the speaker to “All others, [who] from all things, draw all that’s good” (19), and contrasts the speaker’s present existence to a past one. The speaker is “the grave, / Of all, that’s nothing” (21–22). The contrast depends upon two extreme associations, a collapse of oppositions hinging upon the unstable meaning of “all”: the “all” that is everything is contrasted with the “all, that’s nothing,” the speaker. The tense change occurring in the second half of the stanza reveals a past state of existence that is similarly contrasted with whatever else may exist. The speaker uses first-person plural, connecting some “I” with some “you” to indicate a joint existence that distinguishes itself from “ought else,” and participates in a mutual destruction of self and world. The past existence, mortal and destructive, leads to a more concentrated description of the origins of the present nothing.

The beginning of stanza four denotes this you as a “her,” whose death is, in some combination with love, responsible for the ruin and rebirth of the speaker. But the speaker actually originates “Of the first nothing, the elixir grown.” This statement of origins posits a creation that, not only is “nothing,” but also has come from nothing. The creation from nothing replicates the paradox of the first Chapter of Genesis, namely that God’s initial act of creation arose from nothing. The “Nocturnal” twists this paradox, describing a something that is a nothing that has been created from nothing; it thus asserts that “nothing arises from nothing.” These paradoxical origins adhere to the logic of the via negativa, and the argument arrives at the proposition fully stated in the first line of the final stanza, “I am none” (37). Nothing comes of the first nothing—nothing (affirmative) is created out of nothing (affirmative).

I will forego investigating the precise past relationship between “I” and “she,” or assessing the precise role love plays in the creation of the nothing which is the poem. The logic of negative theology is never simple, even though it be manifest. However, it does disentangle much of what is perplexing in the poem, creating new meaning for it. The poem itself is not a riddle. It is a paradox that may not be resolved. If you come to the poem comfortably embracing the paradox that “nothing” is grammatically substantive as well as affirmative, and if you accept that “nothing,” as an affirmative category of existence, can neither be “made” nor “missed,” then you can read the poem literally. Like the love in “Negative Love,” this nothing remains infinitely determinate and infinitely indeterminate.

The temporal setting of “A Nocturnal,” contained in lines 1–2 and lines 42–45, shows the maximum and minimum limitations of this “nothing”: perpetual now in perpetual motion. The opening lines, “Tis the

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32This paradox, widely debated in Donne’s own time (See Booth, “Ideating Nothing,” 203), is discussed and embraced by both Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa.
year’s midnight, and it is the day’s / Lucy’s, who scarce seven hours her-
self unmasks,” utilize the dummy pronoun “it” and the verb “is” to situate
the poem in a particular and permanent temporal location. The final four
lines locate the poem more specifically as a perpetual hour, midnight, at
which time the poem is in perpetual preparation by way of a vigil: “Since
she enjoys her long night’s festival, / Let me prepare towards her, and call
/ This hour her vigil, and her eve, since this / Both the year’s, and the
day’s deep midnight is.” “This,” both as modifier and pronoun, does the
business of naming. First, it names the hyper-present (“This hour”), per-
manently fixing its time as both infinitely determinate (now) and infinitely
indeterminate (eternity). “This,” in pronoun form, renames nothing spe-
cifically: It names both the poem (a nocturnal upon S. Lucy’s Day) and its
speaker (the nothing “preparing towards”), merging the two, now and
always, nothing and all, via the copulate verb “is.”

References


BOOK REVIEWS

As its title suggests, this book is interested primarily in the changing view of the Saracen in medieval French literature. The central premise of the book is that different Old French literary genres can be characterized by different, specific attitudes towards what we might call “the Saracen question.” The book is organized into chapters which each treat a different genre, with an explication of the way in which that particular genre viewed French-Saracen relations. Ramey relies on recent post-colonialist critics (Edward Said, Abdul JanMohammed, Homi Bhabha, María Rosa Menocal, etc.) to provide the theoretical framework of her analyses of the French representation of the Saracens.

After an introduction, the second chapter examines the early epic as a moment of initial encounter between the two cultures, whose initial impulse is toward destruction of the Other. The third chapter examines the troubadour lyric, suggesting that such poems often reveal a desire for the Other, which remains frustrated by difficulties of communication and interpretation however. The later epic of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Ramey argues, presents a model for potential cultural assimilation, through the marriage of the Saracen princess into Christian society. In the following chapter, the epics *Mainet* and the *Siege de Barbastre* are read as proposing a model of intercultural marriage and harmony, wherein Christians could successfully access the Other culture of the Saracen, as opposed to destroying or assimilating it. The sixth chapter reads *Floire et Blanche-flor* and *Aucassin et Nicolette* as retreats from the previous position. They question the optimistic view of cross-cultural relations. The seventh chapter uses the same and other texts to examine the gradual gap which opened up between Christian and Muslim world in the later Middle Ages.

This book will serve as a useful introduction to the topic in question, especially for graduate students and researchers unfamiliar with this area of Old French literature. Ramey integrates a number of social factors—changes in marriage law initiated by Gratian’s *Decretum*, views of the Saracen world in the *mappemonde* genre, and others—to bolster the argument based primarily on literary texts. However, the book has a number of limitations. Most obviously, it is too short for such a vast topic—just 103 pages of text. This prevents a fuller or more subtle treatment of many issues. For example, far more use of chronicles and historical sources is needed, since Ramey is essentially arguing that the literary representations reflect larger social realities. The observations drawn from post-colonial studies could be elaborated much farther. And a greater number of literary examples would strengthen—and nuance—many of the claims.
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More generally, one must question such a strict homology between
genre and worldview. Ramey suggests a historical evolution of social atti-
tudes was occurring, but the genres often overlapped temporally. Furthermore, many disagreements could be found among various epics or romances in their representations of the Saracen. Ramey also never really provides a definition or theory of genre, and indeed, in some chapters she conflates what are traditionally seen as different genres. Without an analysis of the formal or social motivations which might have determined such genre-specific viewpoints, the genre-based approach seems too rigid and arbitrary. Researchers in the field will find the book interesting at times, particularly in the readings of individual texts, but too schematic and reductive to be fully convincing.

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This is a very welcome publication. Despite medieval food being something of a growth industry recently, its regional dimension has not received much attention. Books and articles either concentrate on a single country or do little to discourage the inference that western Europe shared a single cuisine. Beyond western Europe, publication has been sparse (the most important exception being the recent publication of Maria Debinska’s Food and Drink in Medieval Poland in English). There remain some gaps in the Europe presented by this collection: nothing on Scandinavia, and a big gap between Italy and Constantinople. Nevertheless, to have brought so many regions together in a single volume is an achievement for which we owe Dr. Adamson and her contributors considerable gratitude.

Perhaps inevitably, the chronological focus of the chapters varies: most are “Medieval,” but Italy is “Medieval and Renaissance.” The chapter on the Low Countries is a translated article by Johanna Maria van Winter, originally published in German. Ostensibly covering only the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when cookbooks appear, it in fact begins with household accounts of the fourteenth century onwards. From these sources it is possible to track changes between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, as for instance an increase in butter consumption and a wider availability of imported spices. Nonetheless, the bulk of the middle
ages is omitted. This chronological dislocation means that a reader wishing to compare and contrast the various regions will often be at a disadvantage.

The range of this collection extends beyond the middle ages, at both ends: it begins with a chapter on the classical tradition, often seen as the foundation of the cuisines of the middle ages (whether it really was is a question not attracting much attention from the contributors). It is rather surprising, however, that Dr. Adamson, an expert on medieval Germany, has written the chapter herself, given the number of scholars active in Greek and Roman food history. Again, it is a surprise that the chapter does not deal with the regional variations that are the focus of the collection, although it does survey Byzantine diet which, as Adamson points out, continued the classical tradition when it began to die out elsewhere in the former Empire. Despite these caveats, her chapter will provide useful background for readers who are not themselves food historians.

As an early medievalist, I was gratified that the chapter on Britain does not neglect the early middle ages. This is no more than one would expect from Constance Heiatt, an Anglo-Saxonist as well as an expert on Middle English cookery texts. With respect to these latter, she emphasizes the similarities with Arabic and Italian cuisines, rather than French influences. She also identifies what may be specifically British features, such as flowers and fantastic “subtleties.” My only reservation would be that “British” and “English” seem to be taken as synonymous. It is true that medieval sources from Scotland and Wales are very scarce, but this need not mean that their diet and cookery were the same as those of England.

The chapter on northern France is by Terence Scully, who concentrates on the later period, as usual because that is when the surviving texts originated. However, he is not under the illusion that culinary texts and cookery are coterminous. He points out that the texts relate only to élite cookery, finer points and unusual recipes; the basics are taken as read. He also draws attention to the important role of oral transmission in medieval French cookery, an observation that must apply with similar force to other regions. Although there is a wide range of recipes in Scully’s texts, he shows that they are very standardized, with the same recipes reappearing in most collections, no doubt a feature of their belonging to the kitchens of a highly sophisticated, and competitive, aristocracy. He also pursues the regional theme of the book by comparing northern French cuisine with Italian.

From southern France, by contrast, only a single medieval cookbook survives, but Carole Lambert, who has edited it, exploits it thoroughly, comparing it with sources from other regions in order to isolate its distinctive features. There are similarities with Italian and Catalan cuisine, largely due to Arab influence. Numerous contrasts can be drawn between the
north and south of France, perhaps most obviously in the use of Mediterranean ingredients, but less predictably in the extensive use of the oven in southern cookery.

Arab influence again accounts for much of the difference between north and south in Italy. For the north, Simon Varey’s chapter is based on close examination of Platina’s *De honesta voluptate*. This is a very different work from the recipe collections of the north, as much scholarship as cookery. Platina clearly knew his Apicius well, and was a man of the renaissance rather than the middle ages. Beyond Platina’s text, Varey is able to demonstrate regional variations within mainland Italy, each court having its own favourite dishes, and competing in magnificence with its neighbours. This is a significant contrast with France, let alone England, where the number of courts was much more restricted.

No medieval cookbook survives from Sicily, but Habeeb Salloum is able to identify many features of Sicilian cuisine which can only be due to Arabic influence, looking at historical sources, later cookery, and the Sicilian language. The influence of Sicily’s Norman conquerors, by contrast, was negligible.

Spain, the other main area of Arab influence in Europe, is also fortunate in having a fourteenth-century poem listing the culinary specialities of various parts of the country. With this starting point, Rafael Chabrán examines the geographical, ethnic and religious diversity of medieval Spanish cuisines. Not only Arabs but Sephardic Jews made an important contribution. Of all Spain’s cuisines, Catalonia’s is the best documented, and also the most cosmopolitan, due to its links with the kingdom of Naples and its extensive trading activities.

In Adamson’s own chapter, on German-speaking lands, she does food history a service by pointing out that the “barbaric” diet of the early Germans is largely a product of the prejudices of Tacitus and Caesar, drawing a contrast with “civilized” Roman cuisine. In medieval sources we meet with similar contrasts between aristocracy and peasantry. Peasants, of course, feature only as the butt of ridicule, but that need not mean that information about their diet is inaccurate. Adamson assembles a much more rounded picture of medieval German cuisines than would be obtained from cookbooks alone. She suggests a shift in emphasis in the tenth and eleventh centuries from animal foods to cereals.

No concluding chapter sums up the contrasts, or connections, between the regions covered here, but some points emerge from a reading of the book. In the first place, the Mediterranean area seems to have been much more receptive to wider influences than northern Europe. This may have been partly due to the attitudes of peoples used to thinking of themselves as being at the centre of the civilised world. Climate must also have played a part; it is much easier to adopt exotic fruits or spices if one can
grow them at home. And if one cannot, extensive trade links make it easier to obtain them. The spice trade certainly reached northern Europe, but supplies must have been unreliable and for most people prohibitively expensive, until the “voyages of discovery” brought the trade under western European control. Secondly, it is clear that the picture of fashions, including culinary ones, moving in a fairly straightforward manner from Italy to France and from France to England is hopelessly over-simplified. Some seem to have jumped straight from Italy to England, while the range of influences on the north was much wider than has usually been allowed for. However, the more exotic influences did not extend far down the social scale. By bringing these and other fascinating points before the reading public, Melitta Weiss Adamson et al. have done us a service we can best repay by pursuing further studies within the regional framework they have established.

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As the author of this study points out, starting in the twelfth century, Old French and Breton narrative traditions circulated in Italy. Stories about Charlemagne’s battles against the Saracens in Spain, and tales about the knights of Arthur’s round table flourished for approximately four hundred years. This vogue culminated with Pulci, Ariosto, Boiardo, and Tasso, who fused the various traditions together and reworked them into magnificent works of literature. While scholars have studied the many sources which inspired these authors, they have generally not emphasized the production of Andrea da Barberino. Rather, he has been merely listed among the numerous sources, and given no sense of prominence. Because of this, critics have not given him the respect that he deserves. There have been several reasons for this, most notably, an incomplete and imperfect understanding of his works, and the lack of critical editions of his works. Gloria Allaire attempts to address this general oversight through this painstakingly documented and well researched philological analysis. By returning to the manuscripts themselves, she is able to reconstruct his literary corpus more fully than has been previously accomplished. In this way, she demonstrates that Barberino was instrumental in the development of the chivalric epic as a literary genre. By bringing forth this study,
Allaire wishes to return Barberino to a more authoritative position regarding the literary culture of the Italian fifteenth century.

Andrea da Barberino was born ca. 1372 in Florence and died between 1431 and 1433. During his lifetime, he penned numerous prose versions of the lives and adventures of different heroes in Charlemagne’s court. Internal evidence and copyist notes suggest that these works were read in the city piazze during the time of the Florentine oligarchy, before the rise of the Medici family. Therefore, they reflect the aristocratic ethos of the city of bankers and merchants. At the same time, however, Andrea’s style demonstrates a full knowledge of the literature of the day, and includes references to the Bible, Marie de France, Virgil, Guido da Pisa, Ovid, Statius, Justinus, Ptolomy, Giovanni Villani, and Boccaccio. Moreover, the author remained closer to the original French source texts than to the more recent Tuscanizations in general. Therefore, while Barberino appears inspired by the oral tradition, he adopts an ambivalent position to it, writing unmistakeably literary redactions of the tales. Because of his erudition, later authors, including Machiavelli and Ariosto, borrowed from his works. Thus, he plays a crucial role in the transformation of this tradition from a popular art form to a more literary one.

Allaire first examines Barberino’s style, thereby providing herself with the tools to determine if newly found exemplars in the manuscripts are his or not. Writing in pure Tuscan, she says, the author uses a lay, secular tone completely in line with Italian renaissance historiography. Rather than speak in generalities or cite vaguely fantastical occurrences, Barberino prefers the specificity of the chronicler. To that end, he utilizes a regular ordering of events and dates, cites specific statistics such as the strength of a given army, and frequently enumerates the various points on a journey. Indeed, for Barberino, geography constitutes an organizing principle as he mentions actual places and cities. Citing primarily from Ptolomy, he concerns himself with “anthropological” concerns, such as the peoples and customs of a given area. In much the same way, when warriors encounter animals, he borrows from the bestiaries. Therefore, according to Allaire, the hallmark of Barberino’s style is verisimilitude through the use of realistic details.

Having established his stylistic characteristics, Allaire dedicates much of this book to proving that certain texts belong to him. She states that Barberino strove for completeness in his literary production, relating all the important episodes and characters from the tradition. Previous scholarship established his corpus with a number of gaps, and this book seeks to address these missing portions. She first directs her attention to La prima spagna. This work was discovered in the nineteenth century, but was subsequently lost. Working from the scholar’s description, she argues that although it was unattributed in the manuscript, it probably was written by
Barberino. Thus, even though it is no longer extant, Allaire performs the invaluable service of restoring the work to its author.

The same nineteenth-century critic also described another book, *La seconda Spagna*, and Allaire asserts that a version of this text, with the title of *La storia di Ansuigi*, survives. The two *Spagna* texts fill in the narrative *lacunae* between Barbarino’s *Aspramonte* and his *Nerbonesi*. Moreover, she demonstrates that the most famous paladin in Italy, Rinaldo, was not lacking to Barberino’s works. Rather, the work entitled *Le storie di Rinaldo* similarly belongs to him. In her discussions of *La seconda Spagna* and *Rinaldo*, she shows their stylistic affinities to his other books, citing his unique motifs, expressions, and lexicon found in each. By using a group of control texts, she is careful to ascribe only those elements found specifically in the author’s works, and not those which pertain to the chivalric genre in general. Conversely, using this same technique, she is able to argue that Barberino probably did not author the poorly written work, *Il libro di Rambaldo*, but rather, that it represents a copy of his *Guerrin Meschino*. In this manner, Allaire proves that Andrea da Barberino’s literary production formed a seamless whole. It relates all the major events in the complete story of the war between Charlemagne and the Saracens. Rather than being inconsistent, as it appeared previously, it constitutes a consistent, universal perspective on that legendary material.

With this study, Allaire sheds new light on an unfairly ignored author of the early Renaissance. By re-examining the manuscripts themselves, she is able to re-evaluate the scholarly opinion on Andrea da Barberino. She shows that, rather than being second-rate, Andrea da Barberino represents an important figure in the development of Italian literature.

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When the time comes to write the history of cultural criticism in the latest Elizabethan era (and why not, since Elizabeth II’s reign has more or less coincided with the rise of that criticism), one section might be devoted to the category of book in which the first chapter turns on a brief discussion of a painting by an Old Master. Readers usually need look no farther than the book’s jacket or frontispiece to see a reproduction of the painting in question. This category would include Michel Foucault’s *Les mots et les
chooses, with its famously difficult account of Diego Velázquez’s *Las Meninas*, and Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare*, which mingles an account of Sir Thomas More with one of Hans Holbein’s *The Ambassadors*. Both books register as points on a particular intellectual trajectory which has still not come to ground; along its farther extent we could place Bernhard Klein’s book, opening as it does with an analysis of Johann Vermeer’s *The Geographer*. Like Foucault and Greenblatt, Klein is concerned with his introductory objet d’art as the representation of a charged cultural moment, here turning on the nature of the geographer’s gaze: “The painting alerts us not to what the geographer sees, but to how he sees, to the historical and technical conditions shaping his perception of the world: an inquisitive ‘view’ inextricably linked to its articulation in the descriptive language of maps, charts, and globes” (2).

As Klein will go on to argue, this latter “descriptive language” is one element in a complex of articulations, contributing to what Foucault might call the discursive formation of space in the early modern period. The book’s purpose is to analyze “the signifying structures inscribed in the verbal and visual representation of differently imagined social and political spaces” (10). In practical terms this comes down to a transit between cartographic or chorographic documents—among others, Hartmann Schedel’s *Nuremberg Chronicle*, Sebastian Munster’s *Cosmography*, Abraham Ortelius’s *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, John Norden’s *Surveyor’s Dialogue* and *Speculum Britanniae*, Christopher Saxton’s *Anglia*, William Camden’s *Britannia*, and John Speed’s *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain*—and a range of familiar Elizabethan and Jacobean literary works: for instance, *Tamburlaine*, *The Faerie Queene*, *Richard II*, *King Lear*, *Poly-Olbion*. Klein cleverly organizes his discussion of these materials map-wise, in three evenly-proportioned parts, each part containing three chapters in a sequence that topically parallels the sequence in the other two parts (for example, every third chapter deals with Ireland). Thus the book lays out a metaphorical grid based on three products of the geographer’s craft that Klein sees implied in Vermeer’s painting: measurements, cartographies, and narratives. Within these three categories, Klein explores the ways in which his selection of maps and texts interact to produce, shape, and control the “imagined” space of regions, nations, and colonies from various positions and to various ends, almost all of which are ultimately political in character.

The book’s basic argument that maps are instruments of power for the already-powerful is now becoming fairly familiar, and Klein readily acknowledges its sources in the work of J.B. Harley, Henri Lefebvre, Denis Cosgrove, and Richard Helgerson, and more recently of John Gillies and Garrett Sullivan (there is also, of course, the more distant debt to Foucault’s occasional remarks on geography). What Klein brings to the
argument is a willingness to go the extra mile, so to speak: the range of materials is broader, the level of detail is deeper, and even the quality of the black-and-white illustrations is higher than in most previous examples of this genre of criticism. The strength of the book, it should be said, is in its interpretation of geographic rather than literary materials. It is especially valuable for its discussions of English efforts to assimilate Ireland within the parameters of contemporary mapping. In the three chapters devoted to Ireland, Klein illuminates the work of some lesser-known figures in the history of British cartography—Laurence Nowell, John Goghe, Baptista Boazio, Richard Bartlett, Thomas Raven—while nicely demonstrating the ways that their projects parallel the English government’s struggles to bring Ireland and the Irish “within bounds” during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. These chapters make a useful supplement to the recent work on early modern conceptions of Ireland by scholars like Andrew Hadfield, David Baker, and Christopher Highley. Every chapter, in fact, offers sure-footed and nuanced exploration of non-literary materials that—even at a time when almost any textual artifact is fair game for criticism—have not received the attention they deserve.

Klein’s readings of literary works are more problematic. They are generally brief, and sometimes give the impression of being only suggestive fragments upon which more substantial readings of cartographic works can be laid. At one level this simply reflects a working method which is common to much contemporary cultural criticism, but it also leads to some noticeably ragged edges. Chapter 8 on “The Poetics of National Space” contains the most fully developed literary commentary in the book, offering a satisfying comparison of the geographical orientations of \textit{The Faerie Queene} and \textit{Poly-Olbion}: Spenser’s poem “undertakes to question the epistemological significance of space as such” (167), thus defying conventional cartographic representation, whereas “Drayton’s English geography is fixed and immobile, a complete act of faith in the topographical map” (162). The chapter concludes with a section on the levelling giant who appears in the second half of book 5, canto 2 of \textit{The Faerie Queene}; Klein argues that the narrative of Artegall’s refutation and Talus’s destruction of the giant allegorizes the failure of cartography to reflect “a divinely authorized political landscape reflecting the principle of social order and the distribution of power” (169), a landscape which Klein understands Spenser to favor over the sort of topographically precise but socially denatured terrain which forms the ground of \textit{Poly-Olbion}. However, this reading seems to contradict an earlier account of book 5 in chapter 3, “Surveying Ireland,” where Klein focuses on Talus’s levelling activity in canto 12, stanza 26 as “a systematic, quantitative exploration of the land” which resembles the work of the surveyor (71); the rationale for Talus’s activity is that “the Irish countryside needs to be laid open, made
visible and placed under systematic surveillance” (70). Yet the reading of book 5 in chapter 8 suggests that from Spenser’s perspective such a brutally transparent and demystifying mapping of the Irish landscape is neither possible nor desirable. One cannot have one’s giant and one’s Talus too, at least in this sense; but the two readings are never made to square with each other.

This is to say that Maps and the Writing of Space will be of most value to readers who are interested in the hermeneutics of early modern maps, an area of inquiry where Klein shows admirable energy, resourcefulness, and mastery of detail. On the other hand, readers who are concerned with how literary texts respond to geographic projects (and vice versa) may feel that Klein’s approach to that question is somewhat cursory.

I want to sound one other cautionary note, having to do with that frequent fixture in recent criticism, the gaze. My growing sense is that the study of the gaze as a cultural phenomenon is, well, a purely speculative enterprise. It may be that there is something like a collective gaze with which a particular society views itself and its others, but it seems to me that this gaze merges rather too readily with the perceptual apparatus of the critic. The problem surfaces for me in Klein’s treatment of a map from the 1588 edition of Munster’s Cosmography, representing Europe in the figure of a queen, with Italy as one arm and Denmark as the other, Spain as the crowned head, eastern Europe as the fringe of the gown, and so on. One distinguishing feature of this map is that, other than the fact that the head and the gown are clearly marked as feminine, the figure has no conspicuous sexual features whatsoever.

Klein takes this generic figure and runs with it: “the body of the world is now clearly gendered,” and thus “assumes a host of qualities articulated by the signifier ‘woman’ in a patriarchal culture—passivity, fertility, penetrability, a need for male protection, a submissive return to the domestic. The act of sexualizing landscape in this fashion conceives of the global body as the object of an analytic masculine gaze” (36). In pursuit of the “masculine gaze,” Klein nowhere observes that the figure of Europe is very obviously a monarch, thus perhaps not as passive, submissive, or domestic as he imagines. Also, Europe’s gown presents a decoration of mountain ranges, hills, rivers, and forests, but these are tied to the geography of Europe, not to the conventional form of the female body (the only exception would be a circle of trees around Bohemia, which appears to be intended as the buckle of a girdle). There are no obvious sites for “penetrability.” I would suggest that this map mainly registered for its contemporary viewers as a clever novelty, one which might have something to say about continental politics—it portrays the countries of western Europe as being on top and those of eastern Europe as literally trailing the ground—but would do very little to produce a gendered “cartographic gaze.” This is one case in Klein’s book where the study of the gaze actually
produces a sort of myopia, at least in terms of seeing the singular features of the object in question. Another case may well occur at the very beginning with the remarks on Vermeer’s geographer, who could be looking significantly out of the window, surveying, measuring, and interpreting the outer world in cartographic terms; but who could just as easily—in a prospect that Klein acknowledges and then dismisses in his first footnote—“be lost in thought and not looking at anything in particular” (188, n. 1).

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In *Literature, Travel, and Colonial Writing in the English Renaissance 1545–1625*, Andrew Hadfield argues that political philosophy informs a good deal of early modern English literature. Specifically, he aims to establish the currency of republican ideas and ideals in literary and non-literary works cutting across four major genres, from travel and colonial writings to prose fiction and drama. Imaginary or real, the foreign settings of these works provide displaced or defamiliarized locations from which to reflect on both England’s internal government and its colonial involvement in Ireland. His approach draws on critical insights from Cultural Materialism and New Historicism, although without the latter’s emphasis on the power of the state to control and limit political conversation. He also makes clear from the start the paradigmatic status of More’s *Utopia* in his argument both for the “Eurocentric focus” of the political concerns it explores and as the “foundational text” for the period’s “literature of counsel, an extension of the *speculum principis* tradition” (10, 11). Within the framework of his argument, Hadfield’s analysis is richly intertextual, and contextualized with biographical, and historical information where available. In discussing individual works, he often compares it with other literary and/or non-literary works by the same author to show a remarkable consistency of political engagement. Where necessary, he does make use of “circumstantial evidence” and is always careful to acknowledge this use and the “speculation” it entails (226, 227). The result is a highly engaging book that often makes cogent sense of textual ambiguities and yields instructive new ways of reading texts both obscure and familiar.

Hadfield’s argument is most directly persuasive in dealing with writings by English travelers in Europe (chapter 1), texts which have a context
in the Tudor practices of diplomatic visits to foreign courts and the Continental tour as the means of rounding out an aristocratic education. The author makes a point of connecting specific texts with their authors’ travels both abroad and within intellectual circles known for their engagement with issues of government. For example, readers can better understand Starkey’s ideological orientation in *A Dialogue between Pole and Lupset* in light of the author’s relation to Cardinal Pole’s circle. More important, Hadfield identifies in the travel writings the pervasive currency of the myth of Venice as the perfect constitution and model republican state. This thematic link brings together works as far apart in time as William Thomas’s *Historie of Italie* (1549) and Sir Robert Dallington’s *The View of France* (1604). The purpose here is not to establish textual influence but to show how the myth enables a discourse of comparative government in the travel writings, one conducive to political self-reflection that is often subversive and at times openly challenging to the state. His wide-ranging analysis also makes for refreshing juxtaposition of serious works with those often deemed trivial. Notably in the case of Coryat’s *Crudities*, Hadfield suggests that we take seriously the work’s “mode of presenting its author” as a wise fool in the Erasmian tradition recounting a journey organized “around the figure of Venice” (66, 62).

In turning to colonial writings, Hadfield analyzes English and translated Spanish accounts of colonial enterprises in America as vehicles for political reflection (chapter 2). This analysis is necessarily indirect—given the “multi-layered” quality of narrations involving writers, translators, and editors—and selective, given the sheer volume of colonial writings produced in this period (75). The interesting theme to emerge in this chapter is the figure of the “savage critic” who, as both critic of European values and participant in native savagery, embodies the contradictory perceptions that European writers and colonists have of the inhabitants of the New World. Hadfield’s emphasis, of course, is on the critic rather than the savage. His analysis gives new meaning, one might say, to Todorov’s insight that colonial writings register “what knowledge of the other makes of the self.” A striking example of the figure occurs in the confrontation between the prince of the Comogruans and the Spanish conquistador Vasco Nunez de Balboa, recounted in Peter Martyr’s *De Orbe Novo Decades*, translated into English by Richard Eden. Hadfield finds in the prince’s oration “a more subtle critique of European values than that of Thomas More’s ascetic Utopians” (76). An even more ingenious instance of the “savage critic” appears in Theodor de Bry’s pictorial translation of Thomas Harriot’s description of natives in *A brief and true report of the newfound land of Virginia* (1588). The implied comparison of Amerindians with the Picts as Britain’s ancestral race yields a political allegory to the effect that “both [English and indigenous] societies can learn from each other” (117).
Accounts of Anglo-Spanish rivalries in the New World often make for powerful allegory with respect to ongoing religious struggles in Europe between Catholic and Protestant nations. At the heart of this analysis is Bartolome de las Casas’s *Brevissima Relacion de las Indias*, a source for the period’s developing Black Legend of Spanish cruelty in the New World. The English translation entitled *The Spanish Colonie* includes a prefatory warning to the Low Countries to resist the Catholic tyranny of Spain and, more generally, “an apocalyptic vision of a future Europe overrun by the evil Spanish before they in turn meet their judgment” (94). The discussion of political allegory is most suggestive, if appropriately circumspect, when it comes to the relevance of the Black Legend for England’s relation to Ireland, as seen in his treatment of Edward Grimstone’s *The Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (1604), a translation of Jose de Acosta’s *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias* (1590). The allegorical temper culminates in Samuel Purchas’s expanded and re-edited version of Hakluyt’s *Principall Navigations*, entitled *Purchas his pilgrimes*, in which “the figure of the nation has disappeared as an organizing principle, and an apocalyptic religious allegory of man’s pilgrimage…has taken its place” (131).

Chapter 3, which deals with prose fiction, offers some of the most engaging discussions in the book, moving from works “concerned with establishing a rigorous public forum for debate” to works that were less overtly political (146). Of particular interest here is the discussion of *Beware the Cat* written by William Baldwin, “the presiding genius behind the project for *A Mirror for Magistrates*. The work was used as a state-sponsored attack on the Pilgrimage of Grace when it was first published in 1536, and then as anti-Catholic satire when it was republished in 1573 (141). Hadfield especially points to the work’s “rapid movement from an Irish to an English setting” as indicative of how England’s colonial involvements in Ireland “demanded a radical rethinking of English identity” (146, 144–45). In other fictional works, the chapter shows how the use of foreign and exotic settings in the prose romances facilitates displaced commentary on the government in England. As well, comparative analysis of Geoffrey Fenton’s *Tragicall Discourses* and William Painter’s *Pallace of Pleasure* shows them to represent “equal but opposite possibilities in early English fiction” with respect to republican ideas (165). Likewise rewarding is Hadfield’s reading of political ambivalence in Lyly’s *Euphues and His England* (especially in the section “Euphues his Glasse for Europe”) and of Catholic/Protestant tensions in Lodge’s *Rosalynde.*

I only wish the same specificity of treatment can be extended to all the works in this chapter, especially to tease out instances in which writers “dilute and disguise” their political commentary in response to immediate circumstances (154). To be sure, doing so would require a book in itself.
In chapter 4, Hadfield turns to “reading the locations of Renaissance plays” as displaced settings for political commentary on England’s internal and colonial government. Beginning with Marlowe’s *Massacre at Paris*, Hadfield’s focus on political philosophy reframes existing critical debate on the play, subsuming two opposing lines of interpretation of the play. The *Massacre* is thus neither simply “a militantly protestant work” nor “a balanced satire on the cruel excesses of sectarianism”: rather, the play “represents the terrible effects of government which loses control because it is either unable or unwilling to protect and honour the rights of the citizens over which it rules” (215). In turning to *Othello*, Hadfield’s analysis brings out the vulnerability of a liberal republican state to subversion from within in the figure of Iago, and finds in the play’s dual settings of Venice and Cyprus the subtext of England’s relation to Ireland. One wonders, however, whether Iago’s plotting really subverts the will of the Senators who are only too quick to replace Othello with Cassio upon the successful defense of Cyprus. The chapter ends with *The Tempest* with its indefinite setting and John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess*, set on the Moluccan island of Tidore. The juxtaposed analysis of these plays enables readers to see the former as related to the “humanist mode of writing that emphasizes the need for counsel” in the tradition of More’s *Utopia*, while reading the latter as possibly an anti-colonial text.

Chapter 4 thus brings to conclusion a rich and varied intellectual journey. Both in its thematic focus and the broad range of texts it studies, the book makes a worthy companion to its two predecessors, *Literature, Politics, and National Identity: Reformation to Renaissance* (1994) and *Spenser’s Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage Soyl* (1997). This book will delight and instruct both new readers and more seasoned students of early modern English literature and culture.

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As the author writes in her introduction, “[t]he thesis of this book is that many Old English texts construct their female subjects by means of a discourse of enclosure derived from the increasingly restrictive conditions of early medieval female monasticism” (6). One of the main attractions of her book is that Shari Horner has not limited herself to texts with an
overtly monastic theme; on the contrary, she includes a set of works that on the surface may appear to some readers to have nothing to do with monastic cloistering. The book offers a compelling and fresh look at a broad range of secular and religious texts, ranging from Beowulf, a work about which there would seem to be little more to say, to works that have increasingly become the focus of critical enquiry, Juliana and the elegies “Wulf and Eadwacer” and “The Wife’s Lament,” as well as works that have only begun to garner critical interest among Anglo-Saxonists, Aelfric’s virgin martyr legends in Lives of Saints. What binds these works together is their context within an ecclesiastical and cultural system in Anglo-Saxon England that constructed and circumscribed femininity. Drawing on Judith Butler’s model of a fluid gender resulting from a set of socially mandated acts, Horner shows how the “expressions” of gender resulting from female religious enclosure inform and produce a stable gender identity for women in literary texts.

Chapter 1, “Looking Into Enclosure in the English Female Lyrics,” contains one of the strongest arguments in the book. As the only two Old English poems with female speakers, “Wulf and Eadwacer” and “The Wife’s Lament” illustrate the tense relationship between the “silenced and enclosed” monastic woman and the active, vocal women that we find in such characters as Beowulf’s Wealthow (22). At the same time, the speakers of these poems evoke the literate and creative women of the Boniface correspondence who composed texts, copied books, and studied Scripture but also voiced loneliness, sexual frustration, and unease at their physical confinement. Horner convincingly argues that in both poems, the speaker’s exile on an island, where she is cut off from family and lover, metaphorically echoes the enclosure of female religious and creates a gendered identity for her just as the nun’s identity results from the Church’s expectations for her.

In the former poem, the speaker—confined but initially not silenced—voices resistance to her condition and in doing so “captures the tension between the silence of female enclosure and the vocal expression of worldly desire” (45). However, like the nuns who became increasingly silenced and limited in their movement through strict claustration rules, the speaker is silenced, in this case by “se beaducafa” in line 11. An ambiguous reference, “beaducafa” can be read as referring to Wulf, the speaker’s lover, who perhaps evokes simultaneous joy at his presence and pain at the thought of his absence as he holds the speaker in his arms, or to Eadwacer, who rapes her and silences her cries for her lover as he holds her tightly. Either way, the male action can be understood as an attempt to prescribe and limit female sexuality and self-identity.

Horner’s reading of “The Wife Lament” asserts that the poem constructs gender through a perhaps unintentional reliance on monastic imag-
cry and language, which allows the poem to be read in a Christian context. Thus, for example, the relationship of the woman to her “hlaford” reminds us of the male-female friendships presented in the Boniface correspondence and also provides a solution to the puzzling use of “folga≤” in line 9: “_a ic me feran gewat folga≤ secan.” The word usually refers to the service a retainer owes his lord, and scholars, puzzled by its used here, have typically interpreted this passage to mean that she sought protection or material support. However, if we accept Horner’s assertion that the language includes monastic overtones, an alternate meaning derived from the word “folgian”—“to follow monastic profession”—can be applied here and the speaker can thus be viewed as a kind of miles christi, a term that refers to male or female, seeking to serve her lord, “either secular or divine” (52).

The reading of Beowulf in chapter 3, “Voices From the Margins: Women and Textual Enclosure in Beowulf,” provides a similarly innovative and fruitful method of re-examination. Here, the author attempts to peel back the onion-skin-like layers of female narrative to discuss the women of the epic as enclosed by the physical text and the narrative structure, a technique of interest to the Beowulf scholar and also useful for the teacher of an undergraduate British literature survey trying to help students make sense of the often-murky digressions. Female gender, that is behavior appropriate for women, is produced through the repetition and re-interpretation of the peace-weaving motif. Using Hildeburh as the foundation of her argument, Horner shows that “weaving,” successful or not, yields not only a tightly confined woman, but also a woman who inhabits the appropriate social sphere of wife and mother. In this scheme, Grendel’s mother and, to a lesser extent, Modthryth illustrate that unconfined existence is dangerous to the freely moving woman herself and to those around her. Grendel’s mother is, of course, killed for her inappropriate behavior while Modthryth is criticized for her youthful, murderous ways. Once happily and productively married (enclosed), however, she becomes a model of generosity. Yet the text reminds us continually that the peace that comes through weaving and enclosure is only temporary and that “the threat of unenclosed women can never be fully eradicated” (91). Nevertheless, enclosure remains the normative behavior for women as is illustrated by the final female narrative in the story, that of Frewaru whose marriage to Ingeld is doomed from the beginning, and whose story repeats that of Hildeburh, which has itself been filtered through the stories of Wealthow and Hygd, and thus provides evidence of textual weaving to parallel the narrative weaving of the plot.

The third and fourth chapters, “Textual/ Sexual Violence: The Old English Juliana and the Anglo-Saxon Female Reader” and “Bodies and Borders: The Hermeneutics of Enclosure in Ælfric’s Lives of Female Saints,” address texts that might seem a more appropriate topic for a dis-
cussion of Anglo-Saxon monastic enclosure, lives of virgin martyrs. Although neither *Juliana* nor *Lives of Saints* was necessarily intended for a female monastic audience, Horner makes a good argument that both might have been familiar to this group of readers or listeners. Within the context of actual physical threat by Viking invaders, stories of the “heroics of virginity”—a term familiarized by Jane Tibbetts Schulenberg and similarly used here to denote the extreme measures women underwent to protect their virginity—would have been particularly apt. In these works, the discourse of enclosure appears at the level of the virgin’s unpeneetrated and impenetrable body, which contains the spiritual truth of the pure soul. Horner makes a secondary argument in this section based in part on Ælfric’s hermeneutics and his distinction between “lichamlic” (loosely understood as “carnal” or “bodily”) and “gastlic” (“spiritual”) readings: just as the body encloses the soul, the body acts as a “text” that encloses a spiritual truth to be “read” or penetrated by the Christian (male) gaze. The argument convincingly details the distinction between the pagan gaze of the persecutors within the story who cannot see beyond the naked, tortured body of the saints and the Christian audience who perceive the spiritual meaning housed within the body.

If there is any weakness in the book, it occurs in these chapters. The *integritas* of the virgin body is clearly thematically connected to a cultural discourse of female enclosure, and early medieval hermeneutics certainly allows a modern audience to understand the spectacle of a tortured female body for male and female medieval readers of texts that depict violence against women. Yet the connection between the two strains of argument is at times tenuous—not because they are unrelated, but because Horner seems to have developed the arguments separately and then forced them under the thematic tent of the “discourse of enclosure.” She writes in the introduction that her readings of *Juliana* and Ælfric’s women saints shows that the “textualization of the female saint’s body is deeply dependent upon metaphors of containment and release, and on the desirability of *integritas* and the dangers of penetrating the boundaries of female enclosure,” (20) but the argument as developed does not make the connection so neatly.

Despite this mild criticism, I find *The Discourse of Enclosure* to be an interesting and useful addition to the growing body of Anglo-Saxon feminist scholarship and cultural studies. Horner has included a broad range of primary and secondary texts and her discussion skillfully wraps literary and historical evidence in a valuable theoretical framework. Until relatively recently, medieval scholarship on the female body has tended to focus on works of the Middle English period, with particular attention to the context of ecclesiastical reform movements, which reached fruition in the twelfth century and had the practical effect of locking women out of sig-
significant religious and liturgical observances. Scholars of this later period have been at the forefront of developing paradigms for how we think about women in medieval society, and in general readers have ignored evidence that many of these patterns began during the monastic reforms of the Anglo-Saxon era. However, Horner shows that although the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw a proliferation of increasingly restrictive regulations and a concomitant increase in texts concerning such practices as monastic enclosure and anchoritism, literal and figurative models for female enclosure are present in both secular and religious literature of an earlier era, and thus she illustrates a continuity between the literary culture of the early and high Middle Ages in England.

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